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A BSTRA CT

LIMITING EXCHANGE RATE SWINGS UNDER A MANAGED FLOATING
REGIME: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF 24 CURRENCIES

by

Nevin £avu§oglu Yal9 in
University o f New Hampshire, May 2007

The monetary authorities o f many open economies regularly intervene in foreign
exchange markets with the aim o f limiting swings in exchange rates. A survey o f
exchange rate models reveals, however, that the literature lacks a model that provides an
explanation for exchange rate swings and at the same time offers a role for official
intervention and parity announcement to affect exchange rate movements. Furthermore,
empirical studies suggest that official intervention can have a significant effect on
exchange rate movements, but only in the short run (up to 3 months). In this dissertation,
I build on the premium model by Frydman and Goldberg (2007), which is based on
endogenous prospect theory, and construct a model that provides for swings and a role
for intervention. The model implies that intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate
back to some announced or even unannounced parity level at unpredictable moments in
time can lead to more limited swings in exchange rates compared to regimes without such
policy through an uncertainty premium channel. This new channel follows from one o f

xiv
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the key implications o f endogenous prospect theory that market participants require a
premium as compensation for their greater sensitivity to losses before they are willing to
speculate in currency markets. This so-called uncertainty premium depends positively on
the gap between the forecast o f the future exchange rate and its perceived historical
benchmark level. The main contribution o f this research is empirical. I first test for the
positive relationship between the premium and the gap using a contingency table analysis
and regression analysis based on an autoregressive distributive lag model. Then I
investigate whether central banks can take advantage o f this positive relationship between
the gap and the premium in limiting exchange rate swings. My results provide evidence
that the gap and the premium are positively related, and that central bank intervention
supporting some parity level can lead to swings o f smaller magnitude. My empirical
analysis is based on survey data on exchange rate forecasts, exchange rate regime
classifications and data on changes in reserves, and includes 24 currencies from
developed and developing countries.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

OVERVIEW OF STUDY

The modem era o f floating currencies has been characterized by long swings:
exchange rates tend to move persistently away from benchmark levels (such as
purchasing power parity, PPP1) for extended periods o f time, and then tend to exhibit
'y

sustained countermovements towards PPP.
Policy officials have long worried about the long-swings nature o f floating
exchange rates. Long swings are viewed as undesirable because they pose a challenge for
firms that engage in international business. They lead to changes in competitiveness and
terms of trade effects3, which require costly reallocation o f resources. Loss in
competitiveness and negative terms o f trade effects can also lead to declines in income
and increasing unemployment, accompanied by protectionist measures (Williamson,
1985; Dominguez and Frankel, 1993b).4
In attempts to limit such long swings in exchange rates, the monetary authorities
o f many open economies have been regularly intervening in foreign exchange markets for
years by selling or purchasing foreign currency (referred to as official intervention). Such

1 PPP is often used as a benchmark level for the exchange rate in the open-economy macroeconomics
literature. A historical benchmark is a stable and slowly moving rate that exchange rates tend to move away
from and come back to at unpredictable moments. For evidence that PPP acts as such a benchmark, see
Section 3 in Chapter 4.
2 See Figures 1.1 and 1.2 at the end o f Chapter 1.
3 The terms o f trade is defined as the price o f a country’s exports divided by the price o f its imports.
4 These effects can be especially large for small economies. Small open economies are usually
characterized by high export concentration due to the difficulty o f diversifying their export structure, and a
high degree o f openness to satisfy domestic demand. These characteristics lead to higher terms o f trade and
income volatility effects.

1
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official intervention sometimes has also been accompanied by the defense o f some
announced parity level for the exchange rate or bands around a parity level.
In the first two chapters o f my dissertation, I survey the theoretical and empirical
exchange rate literature, respectively, on the effects o f official intervention and parity
announcement on exchange rate swings. The main conclusion o f Chapter 1 is that the
literature lacks a model that provides an explanation for exchange rate swings and at the
same time offers a role for official intervention and parity announcement to affect
exchange rate movements. On the one hand, researchers have constructed models of
exchange rate swings, such as the rational bubble, behavioral and heterodox approaches,
which, on the most part, explain swings as movements away from levels based on
macroeconomic fundamentals and/or as arising from bubbles, irrationality and market
psychology.5 Since exchange rate swings in these models do not depend on fundamentals,
they provide no role for official intervention and parity announcement based on such
fundamentals, to influence exchange rate swings. On the other hand, there are models,
such as the target zone and portfolio balance models, in which central bank policies do
influence exchange rate movements, but according to these, exchange rate swings should
not occur. Consequently, these models provide no insight into the ability o f official
intervention and parity announcement to limit the magnitude o f exchange rate swings.
The major finding o f empirical studies investigating the effectiveness o f central
bank intervention (surveyed in Chapter 2) is that it has a significant but a short-lasting
effect on exchange rates (up to 3 months). Studies have also investigated the effects of
official communication by authorities on their views about the stance o f the exchange

5 Macroeconomic fundamentals include variables such as interest rates, output, prices and the current
account.

2
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rate in relation to macroeconomic fundamentals. Findings indicate almost unanimously
that such exchange rate communications have a significant effect on exchange rate
movements, suggesting that perhaps the announcement o f some parity by central banks
may matter for short-run exchange rate movements.6 However, while these studies
provide valuable evidence on the short-run effectiveness o f exchange rate policy, they
miss a key question: Does intervention supporting a parity level provide a way for
central banks to limit the magnitude of exchange rate swings away from benchmark
levels?
This question is the main focus o f my dissertation. In Chapter 3, I build on the
premium model by Frydman and Goldberg (2007), and show that central bank
intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some announced or even
unannounced parity level at unpredictable moments in time could lead to more limited
swings in exchange rates through the uncertainty premium channel.7 This new channel
follows from one o f the key implications o f endogenous prospect theory, which Frydman
and Goldberg (2007) use to model individual preferences instead o f the usual
assumptions o f risk aversion and expected utility theory.8
Endogenous prospect theory implies that market participants require a premium as
compensation for their greater sensitivity to losses before they are willing to speculate in

6 This argument is also supported by the strong evidence o f exchange rate reaction to news and survey
studies indicating that fundamentals, which authorities use to determine a parity level for the exchange rate,
are important for exchange rates.
7 A channel is the transmission mechanism through which central bank policy affects the exchange rate, or
the link between the variables in the model that transmit changes in central bank policy to exchange rates.
8 Frydman and Goldberg (2007) formulate endogenous prospect theory by building on the prospect theory
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and incorporating limits to speculation. The original version o f prospect
theory implies that speculators would want to hold speculative positions o f unlimited size whenever they
perceive profit opportunities.

3
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currency markets. Frydman and Goldberg model this so-called uncertainty premium as
depending positively on the gap between the forecast o f the future exchange rate and its
perceived historical benchmark level. It is this positive link between the aggregate
uncertainty premium and the gap from historical benchmark that provides this new
channel through which central bank intervention supporting some parity level can
influence the magnitude o f swings in the exchange rate.
How does this work? As the market forecasts say a further movement away from
historical benchmark from above, the market becomes more concerned about the
possibility o f a countermovement back to the benchmark. And the farther away the
exchange rate is from the benchmark, the more concerned they get, asking for a higher
uncertainty premium. This higher uncertainty premium limits their willingness to put
more money at risk, resulting in less speculation in the foreign exchange market, and
thus, less movement in the spot exchange rate.
This suggests that if policy officials can induce individuals to increase the weight
they attach to the benchmark level in forming their forecasts, this would lead to a higher
aggregate uncertainty premium, and thus, smaller swings in the exchange rate. This leads
to a key theoretical result suggesting that official intervention and perhaps the
announcement o f parity can limit the magnitude o f exchange rate swings. In Chapters 5
and 6 o f the dissertation I respectively test for the positive relationship between the
premium and the gap from the historical benchmark, and whether central banks can
utilize this link for limiting exchange rate swings.
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) provide strong empirical support for the positive
relationship between the premium and the gap from PPP using data for three major

4
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currencies. In Chapter 5, I also test for these currencies, but with a different data set for
exchange rate expectations and with a different time frame. Furthermore, I extend the
analysis o f Frydman and Goldberg (2007) to a total o f 24 currencies. Thus, my results
help generalize the empirical findings on the positive relationship between the premium
and the gap from historical benchmark. In addition, my series are based not on individual
currencies but on exchange rate regimes. That is the case because the implication o f the
premium model is that central bank policy might lead market participants to attach a
higher weight to the gap from the historical benchmark, compared to the gap weight
under freely floating regimes. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to estimate one gap
weight for a period that spans two different exchange rate regimes.
In estimating the relationship between the market premium and the gap from
historical benchmark, I follow two different approaches: contingency table analysis
(CTA) and regression analysis based on an autoregressive distributive lag (ADL) model.
CTA is a very simple non-parametric technique that tests the m odel’s prediction by
looking whether the number o f observations for which the gap and the premium move in
the same direction is larger than the number o f observations for which they move in
opposite directions. An ADL model takes the nonstationarity o f the series into account
and allows one to make inference on the significance level o f parameter estimates.
Results from the CTA and ADL analyses provide evidence o f the positive relationship
between the gap and the premium.
In Chapter 6, I investigate whether central banks can take advantage o f this
positive relationship between the gap and the premium in limiting exchange rate swings.
However, I do not investigate this question by developing a measure for the magnitude of

5
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swings and then regressing that on intervention. The reason is that different regimes may
experience different shocks and an effective intervention policy might not appear so if the
currency has been subject to a bigger shock compared to a freely floating regime. To
circumvent this problem, I test if central banks can take advantage o f the positive
relationship uncertainty premium channel in limiting exchange rate swings. I test my
model’s implication that on average the weight the market attaches to the gap from
historical benchmark in assessing potential losses is higher for countries in which the
central bank intervenes to push the exchange rate back to some parity, called managed
regimes, versus a free float.9 A larger weight attached to the gap from PPP would then
imply exchange rate swings o f smaller magnitude fo r the same swing in exchange rate
expectations. My results provide some empirical evidence suggesting that official
intervention supporting a parity level has led to a higher gap weight, and thus, smaller
swings in exchange rates.
Performing the tests related to the uncertainty premium channel in Chapters 5 and
6 requires data on exchange rate forecasts.10 It also requires classifying exchange rate
regimes. I capture exchange rate forecasts by using a novel survey dataset provided by
Forecasts Unlimited, Inc for twenty-four developed and developing countries from
August 1986 through September 2000. Survey data on market participants’ forecasts
concerning the future exchange rates have been used fairly extensively in the literature.
Although there are some bias problems with forecasts from survey data, most researchers
believe that even if there are biases in the forecast data they are not systematic.

9 Managed regimes include intermediate regimes such as conventional fixed pegs, crawling pegs and bands,
and managed floats. For definitions o f these regimes and others, see Table 4.1.
101 discuss the methodology and data in Chapter 4.

6
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There are several issues concerning the survey data. To construct a series for the
market premium I need data on forward exchange rates, and ideally, these forward
exchange rates will be derived from the spot exchange rate that survey participants
considered when forming their forecasts. The survey, however, does not collect such
data. Instead, it reports spot and forward exchange rates 3-7 days later than the date on
which the exchange rate forecasts were formulated. There is this range o f a 3-7 day lag
because survey participants are given a deadline o f two business days to respond to the
survey, and the date on which the forecasts are reported is not being recorded. Since
exchange rates can change drastically from one day to another, such a lag might
significantly bias the results. Therefore, I have collected daily data on forward exchange
rates and have taken the average o f the forward rate for the two days on which, as I am
informed, most o f the surveys are being collected.
Exchange rate regime classification is important because the model predicts that
the market would attach a different weight to the gap from historical benchmark
depending on the regime. One o f the crucial things here is to be able to classify countries
according to the exchange rate regime that they actually adopt. In this dissertation I
consider three studies - Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2002), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) - that have used different methods and have
arrived at different classifications. Besides other issues, one problem that pertains
specifically to the last two classifications is their primary reliance on exchange rate
behavior, and more particularly, its volatility. This raises the concern o f first using
exchange rate volatility to classify exchange rates into different regimes and then using

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

these exchange rate regimes to test for long run misalignments in the exchange rates - the
endogeneity problem.
One way to deal with the problem o f classifying exchange rate regimes is to
utilize data on international reserves as proxy for official intervention and test if the
market attaches a larger weight to the gap in assessing potential losses during regimes
with greater intervention. If that is the case, we would expect to observe smaller
exchange rate swings in these markets.
The use o f official reserves as a proxy for official intervention has been criticized
by some researchers. They have argued that international reserves are not well correlated
with official intervention since they may change due to reasons that are unrelated to
official intervention, such as fluctuations in valuations and accrual o f interest earnings.
Many o f these shortcomings, however, do not pertain to my analysis because I use
international reserves in U.S. dollars and I look for the relative effects o f intervention
across countries. Therefore, fluctuations in valuations, or the accrual o f interest earnings
as well as the use o f other policy tools besides the purchase and sale o f foreign exchange
to affect exchange rate behavior, may not play a crucial role for my results (assuming that
the use o f such policy tools is proportionate across countries). My empirical findings
suggest that more intervention leads to a higher weight attached to the gap from historical
benchmark, and thus, smaller swings in exchange rates.
My overall findings imply that central bank intervention supporting some
announced or even unannounced parity level at unpredictable moments in time could lead
to more limited swings in exchange rates compared to regimes without such policy
through the uncertainty premium channel.

8
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CHAPTER 1

EXCHANGE RATE THEORY
ON THE EFFECTS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTION AND PARITY
ANNOUNCEMENT ON EXCHANGE RATE SWINGS

1 Introduction

The modem era o f floating exchange rates has been characterized by long swings:
exchange rates often move persistently away from historical benchmark levels for long
periods o f time and then tend to exhibit sustained countermovements toward benchmark
levels. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 at the end o f the chapter provide plots o f the German
mark/U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rates along with their
purchasing power parity (PPP) levels for the period from and May 1973 to December
1998 and June 2003, respectively.12 3
As can be seen from these graphs, the two markets exhibit swings o f different
magnitudes and o f different lengths, but they both display long-swings behavior. As
argued by Bergsten and Williamson (1983) and later Williamson (1985, 2002), the

1 PPP is often used as a benchmark level (or a long run anchor) for the exchange rate in open-economy
macroeconomics. For evidence that PPP provides such an anchor see Taylor and Peel (2000), Taylor, Peel
and Samo (2001) and Taylor and Taylor (2004). See also Section 3 in Chapter 4.
2 The PPP exchange rates in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 are calculated by using the Big Mac purchasing power
parity exchange rates reported in The Economist magazine and CPI inflation rate differentials from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
3 The spot exchange rate in Figure 1.1 or 1.2 is usually thought o f as depicting equilibrium in asset markets,
whereas the PPP exchange rate is generally thought to depict equilibrium in goods markets. Given this
interpretation, the long swings in the figures can be viewed as departures from equilibrium in goods
markets.

9
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fundamental problem o f floating exchange rate regimes has been “the propensity of
floating rates to become misaligned [relative to PPP], that is, systematically and
substantially overvalued for prolonged periods.” (Williamson, 2002: 78)
The monetary authorities o f many open economies have been regularly
intervening in foreign exchange markets for years by selling or purchasing foreign
currency. Sometimes this intervention has been accompanied by an announcement o f a
parity level - an exchange rate level such as PPP - that policymakers believe is desirable.
The aim o f such policy has been to limit volatility in the exchange rate and/or to push the
exchange rate back to parity.
A key question for international macroeconomics is whether official intervention
that is perhaps accompanied by a parity announcement during some period o f time would
be effective at reducing the magnitude o f the exchange rate swings that would arise
during that period if such policies were absent. In this chapter, I survey the theoretical
exchange rate literature on this question. Strikingly I find that this literature has little to
say. This literature lacks a model that provides an explanation for swings in the exchange
rate and at the same time offers a role for official intervention and parity announcement
to affect such exchange rate movements. On the one hand, researchers have constructed
models o f exchange rate swings in which there is no role for official intervention and
parity announcement. On the other, there are models in which such policies do influence
exchange rate movements, but according to these, exchange rate swings should not occur.
Models that generate swings in exchange rates include the “rational” bubble
model due to Blanchard and Watson (1982), the behavioral or noise-trader approach
pioneered by Frankel and Froot (1986), and the heterodox approach by Schulmeister
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(1988).

In these models, exchange rate swings, for the most part, are explained as

movements away from levels that are implied by macroeconomic fundamentals, and as
arising because o f bubbles, irrationality, and market psychology.4 But if fundamentals do
not matter for exchange rates, then central bank intervention supporting some parity level
- which impacts the exchange rate through its ability to influence fundamentals - has no
ability to influence exchange rate swings. According to these theories, there is little
policymakers can do to limit the magnitude o f exchange rate swings, except for fixing
their exchange. I discuss these models in Sections 2 and 3.
Target zone and portfolio balance models offer some role for official intervention
and parity announcement to influence exchange rate movements. But, because they rely
on the rational expectations hypothesis (REH) to model expectations, they do not
generate exchange rate swings. Consequently, these models provide no insight into the
ability o f official intervention and parity announcement to limit the magnitude o f
exchange rate swings. The target zone and the portfolio balance models are discussed in
Section 4.
The main conclusion o f this chapter is that there is need for a model that provides
not only an explanation o f exchange rate swings, but also a channel through which
official intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some parity level can
affect exchange rate movements.

4 Macroeconomic fundamentals include variables such as interest rates, output, prices and the current
account.
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2 Exchange Rate Swings as Movements Away from Fundamentals

Two major research areas in the international finance literature led economists to
construct exchange rate models in which exchange rate swings are driven by factors other
than fundamental variables. One is the inability o f conventional flexible-price and stickyprice monetary models to explain swings in exchange rates.5 The other is the main
conclusion o f empirical studies testing these models that macroeconomic fundamentals
do not appear to have significant effects on exchange rates over the short and medium
runs.6
Flexible-price monetary models assume that relative (domestic minus foreign)
prices adjust to their equilibrium level instantaneously.7 In these models, long swings in
exchange rates arise due to “real disturbances to supplies o f goods or demands for goods
[which] cause changes in relative prices, including the “real exchange rate.” (Stockman,
1987: 12). To generate exchange rate swings, these models require frequent and persistent
changes in tastes and technology, which are not plausible. As argued by Dombusch,
“ [t]he events were too large and the reversal too sharp and complete to allude to mystical
shifts in tastes and technology.” (Dombusch, 1989: 415)

5 Conventional refers to models that incorporate a set o f a priory assumptions on how ‘rational’ individuals
make decisions.
6 Short run refers to the time frame for which goods prices are fixed. Medium run refers to the time period
within which prices have fully adjusted to their new equlibrium levels. Medium run is different from the
long run in the sense that it does not imply that variables adjust to their steady state values. The reason is
that the notion o f a steady state implies a stable long run relationship between variables, which might not
exist. See Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
7 The seminal articles in this literature are Stockman (1980) and Lucas (1982). See also Helpman (1981)
and Svensson (1985). These models can be seen as generalizations o f the flexible-price monetary models o f
Frenkel (1976) and Bilson (1978).
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To explain deviations o f exchange rates from their PPP levels, Dombusch (1976)
and Frankel (1979) pioneered the so-called sticky-price monetary model, where goods
prices and/or wages adjust to their long-run equilibrium levels sluggishly. In the
Dombusch-Frankel sticky-price monetary model, nominal and real exchange rates can
overshoot their long-run equilibrium levels in the short run due to unanticipated one-time
changes in money supply or money growth rates.8 This model therefore is often referred
to as the overshooting model.
In the Dombusch-Frankel overshooting model, unanticipated changes in policy
variables, such as the money supply, generate temporary deviations o f exchange rates
from their PPP levels. However, this model is difficult to reconcile with long-swings,
since the assumption o f REH implies that whenever the exchange rate deviates from PPP,
it will move persistently back over time at a constant rate. In this model, persistent
movements away from PPP can arise if there is a sequence o f unanticipated monetary
shocks in the same direction. However, such an explanation is not plausible because it
assumes that market participants can be caught by surprise over and over again.
Therefore, although the overshooting model offers an explanation for temporary
deviations o f exchange rates from PPP, it does not explain persistent swings.
Despite the apparent inability o f these models to explain swings in exchange rates,
however, many studies have confronted these models with data to test the role of
fundamental variables for the exchange rate over the short- and medium runs. The main
conclusion o f such empirical studies has been that macroeconomic fundamentals do not

8 In the Dombusch (1976) model, short-run deviations in exchange rates from their long ran equilibrium
values occur due to unanticipated one-time changes in money supply. Frankel (1979) extends the model to
show that such deviations could also occur due to unanticipated changes in money growth rates.
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appear to have significant effects on exchange rates.9 This failure o f conventional
exchange rate models to explain exchange rate movements in the short run and the
medium run, known as the exchange rate disconnect puzzle has led to the conclusion that
“exchange rates are moved largely by factors other than the obvious, observable,
macroeconomic fundamentals.” (Dombusch and Frankel, 1995: 10-11)

2.1 Bubbles. Irrationality and Market Psychology

Confronted with the failure o f empirical studies to find significant effects of
fundamentals in the short and medium runs and the difficulty o f REH models to explain
long swings, economists have constructed models in which swings in exchange rates
arise because market participants increasingly ignore fundamentals in forming their
forecasts o f future exchange rate movements.
Among the popular mainstream explanations o f long swings in exchange rates are
the rational bubble model due to Blanchard and Watson (1982) and the noise-trader
approach pioneered by Frankel and Froot (1986). These models have a common approach
- they explain exchange rate swings as arising from factors other than fundamentals bubbles, irrationality or market psychology. As such, they do not provide any role for
policy involving official intervention supporting some parity level that is based on
fundamentals to limit swings in exchange rates.

9 See Frankel (1984), Dombusch (1980), Backus (1984), Meese (1986), Meese and R ogoff (1983, 1988),
and Meese and Rose (1991). Perhaps the most widely cited study illustrating the empirical failure o f
conventional exchange rate models, Meese and Rogoff (1983), concludes that macroeconomic
fundamentals provide no more help in understanding exchange rate movements than flipping a coin.
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2.1.1

The Rational Bubble Approach to Long Swings.10 One popular explanation

o f long swings has been provided by models in which expectations are modeled using
REH and that build on the unstable bubble solutions implied by the Dombusch-Frankel
overshooting model - the rational bubble approach.11 In these models, exchange rate
bubbles arise because market participants ignore macroeconomic fundamentals in driving
exchange rates away from benchmark values: “a speculative bubble can be defined as an
increase in the price resulting from an increase in demand that is not related to
fundamentals or to expectations o f fundamentals but that is rather a self-fulfilling
response to expectations that the price will go up.” (Dominguez and Frankel, 1993b: 41)
These bubbles appeal to an old idea that swings occur because market participants
attempt to forecast “what average opinion expects average opinion to be.” (Keynes, 1936:
156) In contrast to contemporary models, however, Keynes attributed the problem o f
guessing the average opinion to imperfect knowledge. In the foreign exchange market,
REH bubbles constitute one o f the leading explanations for long swings.12
The following model will help illustrate the bubble explanation o f exchange rate
swings:

(!)
(2)
s, - p r, t = ui - Ut =u t_x+et

(3)

10 For surveys o f the rational bubble approach see Adam and Szafarz (1992), and Samo and Taylor (2002).
11 The flexible-price monetary model also generates bubble trajectories that involve a steadily rising or
falling nominal exchange rate. However, since PPP holds at all times along each o f these trajectories, these
bubbles do not provide an explanation o f persistent deviations from PPP.
12 See, for example, Frankel (1985), Krugman (1986), Evans (1986) and Meese (1986).
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where mr, , p r t, y r, and ir l denote the time t log levels o f the relative (i.e. domestic
minus foreign) money supplies, price levels, income levels and short run nominal interest
rates respectively; st stands for the log level o f the exchange rate defined as the amount
o f domestic currency necessary to buy a unit o f foreign currency; E (s/|(+11xt ) is the
expected exchange rate at time t for time t+1, given the information set at time t, x ,; s t
is a white noise process; and (j>and X are constant parameters.
Equation (1) is uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), which is the equilibrium
condition for the foreign exchange market under the assumptions o f perfectly
substitutable domestic and foreign assets, perfect capital mobility and homogeneous
expectations. UIP states that equilibrium in the foreign exchange market occurs when on
average the expected return on domestic and foreign assets are equal. Equation (2) is the
relative equilibrium condition for the domestic and foreign money markets, where mt
and y t are assumed to be exogenous to the model. It states that equilibrium in the money
market occurs when the real money supply is equal to real money demand. Equation (3)
assumes that deviations from PPP follow a random walk, following Meese (1986).
Substituting for p r t from equation (2), and for ir t from equation (1) into equation
(3), and rearranging we get:

s , = { l ~ P ) ( m r,, ~ f o r ,

)+P

E

(V i I )'+ 0 ~ P

) u<

where B = ^
l +A
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Taking the first difference to address the nonstationary nature o f exchange rates
and solving forward, one obtains the no-bubble (or market fundamental) solution to (4):13
14

1=0

u

„ , u , ) + £.

f t = m r i -(j)yrt

where

(s >

(6)

a n d e , =(1
0

However, (5) is only one solution to (4) from an infinite number o f solutions of
the general fo rm :15
st =s]+b,

(7)

where the exchange rate is assumed to depend on fundamental variables as captured by
s*, and a rational speculative bubble, b,, that satisfies:

b,=/SE(b,„)

(8)

where (5 < 1.
Before discussing the implications o f such a rational speculative bubble for
exchange rate swings, let is first see how (7) represents a solution to (4). Let us write (7)
for time t +1 and take the expected value to obtain:16

13 This solution is obtained by assuming that the tranversality condition holds: lim (3'E (,sj|j+l

| xt) = 0 .

14 The sample mean and variance o f nonstationary series are not constant over time, and successive
observations are highly interdependent, posing problems for statistical inference.
15 Then the transversality condition is violated.
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E

(V i Ix i )

= E

(V i

\ X' ) + E

(K i )

00

(9)

00

= Z / ^ U - .

u

m

(=0

i

-/

o z
/=0

/ ^ . + «(»,.,)

Multiplying both sides by ft and using (8) gives:

/»£(**.. k ) = E r ' E ( f „ . M ix,)+(i - p ) ±
/=o

i=o

+b,

(10)

or using (7):

s, = (1- P )(wr, - </>yr,>) + P E(V i IX<) + (X~ P ) U,

(11)

Equation (11) is identical to the original equation in (4), therefore, (7) represents a
feasible solution to (4).
A rational bubble captures the market psychology o f an ever-rising exchange rate.
This can be seen by considering the following deterministic rational bubble at time t + k :

E { K k \ x,) = YP~kb,

(12)

where 0 < /? < 1 and y is an arbitrary number.
In the rational bubble approach, swings in exchange rates arise if, when forming
their forecasts at time t , market participants believe that a bubble has begun, i.e. the
exchange rate has started moving away from its fundamental value, and collectively set
the bubble term, bt , to equal some non-zero value. This bubble term is usually interpreted
as “market sentiment,” and is thought to capture the collective "belief' o f market

16 The second part o f the equation is obtained by substituting in for E (s*(+1 | x ) from equation (5).
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participants who forecast “what average opinion expects average opinion to be.”
(Keynes, 1936: 156) Once a bubble is formed, since /? < 1, this deterministic bubble
grows exponentially.
Because such an ever-increasing bubble is implausible, however, researchers
consider stochastic rational bubbles, where the bubble continues to grow with some
probability n , and it bursts with probability 1- n . Such a bubble is represented by

(/?7r) 1bt + jut+l

with probability n

M,+1

with probability 1—n

, where E (fit+x \ bt) = 0 .

With the stochastic rule, once a bubble is formed, it grows at a rate o f {fin) ' with
probability n .
To sum up, in the rational bubble approach to exchange rate swings, swings are
not connected to fundamental variables. Rather, they arise as a result o f perfectly
coordinated self-fulfilling expectations. Therefore, in this approach, it is hard to see how
official intervention and parity announcement based on macroeconomic fundamentals
would affect exchange rates and exchange rate swings.
2.1.2 Behavioral Approach to Long Swings. Another popular explanation in
which movements away from PPP are also unrelated to macroeconomic fundamentals,
but which does not rely on REH, is offered by behavioral economists - the noise trader
approach. This approach was pioneered by Frankel and Froot (1986).

17 18

•

•

It is in essence

17 For a detailed analysis o f the Frankel and Froot (1986) model and subsequent research see Samo and
Taylor (2002).
18 Other studies that build on Frankel and Froot (1986) to explain long swings include Goodhart (1988),
Brock and Hommes (1999) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2005a, b; 2006). The studies by Brock and
Hommes (1999) and DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2005a, b; 2006) assume that individuals use some ‘fitness
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a speculative bubble approach that is not constrained by rational expectations in the sense
o f knowing the true model governing exchange rate movements.
Most behavioral models involve two different groups o f traders, one o f which
consists o f fully informed market participants who base their forecasts on some economic
model (‘rational’ fundamentalists), and another group o f participants who trade on some
chartist rule that looks at past prices (‘irrational’ noise traders, or chartists).
Fundamentalists are considered rational because they base their expectations o f the future
exchange rate on the fundamental value o f the exchange rate. Chartists, on the other
hand, base their expectations on noisy information and are therefore considered to be
irrational.
In these models, persistent movements o f the exchange rate away from PPP occur
because the weight the market attaches to the chartist rule increases gradually, i.e. the
models base exchange rate swings on irrationality on the part o f market participants.
The exchange rate model that Frankel and Froot (1986) use is given by:
st = c ^ + z ,

(13)

where st is the log o f the spot exchange rate at time t, As“ , is the expected rate o f
depreciation by the market from time t to t + 1, and z, represents other contemporaneous
factors time t affecting the exchange rate at (such as macroeconomic fundamentals). In
this model the exchange rate is driven by the speculative decision o f portfolio managers
who use a weighted average o f the expectations o f chartists and fundamentalists:19

measure’ (such as realized profits) to check the profitability o f a specific forecasting strategy ex post, and
that they switch to the more profitable strategies.
19 Portfolio managers are assumed to possess homogeneous expectations.
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As,", = ffl,As/+1 + (1 - o)t ) As,c+1

(14)

where Asf+l and As')+1 stand for the rate o f change in the exchange rate from time t to
t +1 expected by fundamentalists and chartists, respectively, and cot and 1-cot represent
the weight that portfolio managers attach to the fundamentalists and chartists views,
respectively.

90

In this model then, the ‘bubble’ path o f the exchange rate is driven by the
expected depreciation o f portfolio managers. The portfolio managers’ problem consists of
choosing the weight that they want to attach to the fundamentalist and chartist views at
each point in time. The weight that portfolio managers attach to the fundamentalist view
is assumed to evolve over time according to:
Aty, = S

91

cotA )

(15)

where <y,_, is the weight on the fundamentalist view, computed ex-post, that would have
accurately predicted the contemporaneous change in the exchange rate from t to t +1:
As, =G)l_xe(s™P - s t_x)

(16)

where s ppp is the long run equilibrium, PPP, exchange rate.
Rewriting equation (16) in terms o f cb, and substituting in equation (15) gives

Acot = S

20 For the fundamentalist view, Frankel and Froot assume a sticky price model, and for the chartist view
they assume a random walk.
21 In an appendix, Frankel and Froot (1986) allow for the weight to change according to a Bayesian rule.
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where the coefficient 0 < 8 < 1 reflects the weight that portfolio managers attach to prior
information. When portfolio managers attach more weight to p rior information, 8 tends
to be small.22
To see how exchange rate movements determine the weight attached to the
fundamental solution, and how the weight in turn affects exchange rate movements, we
need to solve for these variables simultaneously. So, taking the first difference o f (13)
and substituting (14) for As” , by assuming, for simplicity, that the chartists believe that
the exchange rate follows a random walk, in which case As)+I .= 0 , we obtain

cQ

U pp - s \ l <
om
V ' 1+ c6mt "

(18)

Then solving equations (17) in terms o f Acot+l and (18) simultaneously gives

f+1

*<&»,
(s^ -s,)
\ + C0G)t - 8 c Kl
''

(19)

and
8 (0 , (1 + cdo).)

a ®.+i= - t\ +t cOcol
s —-

ir

8c

(20)

We can now use equations (19) and (20) to see how swings arise in this model.
Note first that when portfolio managers attach a substantial weight to prior information,
so that 8 is small, the denominator in equations (19) and (20) takes on a positive value.

22 This is seen more clearly when equation (15) is rewritten as cot = S 3:l + ( l - < ? ) © , . When portfolio
managers attach no weight to prior information, 8 = 1 so that eoi = cot A; when they attach substantial
weight to prior information, 8 is small.
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In this case, what these equations imply is that if there is a shock that causes the exchange
rate to move away from its long run benchmark level, then portfolio managers will
decrease the weight on the fundamentalist view, ty,+1, and increase the weight that they
attach to the chartist view. As the weight on the chartist view increases, this causes a
further movement away from PPP along a bubble path.
To see why portfolio managers increase the weight they attach to the chartist
view, suppose that we start at long run equilibrium where s, = s ppp and cot = 1. Now
suppose that there is an unanticipated appreciation o f the domestic currency, causing a
fall in the exchange rate. The fundamentalist view will then predict a future depreciation
o f the domestic currency.

However, if portfolio managers attach substantial weight to

prior information, i.e. 8 is small, they lower the weight attached on the fundamentalist
view and start switching to the chartist view.24 This switch causes a further fall in the
exchange rate, leading again to a higher weight on the chartist view.25 So in the Frankel
and Froot (1986) model, when portfolio managers attach substantial weight to prior
information, any shock to the exchange rate tends to move it away from its long run
value.26
The noise-trader approach by construction allows for fundamental variables to
affect the exchange rate, but it explains swings in exchange rates as movements away

23 Equation (16) implies that following a deviation from PPP, the exchange rate will tend to move back to
PPP.
24 Portfolio managers switch to the chartist view because as captured by equation (20), any change in the
exchange rate leads to a lower weight on the fundamental view.
25 According to equation (19) a lower weight on the fundamentalist view leads to a further fall in the
exchange rate.
26 Frydman and Goldberg (2007) have criticized the model because it does not allow for change in
forecasting rules.
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from these fundamentals and as arising from irrationality. Thus, similarly to the bubble
approach, it does not provide a role for policy intervention based on fundamentals.27
To sum up, this section discussed approaches to explaining exchange rate swings
that are based on factors other than macroeconomic fundamentals, namely bubbles,
irrationality and market psychology. However, if it is in fact the case that exchange rate
swings are driven by factors other than fundamentals, then it is unclear how a official
intervention and parity announcement by the Central Bank based on such fundamentals
will have any effect on swings. Thus, although these models provide some explanations
for exchange rate swings, they do not provide a role for policy intervention to affect
swings in exchange rates.

3 Heterodox Approaches to Explaining Long Swings in Exchange Rates

Besides the two popular mainstream explanations o f exchange rate swings,
namely the REH bubble approach and the noise-trader approach, few hon-mainstream
economists have tried to model exchange rate swings. As with mainstream models, the
Post Keynesian approach to exchange rate determination is also based on the insight that
expectations drive exchange rate movements. And similarly to the behavioral approach to
exchange rates, the few Post Keynesian studies have tried to model expectations without
REH. As noted by Harvey (1999: 304), however, “even though all the non-mainstream
approaches have emphasized the role o f market participants’ expectations, none has
offered more than an ad hoc theory o f them.”

27 Chapter 2, Section 3 discusses a noise-trader model by Kubelec (2004a,b) that provides a rationale for
official intervention to limit exchange rate swings based on a fitness measure.
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The most prominent o f the studies in this field are Schulmeister (1988) and
Harvey (1991, 1993).

Schulmeister (1988) distinguishes between short run and medium

run dynamics in exchange rates. Short run exchange rate dynamics are based on the use
o f technical trading rules, while long swings in exchange rates arise due to expectational
bias that is either in favor or against a particular currency:
“exchange rate dynamics in the medium run [read long swings in exchange
rates] can be viewed as a sequence of bubble-like trends, based on an upward or
downward expectational bias and non-directional movements based on an
ambiguity in the formation of expectations (i.e. conflicting signals emanating
from the goods and asset markets and thus the prevailing of a “precarious
equilibrium”).”
Schulmeister (1988: 362)

Such expectational bias arises when both the goods and assets markets provide the
same signal to the market in terms o f an expected appreciation or depreciation o f a
particular currency, say the U.S. dollar. For example, a large U.S. current account surplus
combined with a higher U.S. interest rate in relation to the euro interest rate would cause
the market to expect an appreciation in the dollar, forming an expectational bias in favor
o f the dollar. This positive expectational bias then leads market participants to hold long
positions in the dollar for a longer time compared to the short dollar positions. This
behavior leads to longer lasting upward runs compared to downward runs thus leading to
the stepwise appreciation o f the dollar.29 Then the feedback between the profitability o f
currency speculation and the effects o f this profitability on the exchange rate makes the

28 In a way similar to the work o f Schulmeister (1988), but more incomplete, Davidson (1982) emphasizes
the role o f changing expectations under uncertainty on the volatility o f the exchange rate. Krause (1991)
develops a simple model o f exchange rates in which he constructs an explanation o f speculative bubbles
based on the speculators’ success in predicting the behavior o f other speculators. Harvey (1991) builds on
the insights provided by Schulmeister (1988).
29 A run is defined as monotonic or “almost” monotonic movements (Schulmeister, 1988: 344).
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appreciation process

self-sustainable for some period o f time.

Eventually this

appreciation o f the dollar ends due to a deterioration in the current account, or a falling
domestic interest rate, and the market observes a countermovement. Thus, while in the
short run the exchange rate is characterized by “a sequence o f upward and downward
price runs”, in the long run, “the exchange rate fluctuates around the purchasing power
parity as its “center o f gravity.” (Schulmeister, 1988: 343 and 363)
Schulmeister explains the development o f a single run, which pertains to the short
run dynamics o f the exchange rate, as a result o f the interaction between two effects: the
bandwagon effect and the cash-in effect. The bandwagon effect is generated when, in
response to particular economic or political news, more and more traders act on the signal
generated by technical trading rules to either buy or sell the foreign currency. The longer
the run lasts, the larger becomes the temptation to abandon the bandwagon by cashing in
the profits. The bandwagon effect becomes smaller, and market participants become
more sensitive towards any piece o f news that could be interpreted by other market
participants as a signal o f a “tilt” in the run. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the
increasing sensitivity o f traders with the length o f the run in Schulmester’s model is
similar to the intuition behind the premium model that I use in this dissertation.
Schulmeister (1988) provides an explanation o f long swings in exchange rates,
which, unlike the REH bubble and behavioral models, does not build on irrationality or
market psychology. Because exchange rate swigs arise due to macroeconomic
fundamentals, central bank intervention could influence exchange rates through its effect
on the interest rate differential. However, Schulmeister (1988) does not provide a formal
model.
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4 Policy Implications for Limiting Swings by Models with No Swings

In a different array o f research, economists have concentrated on the policy
question o f what officials can do to limit exchange rate misaligments. The portfolio
balance model and the target zone model are the main ones. Target zone models provide
some role for central bank intervention and parity announcement, but because they rely
on flexible prices, or sticky prices and REH, they do not generate swings. Moreover, the
target zone models have demonstrated very poor empirical performance.
Portfolio balance models also provide a channel for central bank intervention.
However, because they rely on REH, they also do not generate swings. Moreover, they
do not have a role for parity announcement. Portfolio balance models have also been
strongly refuted empirically.

4.1 Target Zone Models30

The target zone model was pioneered by Krugman (1991). In this model, there is
a fixed band around the exchange, which monetary authorities are obligated to defend by
intervening in the foreign exchange market. Besides flexible prices (implying that the
exchange rate is equal to its PPP level at all times), the two other major assumptions o f
the model are perfect credibility (in the sense that individuals believe that the exchange
rate will remain within the fixed band and that the band will not change) and marginal
intervention (meaning that the central bank intervenes only when the rate hits one o f the
band margins).

30 The term “target zone” was first introduced by Williamson (1985) as a wide target zone for real exchange
rates as a method o f international cooperation on economic policy, without an explicit target zone model.
The Krugman target zone model is different, since it has narrow bands around the nominal exchange rate.
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In the target zone model, the exchange rate, s , defined as the domestic price of
the foreign currency, is assumed to depend on the expected rate o f depreciation o f the
E(ds)
domestic currency, — - , and a fundamental variable that consists o f two components:
dt
the exogenous velocity component, v , and the endogenous money supply component,
m:
E(ds)
s = m + v + y — -— dt
The velocity is assumed to be a Brownian motion without a drift:

(21)
oi

dv = a d z

(22 )

where a is a constant and dz is the increment o f a Wiener process.
W ith this assumption, a freely floating exchange rate would behave like a random
walk. The central bank can control the money supply, and thus the exchange rate.
Figure 1.3 illustrates the relation between the exchange rate and the fundamental
under both a free float and a target zone. The dashed FF is a 45-degree line for the free
float, which is obtained by assuming that the exchange rate always is determined by the
E(ds)
fundamental variables alone, m + v , and —-— - = 0 . The target zone relation is given by
dt
the S-shaped solid curve TT where smax and smm capture the band.
The two main features o f the Krugman model are depicted by the TT function: the
“honeymoon effect” and the “smooth-pasting conditions”. The honeymoon effect is
related to the slope o f the S-shaped curve being less than one at all times. When the

31 Brownian motion is the continuous time version o f
Wiener process.

a random walk, sometimes also referred to as a
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exchange rate is closer to the upper band, the probability that the central bank will
intervene to reduce the money supply to strengthen the currency is higher. Since the
market expects the intervention, it will take the expected currency appreciation into
account, and thus the increase in the exchange rate will be less than the change predicted
by fundamentals alone. Put differently, for a given level o f the fundamentals, the target
zone exchange rate is less than the free-float exchange rate, implying a coordinating role
for the band stabilizing market expectations. The same logic applies to the lower band.
The smooth-pasting characteristic is related to the slope o f the S-shaped curve
flattening to zero at the edges o f the band. This property o f the S-shaped curve eliminates
one-way sure bets from the model. If the exchange rate were to simply bump into the
edge o f the upper band, for example, traders would be given a riskless profit opportunity.
They could just sell the foreign currency right before the intervention and purchase it
back right after intervention.
The basic target zone model by Krugman (1991) provides a role for official
intervention and parity announcement to limit movements in exchange rates, however,
since its assumption o f flexible prices implies that the exchange rate should be equal to
PPP value at every point in time, it does not generate swings in exchange rates.
Some economists have extended the basic target zone framework due to its poor
empirical performance in terms o f its predictions about the behavior o f exchange rates
under target zones and its assumptions o f perfect credibility and marginal intervention.
Some have included intra-marginal interventions and imperfect credibility, but since
these have kept the assumption o f flexible prices, they do not generate swings in

32 For detailed discussions o f these models see Svensson (1992), Krugman and Miller (1992) and Samo and
Taylor (2002).
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exchange rates.

-3-3

The target zone models with sticky prices assume REH, in which case

the exchange rate can experience one-time deviations from its PPP level, but then it
should always move back to it. Therefore, as with the basic model, the modified target
zone models do not generate swings in exchange rates.
Krugman and Miller (1993) provide an extension to the basic target zone model by
incorporating market irrationalities captured by stop-loss trading. Stop-loss traders are
risk averse investors that try to limit their potential losses from movements in exchange
rates by specifying a particular level for the domestic price o f foreign exchange at which
they buy or sell domestic assets. There is a group o f domestic investors that would sell
their foreign asset holdings and purchase domestic assets if the domestic price o f foreign
exchange falls below some value sbuy. Similarly, there is group o f foreign investors that
sell all their domestic asset holdings and purchase foreign assets if the price rises above
some value ssell.
Krugman and Miller show that if the exchange rate is not allowed to vary enough to
trigger loss-stoppers, as with a target zone, then speculation becomes stabilizing and the
exchange rates exhibits the behavior shown in Figure 1.3. If the exchange rate is allowed
to move beyond some threshold level that triggers stop-loss trading, then the domestic
currency can exhibit what the authors call ‘crashes’ - “a cascading wave o f sale that
drives the value o f the domestic currency abruptly down.” (Krugman and Miller, 1993:
294)

33 The target zone model with intra-marginal intervention implies a TT function has a less pronounced Sshape and is flatter compared to the basic model. It also implies a role for managed floating regimes, in
which case the exchange rate changes along an MM line that is flatter than the FF line in Figure 1.3.
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Thus, when the exchange rate moves beyond some threshold level, stop-loss traders
quickly bid the exchange rate up or down. However, such sharp movements in exchange
rates can be hard to reconcile with persistent movements away from fundamental levels
that sometimes last for several years. To generate such persistent movements in exchange
rates away from parity, in this model the stop-loss exits from the domestic currency
would need to occur in the same direction for extended periods o f time such as 3-4 years,
which is implausible. Moreover, it is not clear in the model how policy authorities can
affect the exchange rate once it moves beyond the bands and the cascading wave begins.
To sum up, target zone models provide a role for central bank intervention and
parity announcement to affect exchange rate movements, however these models do not
generate swings in exchange rates. As such, they do not constitute models that provide a
role for central bank policy to affect exchange rate swings.

4.2 Portfolio Balance Models

In this class o f models, the level o f the exchange rate is determined by the relative
supply o f and demand for financial assets.34 Individuals maximize their expected return
by diversifying their portfolio between domestic and foreign assets. One major
assumption o f these models is that individuals are risk averse, which implies that
domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. Individuals expect to be
compensated for the risk o f holding a relatively larger supply o f domestic or foreign
assets with a relatively higher expected rate o f return o f the respective asset.

34 The portfolio balance model is originally due to Kouri (1976) and Branson (1977).
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The model can be presented by the following wealth identity and asset demand
functions from the perspective o f the domestic economy:
Wt = M t + B ? + s r f

(23)

M , = M , ( i „ i ; + A s ; t „)W,

(24)

B“

(25)

s t f =Bl: (i„i;+As;„,)W,

(26)

where Wt is the net private financial wealth in the domestic economy at time t , M t is the
time-r domestic money supply, B? is the value o f domestic bonds held by domestic
residents at tim e t, B,' is the value o f foreign bonds denominated in foreign currency
held by domestic residents at time t, st is the level o f the exchange rate at time t,
defined as before to be the domestic currency units it takes to buy one unit o f a foreign
currency, As te{t+x is the expected rate o f depreciation o f the domestic currency from time t
se - s
to time t + 1, given by A s t+l = — — L, and it and i* is the time-1 domestic and foreign
s,
interest rate, respectively. Thus, /, is the rate o f return on the domestic currency, whereas
i* + As(|(+1 is the expected rate o f return on the foreign currency expressed in domestic
currency units. Similar set o f equations hold for the foreign economy.
The assumption o f imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign assets
implies the existence o f a risk premium, p t , defined as the expected excess return on
domestic assets over foreign assets:
P ,= h -h -^ m i

(2?)
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In the basic portfolio balance model, the risk premium is a positive function o f the
stock o f domestic asset supplies and a negative function o f the stock o f foreign asset
supplies, which are denoted by, B and B *, respectively:35
p t = g t (Bl,B; )

(28)

which, assuming a linear relationship and using (27) with REH, becomes:
it - f t - t e l+x=9xBt +e 2B:
where

(29)

> 0 and 02 < 0 .
In the portfolio balance model the exchange rate is determined by the relative

supply o f domestic and foreign assets. Thus, in this model official intervention can
influence the exchange rate by changing the relative supply o f these assets, called the
portfolio balance channel o f official intervention. When intervention changes the relative
supply o f domestic and foreign assets, the exchange rate must change because risk-averse
individuals have to be compensated with a higher expected rate o f return on foreign (or
domestic) denominated assets to continue holding the relatively larger stock o f these
assets. Assume, for example, that the central bank engages in foreign exchange
intervention by selling domestic bonds and purchasing foreign bonds.36 Now, if
individuals are indifferent in holding domestic versus foreign bonds (i.e., the two assets
are perfect substitutes), then they would simply be willing to hold the larger amount of

35 In the mean-variance optimization framework o f the portfolio balance model, the risk premium is a
function o f the mean and variance o f domestic and foreign assets. The logic o f the effect o f official
intervention on the exchange rate, however, does not change. This version o f the model is discussed in
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.4, in the context o f testing the effects o f intervention on the exchange rate.
36 This is an example o f sterilized intervention, where following the intervention, the domestic money
supply remains unchanged. For a more detailed discussion on sterilized intervention, see Chapter 2.
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domestic bonds at the same expected rate o f return. If, however, individuals are risk
averse, which means that they now view domestic bonds as being riskier than foreign
bonds due to their larger supply, then they will be willing to hold the larger stock of
domestic bonds only if they are compensated for the higher risk by a higher expected rate
of return compared to foreign bonds, which would necessitate a rise in the current
exchange rate.37
To conclude, portfolio balance models provide a role for official intervention to
affect the exchange rate, however, because they rely on REH to model expectations, they
do not generate swings. By construction, these models do not provide any role for parity
announcement to limit swings in exchange rates. Furthermore, as will be discussed in the
next chapter, empirical tests o f these models have produced very poor results. It appears
that the assumption o f REH is one factor that contributes to the poor empirical
performance o f these models.

•50

5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a survey o f the theoretical exchange rate literature on
exchange rate swings and the theoretical literature on the effects o f official intervention
and parity announcement. The major conclusion o f the chapter is that there is no overlap

37 From domestic investor’s point o f view, a higher current exchange rate implies a lower expected
depreciation o f the domestic currency against the foreign currency. This leads to a lower expected rate o f
return on the foreign currency, making domestic assets more attractive. From a foreign investor’s point o f
view, a higher current exchange rate implies a higher expected rate o f return on the domestic currency since
a higher current exchange rate implies a higher expected future depreciation o f the foreign currency against
the domestic currency. Again, this makes domestics assets more attractive.
38 Another factor is their specification o f preferences that are based on the empirically-not-supported
assumptions o f risk aversion and expected utility theory. For a discussion o f these issues refer to Frydman
and Goldberg (2007).
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between the two research areas - there is no exchange rate model that provides an
explanation o f swings and also a role for official intervention and parity announcement to
affect exchange rate movements.
The first part discussed the REH bubble, behavioral and post-Keynesian
approaches that, for the most part, explain exchange rate swings as movements away
from levels based on macroeconomic fundamentals and/or arising from bubbles,
irrationality and market psychology. The main argument that arises from the discussion
o f these models is that since macroeconomic fundamentals are not part o f the
explanations for exchange rate swings, these models do not provide a role for central
bank intervention and parity announcement based on such fundamentals to affect swings
in exchange rates.
The second part o f the chapter discussed a different array o f research in which
economists have put aside the question o f what drives swings in exchange rates and have
concentrated on the policy question o f what officials can do to limit these swings. The
main point o f the discussion o f the two main models in the literature - the target zone and
the portfolio balance models - is that although they offer some role for official
intervention and parity announcement to influence exchange rate movements, because
they rely on REH, they do no generate swings. Consequently, these models provide no
insight into the ability o f official intervention and parity announcement to limit the
magnitude o f exchange rate swings.
The main conclusion o f this chapter is that there is need for a model that not only
provides an explanation for exchange rate swings but also offers a role for official
intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some parity level.
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Figure 1.1: Spot German Mark/U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate and its PPP Level

Figure 1.2: Spot Japanese Yen/U.S. Dollar Exchange Rate and its PPP Level
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Figure 1.3: The Basic Target Zone Model
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CHAPTER 2

RECONSIDERING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF THE
INEFFECTIVENESS OF OFFICIAL INTERVENTION

1 Introduction

The monetary authorities o f many open economies have been regularly
intervening in foreign exchange markets for years with the aim o f limiting volatility in
the exchange rate and/or pushing the exchange rate back to some desired level.
Whether official intervention has produced the intended results has been a popular
research topic. Numerous studies have tested whether intervention succeeds in turning
around the exchange rate in the few days, weeks or months following interventions. The
major finding o f studies investigating the effectiveness o f official intervention is that such
action has a significant but short-lasting effect on the exchange rate (up to 3 months).
These studies are reviewed in Section 2.
In

many

countries

official

intervention

has been

accompanied

by the

announcement o f some parity level by the central bank.1 Such announcement o f parity
presumes that macroeconomic fundamentals matter for exchange rate movements. While
studies estimating the conventional exchange rate models find that fundamentals do not
matter for exchange rates, other studies provide strong evidence that they do. Among
these are studies that test for the importance o f news releases regarding macroeconomic

1 And the defense o f this parity or bands around the parity.
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fundamentals on exchange rates, which find strong evidence o f exchange rate reaction to
news. The importance o f fundamentals for exchange rates is also supported by survey
studies. These findings provide evidence that macroeconomic fundamentals are important
for exchange rate movements, suggesting that, because exchange rate parities used by the
authorities are based on fundamentals, perhaps the announcement o f some parity by
central banks may matter for short-run exchange rate movements. Furthermore, there are
studies that have investigated the effects o f official communication by authorities on their
views about the stance o f the exchange rate in relation to macroeconomic fundamentals.
Findings indicate almost unanimously that such exchange rate communications have a
significant effect on exchange rate movements. These findings imply that market
participants care about central bank announcements and policy makers’ views as to
whether exchange rates are over- or undervalued in relation to the parity level they
consider relevant. This suggests that market participants would also care about central
bank announcements o f a parity level.
The major conclusion from the survey o f the empirical studies testing the
effectiveness o f official intervention and official communication is that such policy has a
significant but short lasting effect on exchange rates. Studies have reached this
conclusion by testing whether central bank intervention is effective in turning around the
exchange rate. The finding that such central bank policy can move the exchange rate in
the desired direction is important for my analysis. It implies that the central bank can
inflict pain on traders who bet on the continuation o f the exchange rate movement in the
direction opposite to the one desired by policy officials. Since most central banks
intervene in the foreign exchange market with the aim o f pushing the exchange rate back
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to some parity level, official intervention that is successful in turning around the
exchange rate will inflict pain on traders who bet on a movement away from such parity
levels. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this finding is important for the effectiveness o f
a new channel through which official intervention supporting some parity level can affect
exchange rate movements. The implications o f the results on the short-run effectiveness
of official intervention for my model in Chapter 3 are discussed in Section 2.5 o f the
current chapter.
While the studies testing the effectiveness o f official intervention provide
valuable evidence on the short-run effectiveness o f such exchange rate policy, they have
missed an important question. That question is whether intervention and communication
is effective in terms o f limiting swings in exchange rates. Studies have mostly tested
whether intervention has been effective in turning around the exchange rate over the few
days, weeks or months following the intervention(s). There are only three studies that
•

»

•

"7

•

have investigated if intervention leads to more limited swings in exchange rates. While
they provide evidence that such policy can limit swings in exchange rates, I argue that
they are flawed because they do not allow for individual creativity in choosing and
revising forecasting strategies. These studies are discussed in more detail in Section 3.

2 The Effectiveness of Official Intervention: Empirical Evidence

The literature has explored three ways in which sterilized official intervention
(defined below) may affect the exchange rate: 1) it may alter the relative supply o f
domestic and foreign assets (the portfolio-balance channel); 2) it may act to coordinate

2 These are Kubelec (2004a,b) and Taylor (2004).
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individual expectations (the coordination channel); or 3) it could affect expectations
about future exchange rates, by signaling changes in monetary policy (the signaling
channel). Official exchange rate communication, on the other hand, can influence the
exchange rate through the signaling and coordination channels.
Official intervention is said to be nonsterilized if the sale or purchase o f foreign
currency by the authorities is allowed to change the monetary base, and it is sterilized if
the change in the monetary base is offset by the sale or purchase o f domestic securities.3
There is a consensus among economists that nonsterilized intervention will have a
significant and long-lasting effect on the behavior o f the exchange rate through its direct
effect on interest rates. For example, Fatum and Hutchison (1999: 54) state that “few
doubt that unsterilized intervention may affect nominal exchange rates by changing
interest rates on monetary aggregates.” In fact the effectiveness o f nonsterilized
intervention has been supported by two studies that also test for the effectiveness o f
sterilized intervention.4 Nevertheless, this remark is rather interesting given the major
finding o f the empirical studies on exchange rate determination that were discussed in
Chapter 1. These studies failed to find a significant relationship between macroeconomic
fundamentals and the exchange rate, and this conclusion led the majority o f researchers to
explain exchange rates as being detached from fundamentals and being driven by
irrationality. According to these studies, because fundamental variables do not matter for
exchange rates, although nonsterilized intervention affects interest rates, the change in

3 An example o f sterilized in intervention would be the sale o f foreign currency and purchase o f domestic
securities o f the same value, in which case there is a change in the composition o f domestic and foreign
assets holdings o f the central bank, but there is no change in the monetary base.
4 These studies are Obstfeld (1983) and Kearney and MacDonald (1986).
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interest rates would not influence exchange rate movements. Nevertheless, studies have
assumed that nonsterilized intervention has an effect on exchange rates, and have
concentrated on testing the effectiveness o f sterilized intervention through one o f the
three channels listed above.

2.1 The Portfolio Balance Channel

The portfolio-balance model that I discussed in Chapter 1 implies that official
intervention will affect the exchange rate through a portfolio balance channel. Tests o f
the portfolio balance channel have taken one o f four forms: the direct demand approach,
the indirect demand approach, the macroeconomic model approach, and the meanvariance optimization framework. Except for a few, studies have failed to provide support
for this channel o f intervention, suggesting that official intervention has no impact on
exchange rates by changing the relative supply o f domestic and foreign assets .5
2.1.1

The Direct Demand Approach. The direct demand approach involves testing

the explanatory power o f the portfolio balance model by using the structural asset
demand equations given in Chapter 1. Good explanatory power o f the expected returns on
domestic and foreign assets is interpreted as evidence for the existence o f the portfolio
balance channel o f official intervention. Recall from the discussion in Chapter 1 that in
the portfolio balance model official intervention can influence the exchange rate by
changing the relative supply o f domestic and foreign assets. Because domestic and
foreign assets are assumed to be imperfect substitutes, when intervention changes the
relative supply o f these assets, the expected rate o f return on foreign (or domestic)

5 For a review o f studies discussed in this section as well as other studies, see Dominguez and Frankel
(1993b), Edison (1993), R ogoff (1984), Taylor (1995) and Samo and Taylor (2001, 2002).
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denominated assets must rise for individuals to continue holding the relatively larger
stock o f these assets. This requires a move in the exchange rate.
Most studies that use this approach provide no support to the portfolio balance
model, suggesting that official intervention, which does change relative asset supplies,
has no significant effect on the exchange rate.
Frankel (1984), for example, estimates the structural asset demand equations o f
portfolio balance models for five currencies against the U.S. dollar on a monthly basis:
the Canadian dollar, French frank, German mark, Japanese yen and British pound for
mid-1970s to early-1980s. He finds that the asset and wealth variables in most o f his
regressions are either insignificant or significant but o f the wrong sign.
Similar results are reported by Bisignano and Hoover (1982) for the U.S.
dollar/Canadian dollar exchange rate between March 1973 and December 1978, and
Lewis (1988) for Canada, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. between January 1975
and December 1981. Asset supplies are found to enter the regressions generally
insignificantly or with the wrong sign. The main problem with these studies is that asset
supplies are not variable enough to explain the highly variable expected returns.
2.1.2

The Indirect Demand Approach. The indirect demand approach involves

expressing the portfolio balance model in terms o f a risk premium, and testing the
following relationship between the risk premium and the stock o f domestic and foreign
asset supplies:6

6 See Chapter 1, Section 4.2.

43

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The most common practice in estimating this equation is to invoke rational
expectations, thereby implying a joint test o f asset substitutability and rational
expectations.7 8 Since official intervention through the portfolio balance channel affects
the exchange rate by changing the relative supply o f domestic and foreign assets, such a
policy will have an effect on the exchange rate only if these assets are imperfect
substitutes. Thus, studies testing for the portfolio balance channel by using this approach
have generally done so in two stages. First they have performed the joint test o f asset
substitutability and rational expectations. Rejecting the null hypothesis implies that
possibly domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. However this is not
enough for arguing in favor o f the portfolio balance channel because rejecting the null
hypothesis could be due to the rejection o f REH and not the rejection o f asset
substitutability. The existence o f a portfolio balance channel is supported if in addition to
rejecting the null hypothesis, results also provide coefficient estimates on bond holdings
by

domestic

and

foreign

residents that are

significantly

different

from

zero

( Gx > 0 and 02 < 0).
Studies that have tested for the effectiveness o f official intervention using this
approach have also generally failed to provide support for the portfolio balance model.
Although the joint null hypothesis o f asset substitutability and rational expectations has
been regularly rejected, tests have failed to find significant coefficients on bond supplies.

7 Asset substitutability implies that domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes.
8 There is a related literature that tests jointly for asset substitutability (or risk neutrality) and rational
expectations by estimating this equation but in the context o f market efficiency, rather than the
effectiveness o f official intervention. The joint null hypothesis o f asset substitutability and rational
expectations has been regularly rejected. For a review see Taylor and Samo (2002). This finding in the
literature has also been interpreted as irrationality driving exchange rates and irrelevance o f exchange rate
models.
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Danker et. al (1987), for example, employ both the direct and inverted demand
approaches using the monthly U.S. dollar exchange rate with respect to the Canadian
dollar, German mark and Japanese yen between early- to mid-1970s and early-1980s. The
authors reject the joint hypothesis that domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes
and that expectations are rational for Canada and Germany. However, their risk premium
equations fail to provide any support for the portfolio balance model with the Canadian
dollar and provide limited support for the German mark: although most coefficients are
o f the correct sign, they are not always significant, and some coefficients are o f the
wrong sign.
Similarly, Loopesko (1984) strongly rejects the joint hypothesis o f perfect asset
substitutability and rational expectations, but she finds significant coefficients on bond
supplies o f the correct sign for only about half o f the total cases and subsamples (thirteen
out of twenty four) she considers in her study. The author estimates an equation for the
risk premium for the daily U.S. dollar exchange rate vis-a-vis the British pound,
Canadian dollar, French franc, German mark, Italian lira and Japanese yen from the midto late-1970s through late 1981 by including lagged values o f the premium, the exchange
rate and cumulative official intervention.
Frankel (1982a) reports results that fail to reject the null hypothesis o f zero
coefficients, and thus provide no support for the portfolio balance model. He uses
monthly data on U.S. and Germany from January 1974 to October 1978 to estimate a
variant o f equation (1). A similar approach was adopted by R ogoff (1984) with a higher
frequency (weekly) data on the Canadian dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate for different
subsamples between March 1973 and December 1980. Similarly to the earlier results by
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Frankel (1982a), Rogoff fails to find statistically significant coefficients for asset
supplies.
Ghosh (1992) adopts a different approach. He tests the portfolio balance effect by
controlling for any signaling effects for the monthly U.S. dollar/ German mark exchange
rate between October 1979 and November 1988. To do so, he first estimates a monetary
model in which the current exchange rate is expressed as the present discounted value o f
money supply and income differentials. In this way he assumes that the spot exchange
rate today is solely determined by the future values o f these fundamental variables, which
are known today, which is hard to justify. After estimating the monetary model, he allows
for a risk premium based on variables in the portfolio balance model.9 Since the monetary
model captures any signaling effects, any additional explanatory power o f the portfolio
balance variables should be due to the portfolio balance channel.10 Ghosh provides a
statistically significant, but weak influence o f intervention on the exchange rate through
the portfolio balance channel. He states that: “it should be noted that very substantial
intervention would be required to influence the exchange rate through portfolio balance
effects... The portfolio balance channel o f sterilized intervention may thus remain a
theoretical curiosum rather than a practical policy tool.” (Ghosh, 1992: 219)11
Furthermore, because o f the way in which Ghosh tests for the signaling channel, namely
by expressing the current exchange rate as the present discounted value o f money supply

9 The explanatory variables that Ghosh considers for the portfolio balance model are the total value o f asset
supplies and change in reserves corrected for valuation effects.
10 Ghosh does not test for a specific time frame for the effectiveness o f official intervention.
11 Frankel (1985) also shows analytically that it would take a very large amount o f intervention to affect the
course o f the exchange rate through a risk premium effect.
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and income differentials, his results would also imply that non-sterilized intervention
would not work either.
In sum, studies testing the portfolio balance channel o f official intervention by
utilizing the inverted demand approach provide no support to the hypothesis that central
bank intervention can affect the exchange rate by changing the relative supplies of
domestic and foreign assets. According to these studies, official intervention does not
seem to influence the exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel.
2.1.3

The Macroeconomic Model Approach. A third way in which researchers

have tested for the effectiveness o f official intervention through the portfolio balance
channel has been by estimating a fully specified macroeconomic model that incorporates
portfolio balance equations. Studies that have used this approach to test for the
effectiveness o f official intervention have provided mixed results.
Obstfeld (1983), for example, has investigated the effectiveness o f official
intervention in Germany using monthly data between January 1975 and October 1981 by
estimating a structural portfolio balance macroeconomic model. The author first
estimates a portfolio balance model, and then simulates this empirical model to compare
for the effectiveness o f sterilized and nonsterilized intervention. The study concludes that
sterilized intervention does not appear to have had an effect on the German mark/U.S.
dollar exchange rate through the portfolio balance channel, but that “these findings leave
open the possibility that sterilized foreign exchange market intervention has significant
but short-lived exchange rate effects that disappear within a month.” (Obstfeld, 1983:
185) Nonsterilized intervention, however, appears to have had a strong impact on the
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exchange rate. This result provides further support to the importance o f macroeconomic
fundamentals for exchange rate movements.
Kearney and MacDonald (1986) follow a similar approach for the U.K. using
quarterly data between 1973 quarter 2 and 1983 quarter 4. In contrast to Obstfeld (1983),
Kearney and MacDonald (1986) provide evidence that both sterilized and nonsterilized
intervention, as proxied by the change in foreign exchange reserves, have had a
statistically and qualitatively significant impact on exchange rates.12 The finding on the
effectiveness o f nonsterilized intervention does once again provide evidence that
macroeconomic fundamentals are important for exchange rates. Furthermore, Kearney
and MacDonald (1986) also find that the effects o f sterilized intervention on the
exchange rate have lasted up to one year. This finding o f a long lasting effect o f official
intervention on exchange rates supports the idea that such policy could lead to swings o f
smaller magnitude. This finding stands out distinctively compared to other studies that
have tested any o f the three channels through which sterilized intervention can affect the
exchange rate. The reason is partly because the majority o f studies have only looked at
the short-term effectiveness o f intervention, not testing for the effects o f intervention on
exchange rates beyond a few months. Another reason might be their use o f foreign
exchange reserves to proxy official intervention.13 In contrast, Obstfeld (1983) and other
studies have relied on some aggregate monetary data.

12 The authors mention that the difference in their results on sterilized intervention from those reported by
Obstfeld (1983) to the less than perfect capital mobility in the U.K. in the period considered due to
institutional arrangements.
13 In my empirical analysis, I also use changes in foreign exchange reserves to proxy official intervention.
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2.1.4 The Mean-Variance Optimization Framework. In the mean-variance
optimization framework, the expected rate o f return on foreign exchange is linked to asset
supplies by imposing the constraint that the coefficients o f an inverted asset-demand
function are related to the variance covariance matrix. According to this approach,
empirical evidence indicating the existence o f a risk premium is interpreted as evidence
o f the effectiveness o f official intervention through the portfolio balance channel.
W ithin this framework, individuals maximize a function o f the mean and the
variance o f their final wealth, Wt+l, which depends on real returns and the portfolio
allocation:14

WM =W ,+ W,a,C, + W, (1 - a, )r„, = w \ a , (r/„ - rM )+ 1 + rM ]

(2)

where Wt is initial real wealth, at and ( l - a , ) are the portfolio shares o f foreign and
domestic assets at time t , respectively, and rM and r*+l stand for the domestic and foreign
rates o f real return in terms o f the domestic currency from time t to t + 1, respectively.
Since the real rate o f return is equal to the nominal rate o f return less the inflation rate
( rt+\ = h ~ Pt and r*+] = i* + A,y‘;,+I - p t ), equation (2) can be rewritten as:

K .i)+'1+1- p.]

(3)

It is assumed that investors determine the portfolio shares on domestic and foreign
assets by maximizing a function o f the expected value and variance o f final wealth, in
which case equation (1) becomes:

14 See Frankel (1982b) and Dombusch (1983).
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i* - i , + As*+I = p ,n { a t - 8 )

(4)

where Q is the variance-covariance matrix o f expected currency depreciation, and 8 is
the consumption share o f foreign goods.
Rejecting the null hypothesis o f no risk premium would imply that domestic and
foreign assets are imperfect substitutes. This would be an indication that the portfolio
balance channel does exist.
Studies using this approach have reported mixed findings. Frankel (1982b), for
example, estimates equation (4) with monthly data for Canada, France, Germany, Japan,
the U.K. and the U.S. from June 1973 to August 1980, and fails to reject the null
hypothesis o f no risk premium. Frankel and Engel (1984), on the other hand, use the
same dataset but report results that fail to provide support for the m odel.15
By contrast, Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,c) provide evidence o f a significant
portfolio balance channel. They estimate a risk premium equation within a mean-variance
optimization framework, similar to equation (4), and find a statistically significant
portfolio effect on the U.S. dollar/ German mark exchange rate for different subsamples
between November 1982 and December 1988. The findings o f this study stand in contrast
to the general findings o f the empirical studies on the portfolio balance channel, which
conclude that the effect o f official intervention on the exchange rate through this channel
is insignificant. One clear difference between their study and other studies is their use o f
actual intervention data to capture changes in asset supplies. 16 17 Another distinguishing

15 Frankel and Engel (1984) allow for inflation risk.
16 Previous studies have proxied changes in asset supplies by using some type o f aggregate data, such as
total government debt (Lewis, 1988), net private holdings o f domestic bonds by domestic residents (Danker
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factor o f the studies by Dominguez and Frankel has been their use o f survey data (from
the Money Market Services International, MMS), instead o f relying on REH for
expectations.18 This suggests that the assumption o f REH might be a strong contributing
factor to the failure to find significant effects o f intervention on the exchange rate through
the portfolio balance channel. I view results that are obtained by using survey data as
more reliable because they capture market’s expectations about the future exchange rate
rather than deriving markets’ exchange rate forecasts by using some rule that the
researcher believes all market participants will follow.19

2.2 The Coordination Channel

The coordination channel, suggested by Samo and Taylor (2001), and also
discussed by Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato et.al. (2003), works by coordinating
individual expectations, so that expectations converge on models that drive the exchange
rate towards parity levels.
Morris and Shin (2002) and Amato et.al. (2003) develop a model with no specific
reference to exchange rates that incorporates the signaling and the coordination channel.
In this model individuals try to maximize their return by taking the appropriate action that
is driven by two factors. One factor is the desire to match the price o f an asset to

et.al., 1987), or net private holdings o f domestic bonds plus the monetary base (Rogoff, 1984). These data
are likely to entail a high degree o f measurement error.
17 Loopesko (1984) also uses actual intervention data but her results provide support to the portfolio
balance channel only for half o f her sample.
18 Survey data are four-week ahead surveys on a weekly basis starting October 24, 1984, and three-month
ahead on a bi-weekly basis before that.
19 In this dissertation I also utilize survey data to capture exchange rate expectations. The data are described
in Chapter 4.
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fundamentals, as conveyed by public and private information (the signaling channel). The
other factor is the coordination motive, i.e. trying to guess the actions o f other
individuals: the smaller is the distance between an individual’s own action and the
average opinion o f other individuals, the larger his return is. Morris and Shin (2002: 1-2)
state that communication not only conveys information

about macroeconomic

fundamentals, but it also “serves as a focal point for the beliefs o f the group as whole”,
and thus it “serves as a coordination device.”
In the context o f the foreign exchange market, this discussion on the coordination
channel could be interpreted as official communication or parity announcement by the
central bank coordinating exchange rate expectations towards the exchange rate level
desired by policy authorities.
So far, no explicit theoretical or empirical work has been done on the coordination
channel in the context o f the foreign exchange market. Nevertheless, the findings on the
signaling channel, discussed next, can be viewed as providing findings on the
coordination channel as well. I discuss why that is the case below.

2.3 The Signaling Channel

The signaling or expectations channel was first considered by Mussa (1981).
With this channel, intervention affects the exchange rate by providing the market with
information about future monetary policy, future intervention policies, and/or information
about relevant economic fundamentals. Credible information about the future level o f the
money stock, for example, will lead to a change in the expected future spot rate, which
will bring about a change in the current rate.
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It is interesting to note that the way in which the signaling channel is supposed to
affect the exchange rate, namely by providing the market with information about future
policies and macroeconomic fundamentals, is at odds with exchange rate studies that
have concluded that fundamentals do not matter for exchange rates.

")C\

If it were in fact the

case that fundamentals are not important for exchange rates, then one would expect that
empirical studies would fail to provide any support for the signaling channel. This,
however, is not the case. Although some studies fail to produce results o f a significant
signaling channel, most provide support for a significant effect o f official intervention on
exchange rates through this channel. This suggests that macroeconomic fundamentals do
indeed matter for exchange rate movements.
Tests o f the signaling channel fall in two general groups: testing whether
intervention signals a change in monetary policy assuming that the latter will have an
effect on exchange rate expectations, or testing the impact o f intervention on exchange
rate expectations. It should be noted that since both o f these approaches are based on the
effects o f intervention on exchange rate expectations, results obtained by using either
approach can be interpreted as evidence not only on the signaling channel but also on the
coordination channel. None o f the studies discussed in this section have interpreted their
findings in terms o f the coordination channel since it was only recently introduced. But it
is possible that the effect o f intervention on exchange rate expectations works through
either or both o f these channels.
2.3.1

Intervention as Signaling Future Monetary Policy. This approach assumes

that monetary policy matters for exchange rates, and the argument is that if intervention

20 See Chapter 1, Section 2.
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does provide the right signals about future changes in monetary policy, then intervention
will also matter for exchange rates. Therefore, studies that have used this approach have
generally tested if there is high correlation between intervention and future monetary
policy. They have interpreted their results o f a significant relationship between
intervention and future monetary policy as an indication that the signaling channel exists.
Studies in this category in general provide support for the signaling channel by reporting
a significant relationship between intervention and monetary policy. One study, Lewis
(1995), identifies a short-term (up to 2 weeks) relationship between intervention and
monetary policy variables (discussed below).
Fatum and Hutchison (1999) directly estimate the effect o f U.S. daily intervention
on changes in expected monetary policy, which is captured by changes in the one- and
two-month federal funds futures rate between March 1989 and December 1993. They
conclude that their “results suggest that it is difficult to identify a clear and effective
“signaling” channel” (Fatum and Hutchison, 1999: 67). Watanabe (1994), on the other
hand, provides evidence that official interventions by the Bank o f Japan, measured by the
yen value o f the net purchases o f foreign currencies, have been highly correlated with
Japanese monetary policy, as captured by the discount rate and M2 plus certificates o f
deposit, between April 1973 and April 1992. The argument is that, because a reduction in
the discount rate leads to a depreciation o f the yen, such a policy should be negatively
correlated with official intervention as defined above. Thus, this study supports the
existence o f a signaling channel o f official intervention.
Lewis (1995) examines whether daily official intervention by the Federal Reserve
helps predict future changes in monetary policy from 1985 to 1990, as captured by M l,
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monetary base, nonborrowed reserves and the federal funds rate. She also looks at
reversed causality - whether changes in monetary policy help predict intervention. Her
results provide support for significant effects within a 2-week period in both directions.
Acknowledging the poor empirical support for the theoretical exchange rate models, she
also investigates the effects o f changes in monetary variables on the exchange rate. To
that end, she examines the impulse response functions o f the German mark/U.S. dollar
and the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rates to the U.S. monetary variables.21 Her
findings suggest that changes in monetary policy variables have a significant effect on the
exchange rate, however, except for M l, there is little contemporaneous effect.22 These
results provide evidence o f a signaling channel and also suggest that, contrary to the
findings o f empirical studies on exchange rate determination that were discussed in
Chapter 1, macroeconomic fundamentals are important for exchange rates movements.
Similarly, Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) strongly reject the hypothesis that U.S.
intervention provides no information about future U.S. monetary policy, as proxied by
the federal funds rate, M l and nonborrowed reserves. They also find that from September
1985 to February 1990 U.S. official intervention had no independent effect on the U.S.
dollar/German mark and U.S. dollar/Japanese yen exchange rates, and that exchange rates
tend to move in the direction o f actual monetary policy, even if this is opposite to the
'j'y

direction o f official intervention.

21 In a second set o f regressions she controls for the foreign monetary variables.
22 Controlling for foreign monetary variables, the effect o f a positive shock to M l is an immediate
depreciation o f the dollar and lasts for about 12 weeks. The effects o f a positive shock to nonborrowed
reserves lasts for about 20 weeks, and the effect o f a positive shock to the federal funds rate becomes
significant after 6 weeks.
23 The first result is also supported by the game-theoretic framework developed by Reeves (1997).
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2.3.2 Impact o f Official Intervention on Exchange Rate Expectations. Studies
analyzing the impact o f official intervention on exchange rate expectations have
produced mixed results. The main determining factor behind the difference in results
seems to be the way in which they have measured exchange rate expectations. Studies
using the forward rate fail to report a significant effect o f intervention on exchange rate
expectations. Studies that have used survey data, on the other hand, have reported
significant effects. It has been established by many studies that the forward rate is a poor
proxy for exchange rate expectations.24 Moreover, as I argued before, I view the use
survey data to capture exchange rate forecasts to be superior to assuming how market
participants form their forecasts and capturing these forecasts by using a specific
aggregate measure, such as the forward rate. Although there are some bias problems with
forecasts from survey data, most researchers believe that even if there are biases in the
forecast data they are not systematic. Therefore, the conclusion for this section is that
official intervention seems to have a significant effect on exchange rate expectations
when the latter are captured by survey forecasts.
Galati and Melick (1999) use the forward rate for exchange rate expectations and
provide little support to the signaling channel. They analyze the effects o f perceived
intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bank o f Japan, based on Reuters reports, on
the expected distribution o f future Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate using daily
data between September 1993 and April 1996. They estimate an equation that relates the
moments o f the distribution to the lagged values o f the moments, lagged intervention and
several lagged macroeconomic variables by instrumenting intervention with a reaction

24 For review and references, see Samo and Taylor (2001).
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function for the Federal Reserve and the Bank o f Japan. The results provide little
evidence o f a significant contemporaneous or subsequent effect o f intervention on the
expected exchange rate. Galati, Melick and Micu (2005) follow a similar approach and
also find that official intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bank o f Japan had no
statistically significant effect on the expected mean or higher moments o f the daily
Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate between September 1993 and April 2000.
Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) capture exchange rate expectations with survey
data and find that exchange rate policy announcements and reports o f intervention have
significant effects on exchange rate expectations. They examine the effects o f official
intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank on the bi-weekly, three-month
ahead forecasts o f the German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate between November 1982
and October 1984. The authors estimate the following equation for exchange rate
expectations, which captures the changes in the forecasted exchange rate during the day
on which interventions take place and news reports o f exchange rate policy get released:

f e - :Cj,k) = a 0 + a i (st - s t_j ) + a 2(5, - s '_jjc) +
a,NEW S, + ccaREPINT, + a 5SECINT, + s t

where (setk - s ,e_j k) is the revision in the log survey forecast o f the k-period ahead spot
exchange rate from time t - j to time t , s,_} is the log o f the spot exchange rate on the
day of the last survey, the NEWS\ is official news reports o f exchange rate policy a time
t , REPINT, is the reports o f unilateral and coordinated interventions, and SECINT, is the
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official interventions that have not been reported in the press (i.e. secret interventions).
Findings indicate that exchange rate policy announcements and reported intervention
have significant effects, while secret interventions have no effect on exchange rate
expectations.
The findings by Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) o f a significant signaling
channel have also been supported by Dominguez and Frankel (1993c) with a similar
strategy again for the German mark/U.S. dollar but from 1982 tol988. Another major
finding o f Dominguez and Frankel (1993b,c) is that the effectiveness o f intervention is
considerably enhanced if it is publicly announced.
2.3.3

9f\

Summary o f the Empirical Evidence on the Signaling Channel. Most o f the

empirical studies on the signaling channel conclude that official intervention has a
significant influence on the exchange rate through this channel, either by signaling future
monetary policy or by affecting exchange rate expectations. Since in this channel
intervention affects the exchange rate by providing the market with information about
future

policies

and

macroeconomic

fundamentals,

these

findings

suggest that

fundamental variables are important for exchange rate movements. But if macroeconomic
fundamentals matter for exchange rates, then this implies that perhaps some parity
announcement by central banks based on such fundamentals might have a significant
effect on exchange rate movements.

25 The official news reports o f exchange rate policy are collected from
Financial Times (London) and the New York Times.

theWall Street Journal,

26 This result has received general support in the literature. See Blinder (1998) andBemanke
also the discussion on official exchange rate communication in Section 2.4.

the

(2004). See
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2.4 General Studies on the Effectiveness o f Official Intervention and Official
Communication

Many studies have tested the effectiveness o f official intervention without being
able to distinguish between the different influence channels. Most o f these studies
consider some measure for intervention and test for its effects on the exchange rate. Thus,
these studies only provide evidence as to whether intervention has been effective in
turning around the exchange rate and if so, over what time frame. Few o f the studies
include some macroeconomic variables in their analysis and thus also provide evidence
that macroeconomic fundamentals are important for exchange rates. The majority o f the
studies find that official intervention has a significant but short-lasting (up to 3 months)
effect on exchange rates.
Some o f the studies surveyed in this section have also tested for the effects o f
official communication on exchange rates and almost all o f these have reported
significant results (up to 40 days following interventions). This last result is especially
important for my analysis, since it shows that views o f monetary authorities on the stance
of the exchange rate are important for the exchange rate. This further supports the idea
presented above - that some parity announcement by central banks might also have a
significant role in affecting exchange rate movements.
Humpage (1988) reports a significant effect o f intervention on the exchange rate
that lasts one day. He studies the effect o f intervention by the Federal Reserve on the
daily German mark/U.S. dollar and Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rates for five sub
periods between August 1984 and August 1987. He regresses the spot exchange rate on
lagged initial intervention, lagged subsequent intervention and a lag o f the spot rate. An
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intervention is defined as initial intervention if there has been no intervention in the
previous five business days. If there has been intervention in the previous five business
days, then such intervention is identified as subsequent intervention. Initial intervention
captures the news component o f intervention, while subsequent intervention captures the
effect o f the intervention itself. Results suggest that official intervention can have an
announcement effect on the exchange rate that lasts only one day. Moreover, the size and
duration o f an announcement effect seems to be bigger if the market associates the
intervention with monetary and fiscal policy changes. This result provides further support
to the importance o f macroeconomic fundamentals for exchange rates. Subsequent
intervention, on the other hand, did not appear to have any effect on the exchange rate.
Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006) use an event study approach and provide
evidence in favor o f short-term effectiveness (up to 15 days). They argue in favor o f an
event study approach since interventions happen in clusters, which the authors call
events.27 The authors consider a direction criterion (whether immediately following the
intervention event, the exchange rate moves in the direction intended by the intervention)
and a smoothing criterion (whether following the intervention event, the intervention
smoothes the exchange rate movement). They also introduce a ‘reversal’ criterion that
allows them to analyze if cumulative intervention has been successful. The reversal
criterion looks if the trend o f the exchange rate has been reversed following the
intervention event, i.e. whether the exchange rate has continued to move in the desired
direction for a longer period than right after the intervention.

27 An event is defined as a period o f days with official intervention in the same direction that can possibly
include days with no intervention. The end o f an event is identified if afterwards there has been fifteen days
with no intervention. The authors report no significant difference between the choice o f a fifteen- as
opposed to a five-day window.
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Fatum and Hutchison (2003) analyze intervention by the Federal Reserve and the
Bundesbank on the daily German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate from September 1985
to December 1995 and provide evidence in favor o f short-term effectiveness according to
all three success criteria, i.e. following the interventions, the exchange rate immediately
moved in the desired direction, the trend was reversed and movements were smoother.
These effects are seen with up to 15-day windows, but not with a 30-day window.

9Q

Fatum and Hutchison (2006) perform a similar analysis in terms o f the
effectiveness o f intervention by the Federal Reserve and the Bank o f Japan on the daily
Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate between April 1991 and December 2000. They
find significant short-term effectiveness o f official intervention according to the direction
and reversal criteria for up to two weeks, but again no effect with a 30-day window.
Intervention has been effective independently o f whether it has supported by changes in
the interest rates (MP), and o f being secret or not.
Dominguez

and

Frankel

(1993b)

examine

the

effects

o f central

bank

announcements about exchange rates and official interventions, reported and secret, and
provide generally significant contemporaneous effects o f announcements on exchange
rates but mixed results for interventions.

They analyze interventions by the Federal

28 Short term refers to the two-, five-, ten- and fifteen-day analysis o f the exchange rate following the end
o f an episode.
29 The authors comment that this is a limitation o f the event-study approach, since with a 30-day window
many intervention events are excluded due to overlaps.
30 In both studies intervention is effective independently o f whether it is being accompanied by monetary
policy shifts.
31 For variable definitions, see Section 2.3.2.
32 Ito (2003) also reports such a significant same-day effect for the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar exchange rate
for the period from April 1991 to March 2001.

61

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reserve and the Bundesbank for different subperiods on the change in the daily German
mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate between January 1985 and December 1990, and the
weekly German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate between November 1982 and December
1988. For the daily change in the exchange rate, the authors report a statistically
significant effect o f central bank announcements about exchange rates for all subperiods
and equation specifications.

The coefficients o f reported and secret actual intervention,

however, depend on the period and specification o f the regression equation - sometimes
they are significant and correctly signed, while sometimes they are insignificant, or even
significant but incorrectly signed.
With weekly changes in the exchange rate, official exchange rate announcements
and reported intervention have a significant contemporaneous effect on the exchange rate.
When intervention is measured in other ways (intervention a day before the survey date,
cumulative intervention between survey forecasts, and cumulative intervention from the
beginning o f the sample period), however, the coefficients on interventions and
announcements turn out insignificant.
Fratzscher (2004, 2005) explores the effectiveness o f daily official interventions
(what he calls ‘actual’ interventions) and official communications (called ‘oral’
interventions) by policy makers in the U.S., Japan and the euro area by using a time
series approach.34 He focuses on the U.S. dollar/euro and Japanese yen/U.S. dollar

33 The authors run different equations testing different hypotheses, such as the effects o f coordinated versus
uncoordinated interventions, the effects o f the magnitude o f interventions versus the effects o f intervention
frequency.
34 He regresses the change in the exchange rate on actual and oral interventions in Japan and U.S. for the
yen/dollar exchange rate, and Europe and U.S. for the euro/dollar exchange rate and the corresponding
interest differential.
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exchange rates for the period from January 1990 through June 2003. In addition,
Fratzscher (2005) also uses an event-study approach.
Fratzscher (2004) finds that both actual and oral interventions have a significant
effect on the exchange rate in moving the exchange rate in the desired direction over the
two- or three-day period following interventions.

He also finds that oral intervention

policies may be effective even without the presence o f actual intervention, and that their
effect is generally independent o f whether they move in the same or opposite directions
with past or future monetary policy. This result suggests that parity announcement alone
could affect the exchange rate.
The time series results by Fratzscher (2005) support his earlier results. In the
event-study approach Fratzscher (2005) uses the success criteria by Fatum and Hutchison
(2003, 2006) and also adds an ‘event’ criterion where intervention event is successful if
the exchange rate moves in the desired direction during the intervention event.

His

results indicate that actual intervention has been effective for up to 30 days, while oral
intervention has been effective for up to 40 days:
“com m unication and actual intervention events w ere su ccessfu l and m oved the G3
exch ange rate in the desired direction in the five-day post-event period in 65% to
77% o f the cases. T his directional effect also proves highly persistent and show s a
sim ilar rate o f “su ccess” as m any as 40 days after the events... Oral interventions
appear to be m ore su ccessfu l during the events, w h ile actual interventions have a
som ew hat higher su ccess rate than oral interventions w hen they are o f the
“leaning-against-the-w ind” type and attempt to reverse the previous exchange rate
trend.”
Fratzscher (2005: 24)

35 Oral interventions are classified as being strengthening, weakening or ambiguous in terms o f the value o f
the domestic currency.
36 Fratzscher (2005) defines the end o f an event after ten days with no intervention, as opposed to the
fifteen days chosen by Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006). The author performs robustness checks for
window lengths as short as five days and as long as one month, and does not find significantly different
results.
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Ramaswami and Samiei (2000) analyze the effects o f intervention by the Federal
Reserve and the Bank o f Japan on the change in the daily Japanese yen/U.S. dollar
exchange rate between 1995-1999 using an error correction model that includes interest
rate differentials.37 They find that out o f 17 intervention episodes, 8 have led to a
significant movement in the exchange rate in the desired direction within two days while
for the rest o f the episodes there has been no significant movement in any direction.38
Dominguez (2003) examines the effects o f intervention operations in Germany,
Japan and the U.S. on the German mark/U.S. dollar and Japanese yen/U.S, dollar
exchange rates over the period 1990-2002. She provides evidence that intervention has
been effective in turning around the exchange rate in the very short run (4-hours and 8hours) and longer run (within 3 months o f the final intervention operation o f the
episode).39
Humpage (1999) and Beine, Benassy-Quere and Lecourt (2002) fail to report
significant effects o f intervention on exchange rates. Humpage (1999) uses different
success criteria to assess the degree to which U.S. intervention has influenced the daily
U.S. dollar/German mark and U.S. dollar/Japanese yen exchange rates from February
1987 to February 1990. The most general success criteria that Humpage uses is that
intervention sale (purchase) o f foreign exchange is associated either with an appreciation

37 The authors identify intervention by the Fed and the BoJ by compiling information from the press.
38 The authors cluster individual interventions into episodes when they appear to be part o f the same
intervention process. They also find that the success o f intervention depends on the type. For example,
there have been total nine attempts by the BoJ to weaken the yen over the specific period, and only three
have been successful. Also, coordinated interventions have been more successful that unilateral ones. This
result has received a general support from studies in the field. The authors comment that intervention will
have a lasting effect on the exchange rate because the exchange rate is non-stationary.
39 Out o f total 22 episodes o f intervention, seven (ten) had a correctly signed significant 4-hour (8-hour)
effect on the exchange rate. In fourteen episodes the exchange rate moved in the appropriate direction
within three months o f the final intervention o f the episode.
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(depreciation) o f the dollar on the day the intervention was undertaken, or by a smaller
appreciation (depreciation) o f the dollar on the day o f intervention compared to its
appreciation (depreciation) from the morning o f the previous day to the morning o f the
current day. He uses a logit estimation for the odds ratio o f successful intervention by
controlling for the amount and type o f intervention, monetary policy and trade statistics.
Humpage finds that the odds o f a successful U.S. intervention increases with the amount
o f intervention, but U.S. sales (purchases) o f foreign exchange were not associated with
systematic dollar appreciation (depreciation).
Beine, Benassy-Quere and Lecourt (2002) investigate the effects o f official
intervention by the Federal Reserve, the Bundesbank and the Bank o f Japan on the mean
and variance o f the daily U.S. dollar/German mark and U.S. dollar/Japanese yen
exchange rates from 1985 to 1995. One o f their main findings is that both exchange rates
move in direction opposite to the one intended by official intervention. The authors
perform causality tests to investigate possible leaning-against-the-wind effects where the
central bank intervenes to oppose a particular direction o f movement in the exchange
rate. Their findings indicate that their “results do not systematically stem from reversed
causality, although central banks clearly lean against the wind” (Beine, Benassy-Quere
and Lecourt, 2002: 142).
It should be noted that all o f the studies on the effects o f intervention discussed so
far have concentrated on developed countries. One o f the major reasons for this is the
lack o f intervention data for developing economies. Another is that it is difficult to
control for changes in central bank credibility and policy reaction functions (Guimaraes
and Karacadag, 2004). However, intervention is especially widespread in emerging
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countries because o f the high premium due to low policy credibility, and the high pass
through from exchange rate movements to inflation (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002). There
are a few studies that have investigated the effectiveness o f intervention on Mexico and
Turkey (Domac and Mendoza, 2004; Guimaraes and Karacadag, 2004), and Chile (Tapia
and Tokman, 2004). These studies do not differentiate between the different channels o f
influence and they report mixed findings.
Domac and Mendoza (2004) test for the effects o f intervention on the mean and
variance o f the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and conclude that in both Mexico
(from August 1996 to June 2001) and Turkey (February 2001 to May 2002), foreign
exchange sales have been effective in influencing the exchange rate, but not foreign
exchange purchases. Guimaraes and Karacadag (2004) estimate a first-difference
equation for the exchange rate against the U.S. dollar and find a similar result for Mexico
for the period from August 1996 to June 2003, whereas in Turkey intervention did not
appear to have a significant effect on the exchange rate between March 2001 and October
2003.
Tapia and Tokman find that between January 1998 and February 2003 in Chile
official intervention had a significant effect on the exchange rate during some subperiods,
but not others. They also report that public announcement on potential intervention had a
significant impact on the level and the trend o f the exchange rate. This last result can be
seen as supporting the effectiveness o f official communication by central banks regarding
exchange rates.
To sum up this section, the majority o f studies that have tested the effectiveness
o f official intervention in developed countries with no specific channel o f influence find
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that official intervention has been successful in moving the exchange rate in the desired
direction as soon as in the day o f the intervention and as late as 3 months following the
intervention. Thus, one major conclusion from these studies is that official intervention
has a significant short-term impact on exchange rate movements. The result o f effective
official intervention has received partial support for developing countries.
Some o f the studies investigating the effectiveness o f official intervention have
also tested for the effects o f official communication on exchange rates. All o f these,
including the ones on developing countries, have reported significant short-term results
(up to 40 days following interventions). This result suggests that some parity
announcement by central banks might also have a significant role in affecting exchange
rate movements.

2.5 Evidence on the Effectiveness o f Official Intervention: Summary and Implications

This section presented studies testing the effectiveness o f official intervention
through the portfolio balance, signaling and coordination channels.40 The majority o f
studies investigating whether official intervention has a significant impact on exchange
rates through the portfolio balance channel have produced results that do not support the
significance o f this channel. Studies on the signaling channel, on the other hand, have
mostly concluded that official intervention has a significant effect on exchange rates by
providing the market with information about future policies and macroeconomic
fundamentals.

40 The effect o f official communication on the exchange rate could work through the signaling or
coordination channel.
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Many studies have tested for the effects o f intervention on exchange rates without
a clear indication o f a channel o f influence and these have mostly reported significant
short-term results (up to 3 months). Thus, the major conclusion that seems to arise from
this literature is that official intervention has a significant but short lasting effect on
exchange rates.
This finding on the ability o f official intervention to turn around the exchange rate
in the short run implies that the central bank can inflict pain on traders who bet on a
movement away from announced parity levels. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, this
finding is important for the effectiveness o f a new channel through which official
intervention can affect exchange rate movements, the uncertainty premium channel. It is
also the case that the effectiveness o f this new, uncertainty premium, channel is enhanced
if intervention is accompanied by the announcement o f some parity level. Usually, parity
levels are based on macroeconomic fundamentals, such as PPP.41 The importance o f
parity announcement for exchange rates is revealed by three major findings o f empirical
studies. First is the empirical finding o f a significant effect o f official communication by
monetary authorities on exchange rates (up to 40 days). Furthermore, the supportive
evidence on the signaling channel implies that macroeconomic fundamentals are
important for exchange rates. And last but not least is the general support in the literature
for the enhanced effectiveness o f official intervention when it is publicly announced.

41 There are other measures for the benchmark exchange rate that have been proposed in the literature.
Williamson (1985), for example, develops a measure for a ‘fundamental equilibrium’ exchange rate that
generates a current account surplus or deficit equal to the underlying capital flow over the cycle, assuming
that the country is pursuing internal balance (i.e. aiming to attain full employment level o f output) and not
restricting trade for balance o f payments reasons. Kubelec (2004a, b) constructs a benchmark level for the
exchange rate using data on relative money supplies (M l) and output levels. As will be discussed in
Chapter 4, however, empirical studies have found that PPP acts as a long run anchor for exchange rates.
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In addition to these findings, studies that test the importance o f news releases
regarding macroeconomic fundamentals on exchange rate forecasts report strong
evidence o f exchange rate reaction to news and thus provide further support for the role
o f parity announcement by central banks based on fundamentals to affect short-run
exchange rate movements. These news releases are related to the surprise component o f
the announcements, since the expected part is already incorporated in exchange rate
expectations. Dornbusch (1980) and Frenkel (1981), for example, derive measures o f
news by using statistical innovations in interest differentials and other macroeconomic
variables. To capture the unexpected part o f the news Edison (1997) and Andersen et. al.
(2003) use survey data o f expectations about the value o f the fundamental variable to be
released that is collected a week before the actual release by Money Market Services,
International.42
Furthermore, survey results reported by Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor and
Allen (1992), Cheung and Chinn (2001) and Cheung, Chinn and Marsch (2004) clearly
indicate the importance o f macroeconomic fundamentals for market participants’
exchange rate expectations. For example, Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen
(1992) report survey results covering over 400 chief foreign exchange dealers in the
London market in November 1989 with a 60% response rate. About 85% o f the
respondents judge fundamentals to be more important that chartist rules for expectations
over a year and longer, with 30% relying exclusively on fundamentals.
In sum, the conclusion o f significant short-term effects o f official intervention and
official communication on the exchange rate through the portfolio balance, signaling and

42 For other studies see references in Frankel and Rose (1995) and Edison (1997).
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coordination channels and the findings and survey results indicating that macroeconomic
fundamentals are important for exchange rates provides a role for official intervention
and parity announcement to influence exchange rate movements.

3 The Effectiveness of Official Intervention in a New Perspective

The empirical studies on the effectiveness o f official intervention through the
different channels share one main characteristic - they have all investigated the
effectiveness o f intervention by looking at whether it has been successful in turning the
exchange rate in the direction o f intervention in the few days/weeks/months following the
intervention. While it is true that monetary authorities care about the short-term trend in
the exchange rate, they also care about long-term misalignments o f the exchange rate
from fundamental values. Survey results reported by Neely (2000b) display that
seventeen out o f nineteen reporting monetary authorities always or sometimes intervene
to resist short-term trends in exchange rates, and twelve out o f eighteen always or
sometimes intervene to correct long-run misalignments o f exchange rates from
fundamental values.
To the best o f my knowledge, only three papers have so far investigated whether
intervention is effective in terms o f limiting the magnitude o f misalignment in exchange
rates from benchmark levels, Kubelec (2004a, 2004b) and Taylor (2004). In the
framework o f a noise-trader model, Kubelec (2004a, 2004b) shows that intervention in
the Japanese yen/U.S. dollar market from 1991 to 2003 has led to swings o f smaller
magnitude.
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Kubelec (2004a,b) develops a noise-trader model in which when choosing a
strategy, traders either pay a fixed cost to purchase a rule that is based on fundamentals,
or use a chartist rule to extrapolate recent trends in exchange rates. Traders base their
decision on an evolutionary fitness measure that is a weighted function o f past realized
profits and future expected profits from the chartist and the fundamentalist view (based
on Brock and Hommes, 1998, 1999). Since this is just an extension o f the Frankel and
Froot noise-trader approach to exchange rates, swings in exchange rates here again arise
because individuals switch to using the chartist rule as opposed to the fundamentalist
rule.
In this model, chartists’ profits rise as long as the exchange rate moves away from
the ‘fundamental’, i.e. benchmark exchange rate. When the exchange rate reverts towards
the benchmark level, market participants that continue to follow the chartist rule incur
losses. Fundamentalists, on the other hand, endure losses when the exchange rate moves
away from benchmark levels, and make profits when the exchange rate reverts towards
the benchmark.
Kubelec models the effects o f sterilized official intervention on the exchange rate
through a risk premium as in the portfolio balance model. The argument here is that the
risk premium affects realized profits, and thus the fitness measure, causing market
participants to switch from the chartist rule to the fundamentalist rule. For example, if a
central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market to depreciate the domestic
currency by purchasing foreign currency and selling the domestic currency, the supply o f
domestic currency rises relative to the supply o f foreign currency. Now individuals will
be willing to hold this larger supply o f domestic currency only if they are compensated
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by a higher excess return on the domestic currency, i.e. by a risk premium, which leads to
a depreciation o f the domestic currency towards benchmark levels. The higher excess
return on the domestic currency will increase the realized profits o f individuals who
followed the fundamentalist view and will thus induce more individuals to follow this
view. This in turn will reduce “the persistence o f exchange rate misalignments.”
(Kubelec, 2004a: 2)
Kubelec (2004a,b) tests the effects o f official intervention by the Bank o f Japan
on the misalignments in the U.S. dollar/Japanese yen exchange rate from 1991 to 2003,
where misalignments are measured as deviations from an equilibrium exchange rate
based on fundamentals. For the equilibrium exchange rate he uses data on relative money
supplies (M l) and output levels. Then he derives a series for the deviation o f the
exchange rate from its equilibrium level. His findings suggest that about 32% o f the
periods where traders use the fundamentalist strategy, the use o f this strategy can be
attributed to official interventions.43
Simulation results suggest that the size o f intervention that is necessary to have a
significant effect on the exchange rate in terms o f moving the exchange rate in the
desired direction decreases with the size o f misalignment, and that misalignments would
have been larger in the absence o f intervention. One very interesting remark by Kubelec
(2004a: 38) is: “the model identifies many interventions as having a significant effect on
the path o f the exchange rate, even in case where they do not seem to effect the trend in
the short run.”

43 The author arrives at this result by attributing one fundamentalist strategy to all fundamentalists in the
market.
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Taylor (2004) provides indirect evidence on the effectiveness o f official
intervention in terms o f limiting the size o f swings in the real exchange rate. Using a
Markov-switching model, Taylor shows that intervention in the Deutche mark/U.S. dollar
market during the period o f 1985-1998 has increased the probability o f stability when the
rate is misaligned, and that this probability grows with the degree o f misalignment. In this
approach, the assumption is that market participants switch between a mean-reverting
(stable) regime and an unstable regime, in which the exchange rate moves away from its
fundamental equilibrium according to some specific rule. Taylor allows for transition
probabilities between the two regimes to be affected by, among other factors, the degree
o f misalignment in the exchange rate and official intervention. He estimates a model that
relates the transition probabilities to official intervention, the degree o f misalignment in
the exchange rate and other factors, and concludes that intervention increases the
probability o f switching from the unstable to the stable regime when it takes place at
times when the real exchange rate is far from its equilibrium. The authors interpret these
findings as indirect evidence on the coordination channel.
The studies by Kubelec (2004a,b) and Taylor (2004) provide evidence that
official intervention is effective in limiting the magnitude o f exchange rate swings.
However, they do so by attributing two strategies - one fundamental, or stable, and one
chartist, or unstable - to all market participants, with a fixed rule according to which
individuals switch between strategies. As such, neither allows for different strategies
among individuals, or for the creation o f new strategies, thus ruling out any individual
creativity related to the choice and revisions o f forecasting strategies. In Chapter 3, I
build on a model by Frydman and Goldberg (2007) that allows individuals to creatively
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cope with imperfect knowledge when formulating their forecasts o f the future exchange
rate and discuss its implications for central bank policy. Then in Chapter 6, I provide
additional empirical evidence suggesting that official intervention coupled with parity
announcement may lead to swings o f smaller magnitude through the uncertainty premium
channel.

4. Conclusion

This chapter discussed studies testing the effectiveness o f official intervention.
The majority o f these studies have defined interventions to be effective if they are
successful in turning around the exchange rate in the few days, weeks or months
following interventions. As such, they have missed an important question, which is
whether official intervention has been effective in limiting swings in exchange rates. I
investigate this issue in Chapter 6.
The major finding o f the studies testing for the effectiveness o f official
intervention is that intervention has a significant but a short-lasting effect on exchange
rates (up to 3 months). Several o f these studies have also analyzed the effects o f official
exchange rate communication by authorities and have concluded almost unanimously that
such communications have a significant effect on exchange rate movements in the short
run (up to 40 days). These findings combined with the strong evidence for the reaction o f
exchange rates to news regarding macroeconomic fundamentals suggest that parity
announcement based on fundamentals and official intervention might be effective in
limiting exchange rate swings. This result is important for my model that is presented in
Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3

LIMITING SWINGS IN EXCHANGE RATES:
THE UNCERTAINTY PREMIUM CHANNEL

1 Introduction

In the preceding chapter I argued that the empirical literature on the effectiveness
o f central bank intervention and official communication by authorities on their views
about the stance o f the exchange rate in relation to macroeconomic fundamentals
suggests that such policies have significant influence on short-run exchange rate
movements. However, while these studies provide valuable evidence on the short-run
effectiveness o f exchange rate policy, they miss a key question: Does intervention and
parity announcement provide a way for central banks to limit the magnitude o f exchange
rate swings away from benchmark levels? The empirical studies o f Kubelec (2004a,b)
and Taylor (2004) provide some evidence that this may be the case. However, Kubelec’s
(2004a,b) analysis is based on an exchange rate model in which swings away from
historical benchmark levels occur because market participants irrationally rely on
technical trading rules rather than macroeconomic fundamentals in forming their
forecasts. As I discussed in Chapter 2, however, there is much evidence that market
participants do care about fundamentals. Taylor (2004), for his part, provides no
theoretical model at all.
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In this chapter, I first sketch a model o f the premium on foreign exchange
developed in Frydman and Goldberg (2007). The Frydman and Goldberg model replaces
the usual specification o f preferences based on risk aversion and expected utility theory
with preferences based on endogenous prospect theory. It also replaces REH with
imperfect knowledge

economics (IKE) representations o f individual forecasting

behavior.1 Frydman and Goldberg show that these alternative assumptions lead to a new
equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market, which they call uncertaintyadjusted uncovered interest parity (UAUIP).
In this chapter I extend the Frydman and Goldberg model to allow for the
possibility o f intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate to some announced or
unannounced parity level. I then show that the Frydman and Goldberg model provides a
new channel through which these policy tools can limit swings in exchange rates away
from benchmark levels. This analysis, in turn, suggests a new way to test the efficacy o f
central bank intervention. The question is not whether central bank intervention can turn
around the exchange rate over the next few days, but rather whether such policy can limit
the magnitude o f exchange rate swings. As was discussed in Chapter 2, for the most part,
the literature has not examined this question. The Frydman and Goldberg premium model
implies that in currency markets that are characterized with central bank intervention at
unpredictable moments in time aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some pre
announced or unannounced parity level, exchange rates will experience smaller swings

1 IKE representations o f forecasting behavior recognize that in making choices, individuals have to cope
with imperfect knowledge. Consequently, individuals do not rely on one fixed forecasting strategy
endlessly. To characterize an individual’s forecasting behavior, an IKE model imposes only qualitative
restrictions on how individuals may revise their forecasting strategies. Such IKE restrictions allow for
myriad possible revisions o f forecasting strategies at each point in time and yet they impose sufficient
structure on the analysis to generate testable implications. See Section 3 in this chapter.
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for the same swing in exchange rate expectations compared to currency markets without
such policy intervention.
The remainder o f the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2, I outline the
Frydman and Goldberg model o f the premium and discuss UAUIP. In Section 3 , 1 discuss
how the Frydman and Goldberg model is compatible with exchange rate swings away
from historical benchmark levels. Then in section 4 , 1 extend the Frydman and Goldberg
premium model and show that it implies a new channel - the uncertainty premium
channel - through which central bank policy can affect exchange rate swings. In this
section I also discuss how the extended Frydman and Goldberg model informs us about
the way in which one can re-examine exchange rate policy. Section 5 concludes the
chapter.

2 The Frydman and Goldberg Model

It is useful to begin my sketch o f the Frydman and Goldberg model with a
discussion o f how individuals speculate in the foreign exchange market and how they
determine how much money to place at risk. I will then turn to the new equilibrium
condition for the foreign exchange market - UAUIP.

2.1 Speculation in the Foreign Exchange Market

I assume that there are two countries, A (the domestic country) and B, and two
types o f non-monetary assets, A and B bonds, where these bonds are denominated in
country-A currency (the domestic currency) and country-B currency, respectively. Both
domestic and foreign individuals can issue A and B bonds, i.e., they can borrow domestic
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and foreign currency, respectively, without limit. The risk-free nominal returns on these
bonds from time t to r + 1 are denoted by if and i f , respectively.
Consider how a country-A individual would take a pure long position in foreign
exchange for one period, which requires no money down at time t ? He would borrow,
say, one unit o f domestic currency at time t at the rate i f . He would then immediately

sell this one unit o f domestic currency at the spot rate, — , and lend — units o f foreign
st
s,
currency at the rate i f , where the exchange rate, s ,, is defined as the price o f foreign
currency in terms o f the domestic currency. At the end o f the period, at time t + 1, he
would sell — (l + if ) units o f foreign exchange at the spot rate, St+V The nominal return
st
on his pure long position would then be -^±L(l + /,B) - ( l + //4) , the log approximation of
st
which is given by:
Rt\l+i = S l+l - s , + i f - i f

(1)

Similarly, to take a pure short position in foreign exchange, an individual would
borrow foreign currency at time t at the rate i f , purchase domestic currency at the rate
s ,, lend out the domestic currency at the rate if and at the end o f time t + 1 convert the

2 Speculation o f a country-B individual is identical to the speculation o f a country-A individual.
3 Note that lowercase letters denote realizations while uppercase letters denote random variables. Thus, for
example, S +i denotes the future spot exchange rate, which is not known at time t , and is therefore a
random variable. Similarly, R

is a random variable that stands for the unconditional distribution for the

nominal excess return.
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domestic currency back to foreign currency at the r a t e

. So, the log approximation for
1

the nominal return on his pure short position would be given by:

(2 )

An individual’s speculative decision involves the choice o f speculating in the
foreign exchange market or staying out o f the market. If he decides to speculate, he also
has to decide on the amount o f wealth he would want to place at risk, called the position
size. Frydman and Goldberg model the speculative decision problem by assuming that an
individual chooses his position size so as to maximize his utility. They use endogenous
prospect theory that builds on the prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992), and IKE representations o f forecasts. One needs to
represent forecasts because at time t an individual does not know what the future spot
exchange rate will be, and thus, at time t , he formulates a forecast o f the one-periodahead real return on a pure long or short position in foreign exchange and chooses his
utility-maximizing position size.4
As will be discussed in Section 2.3.2, to take an open position in the foreign
exchange market, an individual requires some minimum positive return. An individual
would take a long position in foreign exchange if he believes that the exchange rate
would go up from time t to t + 1, and he forecasts some positive return on the foreign
currency, R^t+x=S^M - s t + i f - i f

in excess o f some minimum return, where S{;l+[

4 The real return is, as usual, defined as the nominal return less the inflation rate, where individuals from
country A are assumed to care only about the country-A inflation. See Section 2.2.1.
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denotes the log level o f his time-1 forecast o f the time t + 1 spot rate.5 Such an individual
is called a bull. He would take a short position in foreign exchange if he believes that the
exchange rate would fall from time t to t +1 and he forecasts some positive return on the
domestic currency, Rfl+l = st - Sfl+l + if - if in excess o f some minimum return, where
Sl]t+{ denotes the log level o f his time-1 forecast o f the time / + 1 spot rate. An individual
that believes that the exchange rate would fall is called a bear.
In the next section, I discuss prospect theory in the context o f the foreign
exchange market. This section is followed by endogenous prospect theory, which
includes discussions on IKE representations o f forecasts and the new equilibrium
condition for the foreign exchange market, UAUIP.

2.2 Prospect Theory in the Context o f the Foreign Exchange Market6

Prospect theory is an alternative way to model preferences o f individuals to
explain the often gross inconsistencies between the actual choices o f individuals who are
faced with risky or uncertain outcomes, and the predictions based on standard preferences
with risk aversion. One o f the key assumptions o f prospect theory, called reference
dependence, is that rather than the level o f final wealth, individuals care about changes in

5 Modeling forecasting behavior requires some representation o f how individuals formulate and update
their forecasts. Thus, a ‘A’ denotes the representation o f a forecast. The Frydman and Goldberg model
emphasizes that there is a difference between the forecast o f the market participant and the representation
o f that forecast by an economist.
6 See Appendix A for the original formulation o f prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and
Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
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wealth relative to some reference level o f wealth, i.e. it is gains and losses that matter.7
Another important assumption is loss aversion: wealth holders are assumed to be more
sensitive to losses than to gains o f the same size. Prospect theory also assumes
diminishing sensitivity: that the utility function depends nonlinearly on the magnitudes of
gains and losses and that the marginal value o f gains and losses decreases with their size.
To capture these assumptions, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose a particular
parametric utility function. Because this utility function is specified in terms o f gains and
losses, we need to first define these in the context o f the foreign exchange market.
2.2.1

Gains and Losses in the Foreign Exchange Market. Gains and losses for

individuals that participate in the foreign exchange market are defined by the change in
the individual’s wealth from time t to t + 1. If a country A individual starts with an initial
non-monetary real wealth o f Wt‘, then her time / + 1 wealth, Wt'+1, is equal to her initial
wealth at time t plus her real returns from domestic and foreign bonds:

K , = w, [1+a' (s;„, - s, + if - p ,)+(l -

)(;/ - P, )]

(3)

where the individual’s wealth is given by her domestic and foreign bond holdings,
Wt‘ = A' + B 't ; a\ is an individual’s share o f B bonds at time t; p, is the non-stochastic
domestic rate o f inflation; and (l

- /? ,) and a\ (S1^

- s t + if - />,) represent the

Q

real returns from domestic and foreign bonds, respectively.

7 This is as opposed to the assumption in expected utility theory that individuals care about the level o f their
final wealth. For a further discussion on the differences between expected utility theory and prospect
theory, see Appendix A.
8 Domestic individuals are assumed to use only domestic prices to deflate nominal values.
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Substituting in for R ‘{l+l = S't{t+1 - s, + if for an individual’s one-period ahead
nominal return on a pure long position in foreign exchange, and rearranging, the change
in an individual’s wealth from time t to t + 1, AW/+1, relative to some reference level of
wealth, r ; +1,is given by:

=K, - C

= ^ '[ « X w + (1 + ^

(4)

Frydman and Goldberg define T' as the level o f wealth that an individual would
obtain if she were to stay out o f the foreign exchange market at time t:9
r = w :(\+ i? -p ,)

(5)

a w ‘l+l= a;w;R;]l+i

(6)

Substituting (5) in (4) gives:

When AW,;tl > 0 ( a W ‘tl< 0 ) , an individual is said to experience a gain (loss). A
positive realization o f R ‘!<+1, denoted by r* ,, leads to a gain (loss) for an individual if she
holds a long (short) position, in which case she is called a bull (bear). Recall that a bull
(bear) is an individual who gains when the price o f foreign exchange, i.e. the exchange
rate, increases (falls). A negative realization o f R ‘tll+l, denoted by r ~
+], leads to the
converse: a loss for a bull and a gain for a bear. Note also that holding a long (short)
position implies that a domestic wealth holder holds her wealth in foreign (domestic)

9 Barberis and Huang (2001) and Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) also use this reference level. This
definition provides for a final level o f wealth that an individual obtains by investing her initial wealth on
domestic bonds.
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bonds, i.e. a't > 0 ( a\ < 0) .10 To sum up, for a bull at > 0, r 8 = rt+
+l and rl = rl+x and for a
bear at < 0 ,r 8 = -r~ t and r l = -r*+l .n
2.2.2

The Original Tversky and Kahneman Utility Function. In the context o f the

foreign exchange market, Tversky and Kahneman’s value function can be written as
follows:

(Wt \atr 81)
V (A W ) =

if AW > 0

b
-X(W t \ a / ^

(7>
ifA W < 0

where Wt , as before, denotes an individual’s non-monetary real wealth at time t\ at is
the share o f foreign bonds; r 8 and r 1 denote a single gain and loss from speculation on a
unit position; and a , p and X are parameters, explained below.

19

This value function embodies the experimental findings by Kahneman and
Tversky on how individuals actually choose among gambles with uncertain outcomes. It
embodies the experimental finding that individuals care about the changes in wealth
rather than the level o f wealth. The assumption o f diminishing sensitivity is captured by
the parameters a and P , where the decreasing marginal value o f gains and losses with
their size implies that both a < 1 and P < 1. The finding o f loss aversion (individuals

10 A domestic individual can hold a short position in foreign exchange if she holds A bonds in excess o f her
total wealth, i.e. ( l - a\ ) > 1, which is possible by borrowing foreign exchange at

(i.e. by issuing B

bonds), exchanging this foreign exchange at the spot rate for domestic currency and then using this
domestic currency to buy A bonds.
11 Note that for ease o f notation, the subscript /' is eliminated from this point on.
12 The absolute value function ensures that the value function is relevant for both bulls and bears in the
sense that both Wt ja,r* j and Wt \ a f | are always positive.
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being more sensitive to losses than gains o f the same size) is captured by the loss
aversion parameter A . Under the assumption that a = p , that Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) as well as other researchers have used for practical purposes, A > 1.

1"X

The utility function given in (7) attaches a value to single outcomes. However, to
represent an individual’s preferences over prospects (or gambles) with different outcomes
one needs to arrive at a weighted sum o f the single outcomes comprising a gamble, i.e.
the prospective utility o f a gamble.14
2.2.3

The Prospective Utility o f a Gamble. In the context o f the foreign exchange

market, the prospective utility o f a gamble involving a long position o f size Wt |at | , where
a, > 0 , is given by:

where 7t+
j k and n~k denote the weights that an individual attaches to the utility o f each
positive and negative outcome k , respectively, called decision weights',15 K j is the set o f
outcomes comprised o f potential gains; K~ is the set o f outcomes comprised o f potential
losses, and K j = K* +K~ is the set o f potential returns from choosing gamble j;
r^+l k and r^+1k denote the positive and negative values o f ^ +1, respectively, which
stands for the representation o f an individual’s forecast o f Rl+l.

Thus, the prospective

13 For more details on the three experimental findings and the value function, see Appendix A.
14 For a more formal definition o f a prospect, see Appendix A.
15 Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present experimental evidence that these decision-weights are nonlinear
functions o f the true probabilities - individuals tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight
moderate and high probabilities. For details, see Appendix A.
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utility o f a gamble is composed o f the sum o f the utilities o f single losses and gains
weighted by the decision weights.16
Recalling that for a bear at < 0 and that the set o f potential gains (losses) consists
o f the negative (positive) values in Rt|(+1, the prospective utility from a short position is
given by

2.2.4 Applying Prospect Theory to Real World Markets. Kahneman and
Tversky’s experimental evidence concerning the properties o f their utility function is
compelling. However, the application o f prospect theory to model both individual
behavior and aggregate outcomes in real markets is challenging. One problem is posed by
the utility function being nonlinear in gains and losses.

17

•

What this nonlinearity means is

that one cannot represent utility in terms o f expected values for an individual.
Furthermore, with heterogeneous forecasts, one cannot aggregate to obtain an equilibrium
condition in terms o f the aggregate expected values.
To circumvent these difficulties, economists have constrained the marginal value
of gains and losses to be constant by assuming a linear utility function, that is, by setting

16 This is very similar to expected utility theory, which sets the expected utility o f a gamble equal to the
weighted sum o f the utilities o f single outcomes, with weights being equal to probabilities.
17 For other issues related to the application o f prospect theory to real markets, see Appendix A and Chapter
9 in Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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a = (5 = 1.

18

• •
•
This linear specification o f the utility function, however, has a number o f
•

drawbacks. It is inconsistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental findings on
how individuals make decisions under uncertainty. Furthermore, with a linear utility
function, one does not get limits to speculation, which is necessary for a well-defined
equilibrium condition. What this implies is that an individual would either stay out o f the
foreign exchange market when she believes that she will not be able to cover her
potential losses, or she would want to hold a position o f unlimited size whenever she
perceives profit opportunities.19 20 To see why this is the case, let us reconsider the
prospective utilities for a bull and a bear, as given by equations (8) and (9). Let us define

pG i

+1=Z

(%+u J

k

’

PLU =

-Z Vu (_iVu f
k

and

1

PK+ =

+PL' ^

respectively as the prospective gain, loss and return on a unit long position from time t to

t +1;

and

similarly,

K+

I

\a

PG?lt+l = Z ^ +u H k * J

’

K

P 4 +i = “ Z ’W

k

i

( ^ j

\P

and

k

PR?]t^ = PG*t+x + PL^t+x as the prospective gain, loss and return on a unit short position.
Then if we constrain a = p = 1, the prospective utilities for a bull and a bear become
linear in both prospects and position size:

PUl- = ( a w , ) [ p ^ -(1 -A )P Z ‘ „ ]

(10)

18 Schmidt and Zank (2001) use a piece-wise linear utility specification where the utility function is linear
in both gains and loses, but steeper in the region o f losses. Although this solves the aggregation problem, it
does not allow for diminishing sensitivity.
19 As DeLong et.al. (1990a, b) have emphasized, to obtain a well defined equilibrium under the
assumptions o f heterogeneous forecasts and unlimited short selling one needs limits to speculation.
20 In fact, as long as a = p , even if these are not constrained to be equal to 1, there will be no limits to
speculation (see Frydman and Goldberg, 2007).
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/>c/f=(0(f,)[/>^„-(i-2)w;„]

(ii)

Accordingly, an individual would stay out o f the market if her prospective return
is less than her prospective loss on either a long or a short position, i.e.
PR[;l+l < ( \-A ) P L ^ t+l and PR*t+] < ( l -A )P L ^ t+l, because taking any open position would
lead to a negative prospective utility. If her prospective return from taking a long (short)
position

is

larger

than

her

prospective

loss,

i.e.

PR^l+l > (l - A) PL^+l

( PRu+i > (l - A) PLsl]l+l), however, then every unit increase in her long (short) position size
would raise her prospective utility. Thus, she would not only decide to take a long (short)
position, but she would want to take a long (short) position o f unlimited size.21
Thus, to obtain a well-defined equilibrium, Barberis and Huang (2001), Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001), as well as other behavioral-finance economists have relied on
risk-averse preferences, despite the rejection o f this assumption in the behavioral
literature in favor o f loss aversion.22
To apply prospect theory to the foreign exchange market, Frydman and Goldberg
(2007) propose a utility function that embodies endogenous loss aversion, where the
degree o f loss aversion depends on the position size. In contrast to other behavioralfinance models, this alternative formulation o f the utility function that is based on
endogenous prospect theory does not violate any o f Kahneman and Tversky’s

21 This result is based on the assumption that the reference level o f wealth that individuals consider relevant
is the level o f wealth they would receive if they stay out o f the market, as defined in (5). However, even
when reference levels are not defined in this way, in general when a = P , there are no limits to
speculation. See Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
22 See Barberis and Thaler (2003).
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experimental findings. The following section demonstrates how Frydman and Goldberg
get limits to speculation by using the utility function that was defined in equation (7).

2.3 Endogenous Loss Aversion

2.3.1

Limits to Speculation. To illustrate how endogenous loss aversion leads to a

well-defined equilibrium in the foreign exchange market, let us once more consider the
utility function given in equation (7), which is rewritten below for convenience:23

(Wt \air g\ J

ifA W > 0

V (A W ) :
-X { W t \atr ,]^

if AW < 0

Now let us once again consider the loss aversion parameter. Loss aversion is
defined as the ratio o f disutility from losses to the utility from gains o f the same
magnitude. Thus, to find the loss aversion parameter, one needs to express the utility
function in gains and losses o f the same magnitude. When a - f i , the utility function
becomes V (AW ) = (Wt

j ~ x (W t |a,rl j . In this case, loss aversion is given by the

parameter A > 1 ,24 To derive the loss aversion parameter with the more general case
when a * f holds, let us rewrite the utility function as:

23 Note that endogenous prospect theory is defined with the modified utility function that is discussed in
Appendix A. The utility fimction discussed in this section is only used to demonstrate limits to speculation
when the loss aversion parameter depends on the position size. For a discussion on why Frydman and
Goldberg needed to modify this function, see below.
24 The ratio o f disutility from losses to the utility lfom gains o f the same magnitude is equal to

A (w \ar'\)a
— ' U- = X.

{ W \a f\ y
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V ( A W ) = (W, \atr g\y - x ( w t | a / | ) ^ “ [w, | a / | ) “

( 12)

In this case, the parameter o f loss aversion is given by:

(13)

As can be seen from equation (13), the degree o f loss aversion is endogenous
because it depends on the position size, at . When a < /? holds, which is consistent with
the experimental evidence o f Kahneman and Tversky indicating that the curvature o f the
utility function in the domain o f losses is greater than in the domain o f gains, the degree
o f loss aversion increases with the speculative position size

-------> 0 . 25 What

endogenous loss aversion implies is that, as an individual increases her position size, her
disutility o f losses relative to gains increases. Therefore, she limits her position size. This
is the case because with endogenous loss aversion the prospective utility becomes
concave in the position size, as opposed to the linear case when a = P .
It should be noted that although the utility function given in (7) provides a utilitymaximizing position size, and thus, limits to speculation, for a range o f small values for
the position size

it implies that individuals would prefer losses over gains.

Therefore, Frydman and Goldberg propose a modified utility function that implies that
individuals prefer gains over losses for any position size. This utility function is
associated with prospective utilities that are linear in prospective gains and losses and
nonlinear in position size. The linearity o f the prospective utilities allows for aggregation

25 See Appendix A.
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across heterogeneous individuals, i.e. bulls and bears. The nonlinearity o f prospective
utilities in the position size implies limits to speculation. This alternative formulation o f
the utility function is discussed in Appendix A. The next section discusses the utilitymaximizing position size that follows from this modified utility function.
2.3.2

The Utility-Maximizing Position Size. Using the modified utility function,

the utility-maximizing position size that individuals decide to hold in the foreign
exchange market depends on their forecasted loss on a unit position and their degree of
loss aversion:

(14)

(is )

where L and S stand for Tong’ and ‘short’ positions; as before, at is the share o f B
A

bonds at time t and Wt denotes non-monetary real wealth at time t ; r(j(+1 and ll l+l are the
forecasted return and loss, respectively, from a unit position size, defined below; and
\ > 1 and A, = ^ - —
a

>0

represent the degree o f loss aversion.26 Note that the

forecasted return on a unit position for a bull and a bear is respectively given by
^i/+i = ^+ i ~ st + ^ ~

ar*d f"r\t+\ - _ ( Am ~ A + i? ~ i? ) • The forecasted loss on a unit

26 The utility-maximizing position size for a bull and a bear given by equations (14) and (15) is obtained
using the modified utility function that is discussed in Appendix A. These are obtained by differentiating
the prospective utilities for a bull and a bear with respect to at and setting the resulting equations equal to
zero.
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position is given by the expectation o f a negative return: f^+1 = E[r^t+l < 0) and
/,:)+l =E(r^t+x < 0) for bulls and bears, respectively.27
These expressions for the position size have important implications for an
individual’s speculative decision problem. They imply that an individual’s assessment o f
the potential loss on a unit position and her degree o f loss aversion may be so large that
although she forecasts a positive return from speculation she nevertheless decides to stay
out of the market. In other words, an individual requires some minimum return before she
takes a long or short position in foreign exchange. The expressions for the utilitymaximizing position size for a bull and a bear, given by equations (14) and (15), show
that this minimum return, called the uncertainty premium, depends on the forecasted loss
on a unit position, /,k+l, and the parameter o f loss aversion, A ,:

= ( i - a K h >0

(16)

5 » . i = ( 1- 4 ) ' , H > 0

( 17)

Accordingly, an individual should stay out o f the market, i.e. set at = 0 , when her
forecasted return from taking either a long or a short position is less than her uncertainty
premium, i.e. r^t+i < uplil+] and rtj;+1 < up^l+].

Note that under risk neutral preferences, a

positive expected return o f any size would lead an individual to take an open position in
foreign exchange. Because individuals are loss averse, however, they need some

27 The way in which Frydman and Goldberg model the individual forecast o f losses on a unit position is
discussed in Section 2.3.4.
28 An individual that stays out o f the foreign exchange market holds all o f her wealth in domestic assets.
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minimum positive return to compensate them for their aversion to losses. Thus, an
individual would hold a long position in foreign exchange o f size a^Wt only if the
forecasted return from holding a long position is larger than her uncertainty premium, i.e.
L

r(' +| > uptl+l (equations (14) and (16)). If, on the other hand, the forecasted return on a

short position is greater than her uncertainty premium, i.e. rt|/+1 > upt|(+l, a market
participant should hold a short position in foreign exchange o f size afW, (equations (15)
and (17)).
In general then, to take an open position in the foreign exchange market, each
individual expects to receive a return in excess o f her uncertainty premium, where this
A/

S

so-called excess return is given by rllt+l - upt[l+[ and r,!(+1 - up,!<+1 for bulls and bears,
respectively.29
We are now ready to discuss the new equilibrium condition for the foreign
exchange market implied by endogenous prospect theory, UAUIP.
2.3.3

UAUIP.30 Equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is generally defined

as the balance between the demand for and supply o f foreign exchange. Under
endogenous prospect theory such a balance is characterized by the equality between the
expected returns on domestic and foreign assets once these returns are adjusted for

29 Note that this definition o f the excess return is different from its conventional use in the literature, where
it represents the return on foreign bonds,

St||+1 - st + f , in excess o f the return on domestic bonds, i ' , both

in domestic currency units.
30 UAUIP is derived in Appendix A.
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-J 1

market participants’ greater sensitivity to losses.

This equality can be expressed as

follows:

r,\,+x = p r tv+,

( 18)

Pr t\l+x = u p t\l+i+AsIFPt

( 19)

where32

(20)35

B f-J ls ,

w,
In the last equation, B f and A? denote the total value o f B and A bonds that are
held by country-A and country-B wealth holders, respectively; Wt = ^jT Wtl is the total

31 It is interesting to consider the special case where all market participants are loss averse except for one
individual who is risk neutral. Could that risk neutral individual make higher profits compared to others?
Now if this individual could borrow an unlimited amount o f domestic or foreign currency, which is the
assumption o f the model, then UIP would hold and her expected rate o f return would be zero. If there is
some constraint on the amount o f money she could borrow, and this amount is small enough so that she
could not affect the equilibrium exchange rate, then UAUIP would hold. If there is one aggregate
forecasting strategy, which she knows, and the exchange rate moves according to this strategy, then she
would receive the same return as all other market participants who are loss averse. If the exchange rate
moves in the opposite direction, she would incur losses. In either case she would not be able to make higher
profits compared to market participants who are loss averse.
32 Equations (20) and (21) assume that bulls and bears share the total non-monetary wealth equally.

33

The aggregate expected return is given by rtm = —(/^+l - rj'+l) because the return on short positions is

- R lt] (see equation (2)). In this case,
1 T

/ 't

•«

^ +i = - L ( v . - s. +j,

\

-B

-A M

S 'l '+I
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non-monetary wealth o f individuals in the market in countries A and B; and IFPt stands
for the international financial position o f country A vis-a-vis country B, expressed as a
proportion o f total market wealth. If IFPt > 0 (IFPt < 0 ), country A is a net creditor
(debtor) to country B. Also note that a positive B f

represents the aggregate long

(short) position held by individuals from country A (country B), net o f any short (long)
positions at time t . Thus, IFPt is also the net supply o f long positions.
UAUIP can be written as:

C ~up\t+1=C - upI+i+^IFP>

(23)

As can be seen from this equation, in the aggregate, the side o f the market that
forecasts a larger excess return is determined by the sign o f IFPt . If, for example,
IFPt > 0 , then in equilibrium, the forecasted return by bulls in excess o f their uncertainty
premium must be larger than that o f bears in order to compensate them for their larger
open position, i.e. |r ^ +1 - u p l]l+] j >

- u p t]t+1j . This is the case because a positive lFPt

implies a net supply o f long positions that bulls must hold. This larger supply o f long
positions implies that bulls’ perceived exposure to potential losses is higher relative to
that of bears. Therefore, bulls will be willing to hold this larger supply o f long positions
only if they forecast a higher excess return compared to bears.
We saw in this section that the market premium depends on the aggregate
uncertainty premium o f bulls and bears, which depend on bulls’ and bears’ forecast o f the
potential unit loss. Thus, to use UAUIP as an equilibrium condition for the premium, one
needs to model the expected losses o f bulls and bears.
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2.3.4 The Uncertainty Premium and the Gap from the Historical Benchmark.
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) model expected losses by using a behavioral insight from
Keynes (1936). In discussing why an individual might prefer to hold cash instead o f some
interest-bearing asset, Keynes draws a connection between what he calls the fear of
potential losses and the gap between the interest rate and its ‘safe’ historical benchmark
level.34 He argues that the decision o f holding cash instead o f some interest-bearing asset
will be determined not by the absolute level o f the interest rate, but by “the degree o f its
divergence from what is considered a fairly safe level o f r [the interest rate].” (Keynes,
1936: 201)
Frydman and Goldberg apply this insight to the foreign exchange market, and
model an individual’s expected loss from holding an open position in the foreign
exchange market to depend on her assessment o f the gap from some historical
benchmark. They capture this relationship by assuming that an individual’s expected unit
loss depends on the gap between the forecasted exchange rate and some historical
benchmark level for the exchange rate, gap^t+] = sll+] - S, m. As will be explained further
below, for a bull, an increase in the gap implies higher potential losses, whereas for a
bear a higher gap implies lower potential losses. The qualitative nature o f this implication
follows from the IKE representations o f forecasted returns and losses, which recognize
that in making choices, individuals have to cope with imperfect knowledge.
In representing forecasts, Frydman and Goldberg allow for differences among
information sets that individuals use as well as differences in forecasting strategies.

34 A historical benchmark is a stable and slowly moving rate that provides a long run anchor for exchange
rates. Independently o f the way in which the benchmark is measured, it moves more slowly compared to
exchange rates.
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Furthermore, their representations also allow for a speculator to change her strategy if she
believes that this would lead to higher profits. She can do so by switching to another
existing strategy, or by inventing a new one. To model such revisions in forecasting
strategies, Frydman and Goldberg use qualitative conditions. One set o f such conditions,
called the gap restrictions, implies that an individual’s revised forecasting strategy must
be consistent with a positive (negative) relationship between the magnitude o f her
potential loss and the gap from historical benchmark if she is a bull (bear). As such, IKE
representations o f forecasting behavior describe the qualitative properties that different
forecasting strategies and/or their revisions have in common.
Thus, while the IKE assumption implies that when the gap increases, bulls’
prospective loss and thus uncertainty premium increase, and bears’ prospective loss and
uncertainty premium decrease, it does not imply a specific quantitative relationship. In
this dissertation, however, I am investigating whether the effect o f the gap on the
uncertainty premium could depend on the exchange rate regime. As I discuss in Sections
3.2 and 4 o f this chapter, it is possible that the weight attached to the gap from historical
benchmark is on the average higher for markets that are characterized by central bank
intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate towards some parity level. Furthermore,
in Chapter 6 I test for the magnitude o f this effect across different exchange rate regimes.
Therefore, I assume that the relationship between the gap and the premium is stable over
time, and use the following functions for bulls and bears, respectively:35 36

35 In Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss the possibility o f a
benchmark.

to be varying with the gap from the historical

36 Note that the historical benchmark levels for bulls and bears are aggregates o f individual benchmarks.
Individual benchmarks are likely to differ from each other due to imperfect knowledge, which encompasses
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(25)

where .?,j;+l and .?£+1 denote the log levels o f the bulls’ and bears’ time t forecast o f the
time t +1 spot rate, respectively; s™'1 and s™,s stand respectively for the bulls’ and
bears’ assessment o f the historical benchmark at time t , around which bulls and bears
believe the exchange rate swings revolve; a 1 > 0 and a s > 0 are parameters that reflect
the importance that bulls and bears, respectively, attach to the gap from the historical
benchmark; and 0 L > 0 and 0 s >0 are constant parameters that are large enough to
ensure that upll+l and up,!(+1are positive.
In the aggregate, the uncertainty premium is given by:

1

1

=

(26)

where & = ^ & L + d s ^ denotes the aggregate o f bulls’ and bears’ weight attached to the

gap from the historical benchmark; st]t+]

+ s^l+]) stands for the bulls’ and bears’

aggregate time t forecast o f the time t + 1 exchange rate; s™

) stands

the difference in variables that individuals deem important for benchmark levels, as well as the different
ways in which they incorporate new information about such variables.
37 The parameters 6 ’ and 6 s become important when s^

< s ' 8 ’’ and/or s*+l > s “B,s.
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for the aggregate o f bulls’ and bears’ assessment o f the historical benchmark; and

Let us now discuss the implications o f equations (24)-(26). Market participants
are assumed to know that the exchange rate experiences long swings - it has a tendency
to move away from benchmark levels for extended periods o f time only to be followed by
sustained countermovements back. The problem that individuals face is that they do not
know exactly when such swings in exchange rates away from benchmark levels end and
the countermovement begins. A bull in the market believes that the future exchange rate
will be further from the benchmark than the current spot exchange rate. A bear, on the
other hand, believes that the future exchange rate will be closer to the benchmark than the
current exchange rate. Suppose, for example, that the exchange rate is above the
historical benchmark and that gap,!<+1 = sl{l+1 - s™ > 0. Bulls believe that the exchange
rate will continue moving away, while bears believe that it will revert back to the
historical benchmark. Now suppose that both bulls and bears increase their forecast o f the
future exchange rate, i.e. both i^ +1 and i^ +1 rise, while their assessment o f the historical
benchmark remains unchanged.38 39 The increase in s^!+x leads to a larger gap from the

38 Note that in general, it is possible that an increase in s(|I+1 is associated with an increase in

and a fall

in S*+1, which means that both bulls and bears would increase their assessment o f potential losses, leading
^

L

^

S

to an increase in both upi]rA and uplll+l. Thus, the aggregate uncertainty premium could, in general, rise or
fall. Frydman and Goldberg derive what they call relative gap conditions, under which the aggregate
uncertainty premium would still rise with an increase in the gap. These relative gap conditions state that “if
the bulls revise their assessment o f the gap by a greater (smaller) magnitude compared with the bears, then
they would also tend to revise their forecasts o f the unit loss by a greater (smaller) magnitude.” Frydman
and Goldberg (2007, Ch. 12, pg. 10)
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benchmark and this rise leads our bulls to become more concerned about the potential
loss of continuing to bet on a continuation o f the swing away, which would result if the
exchange rate were to revert back to its benchmark level. Therefore bulls require a higher
uncertainty premium to speculate in the currency market, i.e. a up,m rises (equation (24)
). Bears, on the other hand, become less concerned about potential losses, which would
result if the exchange rate were to continue moving away from the historical benchmark.
Therefore, bears require a lower premium, i.e. up,!(+1 falls (equation (25)). This increase

in up,j,+] and fall in upt{l+l leads to a higher uncertainty premium in the aggregate.

39 Note that in general, a market participant is a bear as long as she forecasts the exchange rate to be lower
than the current spot exchange rate, s* +1 < j . Thus, a bear increasing her forecast o f the future spot
exchange rate in general implies that she forecasts a smaller fall in the exchange rate, compared to her
previous forecast. It is, however, possible that an individual is a bear even when s*+1 > s . That would be
the case if the interest rate differential,

i“ - 1' , is more negative than s*+| - s , which would still imply a

positive expected return on a short position. Such a case, however, would not change any o f the basic
arguments.
y*s L

40 Recall that wp,|(+l =

^

S

- wp„,+I.

41 Note that this result does not depend on the sign o f the gap, i.e. even if gap:[Mt = £(|(+| - s'" < 0 , as bulls
and bears increase their forecast o f the future exchange rate towards the benchmark, the aggregate
uncertainty premium would rise. To see why this is the case, let us first work out the case with gop,1(+l < 0
and both s ‘ +| and

decreasing further below the benchmark. In this case, bears become more
^

L

concerned about an eventual countermovement, while bulls become less concerned. Thus, upf:i) falls while
S

upiit] rises. In the aggregate, then, as 5

falls, so does the aggregate uncertainty premium. Now if

gop,|(+l < 0 and both bulls and bears increase their forecast o f the future exchange rate towards the
benchmark, then the uncertainty premium for bulls and bears changes in the opposite way. Bears become
^

L

less concerned about an eventual countermovement, while bulls become more concerned. Thus, wp;|I+l rises
S

while uplil+l falls. In the aggregate, then, as S(|1+1 increases, so does the aggregate uncertainty premium.
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Now that we modeled forecasted losses by bulls and bears, we are ready to
discuss how UAUIP serves as an equilibrium condition for the premium on foreign
exchange.
2.3.5 UAUIP as an Equilibrium Condition. To illustrate how UAUIP serves as an
equilibrium condition for the premium, let us rewrite UAUIP by substituting for
r,„+i = V , - s t + i f - i f and p r,m = qp,k+I + ^ IFPt in (18):

(27)

Now
gcipll+l =

suppose

that

initially

the

equilibrium

condition

holds,

and

that

- s[m > 0. Also suppose that both bulls and bears in the market increase

their forecast o f the future exchange rate, i.e. sfl+t and s£+1 both rise. Assume further that
s f K, if and if remain unchanged. As sfl+] rises away from s f B, bulls’ forecasted excess
return rises (recall that r f+x = s£+1 - st + if - i f ), which causes them to want to increase
their position size. If bulls’ expected losses do not change then, bulls increase their long
position (see equation (14) above). Simultaneously, however, the rise in i,|<+1 leads to a
larger gap from the benchmark and this rise leads our bulls to become more concerned
about the potential loss o f continuing to bet on a continuation o f the swing away, which
would result if the exchange rate were to revert back to its benchmark level. Therefore
bulls require a higher uncertainty premium to speculate in the currency market, i.e. a
upl]ux rises (equation (24)). This higher premium restrains bulls’ desire to increase their
long positions. For bears, on the other hand, the increase in sfl+] implies a lower expected
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return (recall that r*+l =

- s t + z,B- if j ), which leads them to reduce their position

size (see equation (15) above). At the same time, bears become less concerned about
potential losses, which would result if the exchange rate were to continue moving away
s

from the historical benchmark. Therefore, they require a lower premium, i.e. up,!<+1 falls
(equation (17)). This lower premium restrains bears’ desire to decrease their short
positions.
In the aggregate, the expected excess return, r/i(+1 = ~(^'+i

) > rises, and so

l j '—l
\
does the premium, upt!<+1 = —\u p lll+l - upllt+l I. Assuming that the increase in the premium
does not completely reduce market participants’ willingness to take open positions, the
rise in the exchange rate forecast creates excess demand for foreign exchange, which bids
up the spot exchange rate to restore equilibrium in the foreign exchange market.42

3 UAUIP and Swings in Exchange Rates

With the gap restrictions that were discussed in the previous section, UAUIP
gives rise to a model o f the premium. To model the exchange rate, however, one needs to
also model exchange rate expectations, the interest rates, the historical benchmark, and
the international financial position. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) develop such an IKE
model, which I briefly discuss in this section.43 Before moving on, let me point out that
the focus o f this dissertation is not on the genesis o f swings. For my purposes, it does not

42 This implies that a < 1, in which case the increase in r

is larger than the rise in wp1|(+l. Therefore, st

rises to restore equilibrium in the market.
43 See Chapter 14 in Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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matter how swings in exchange rates arise. Independently o f the way in which swings
may arise, the Frydman and Goldberg model o f the premium implies that swings in the
exchange rate toward or away from historical benchmarks should be associated with
swings in the aggregate premium on foreign exchange. This is the relationship on which
my dissertation builds.
However, it is worthwhile to discuss the basic idea behind Frydman and
Goldberg’s IKE model o f exchange rate swings model. The dominant view in the
literature is that swings in exchange rates are driven by bubbles, irrationality, or market
psychology (discussed in Chapter 1). However, in Frydman and Goldberg’s IKE model,
exchange rate swings arise without assuming irrationality. Moreover, such behavior can
occur even if all market participants base their forecasts solely on macroeconomic
fundamentals.44

3.1 What Drives Exchange Rate Forecasts Away from Benchmark Levels?

Recall from the discussion in Chapter 1 that the flexible-price and sticky-price
monetary models rely on REH, and thus they fail to provide an explanation for long
swings in exchange rates. In exchange rate models that do generate long swings - the
REH bubble model and behavioral models - swings occur because as exchange rate
expectations move persistently away from historical benchmarks, the exchange rate
follows. With IKE, swings in exchange rates are also driven by exchange rate
expectations. To see how swings in exchange rates occur in the IKE model, consider the
following representation o f the aggregate forecast for the future exchange rate:

44 For the IKE model o f swings, refer to Chapter 14 in Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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(2 8 )

where slV+l depends on a set o f causal variables, x, , called the autonomous component,
and an endogenous component that depends on the level o f the spot exchange rate.
The influence o f the causal variables on the exchange rate forecast, St , is not
constrained either in terms o f algebraic sign or magnitude. Moreover, this influence
might be changing over time.45 The effect o f the spot exchange rate on exchange rate
forecasts is captured by the parameter 0 < y < 1, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be
invariant over time.
According to this specification o f the exchange rate forecast, a change in the
aggregate forecast o f the future exchange rate can occur either because o f new
realizations o f causal variables or the exchange rate, or because o f changes in the
parameters, 8t , attached to each causal variable. This latter change could involve a
change in the set o f causal variables in xt , so that the absence o f a causal variable at time
t , for example, would be represented by 8t = 0 for that specific variable.
In this model, there is no constraint on either the set o f causal variables that might
be deemed important by market participants, or how these variables might matter for
them. In forming their forecasts, market participants may be looking at many factors,
including the historical benchmark as well as other macroeconomic fundamentals, such
as interest rates and current account deficit. The variables individuals deem important
might change over time, as might the way in which these variables matter for them.

45 Allowing the 8 parameters to change over time leads to a piece-wise linear specification o f forecasting
behavior.

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

What role does such a representation o f the aggregate forecast for the future
exchange rate play in terms o f exchange rate swings? According to the specification in
(28), when market participants are presumed to have imperfect knowledge and the policy
environment does not change, swings in exchange rates away from benchmark levels can
arise due to new realizations o f the causal variables with no change in the forecasting
strategy, i.e. changes in xt . In the conventional flexible-price and sticky-price monetary
models, such new realizations in causal variables do not generate swings in real exchange
rates.46 The reason is that these models assume that the structural parameters o f the
economy and the parameters that individuals use in their forecasting strategies are the
same. In other words, they do not allow for diversity in forecasting strategies across
individuals. Therefore, in these models, representations o f individuals’ forecasts on the
exchange rate are tied to PPP. This implies that the real exchange rate equals its PPP
level.
IKE, on the other hand, recognizes that individuals use diverse forecasting
strategies. Therefore, with IKE, the aggregate o f individual forecasts o f the exchange rate
will not be captured by the REH representation. This implies that, in general, the real
exchange rate will not equal its PPP level, and the nominal exchange rate will not equal
to its PPP le v el47 Thus, with IKE, if causal variables, which could be comprised
exclusively o f macroeconomic fundamentals, are moving in a way that causes individuals

46 Recall from the discussion in Chapter 1 that in the flexible-price model swings in nominal exchange rates
can occur if there is a change in relative price levels. These models, however, have not been able to
generate swings in real exchange rates.
47 Note that the relationship between the PPP levels o f the nominal and real exchange rates is given by
s PP" = q 'IT + p t . Thus, swings in the real exchange rate will, in general, imply swings in the nominal
exchange rate.
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to formulate their forecasts in a direction pushing the exchange rate persistently away
from historical benchmark levels, then there will be swings in exchange rates away from
AO

benchmark levels.
Exchange rate swings could also occur due to revisions o f forecasting strategies,
which is captured by the change in 5t , when revisions o f the St parameters is either
reinforcing or conservative. Revisions o f forecasting strategies are said to be conservative
or reinforcing if they lead to a new forecast that is not too different from or reinforces the
forecast that an individual would have formed if she had not revised her forecasting
strategy. These conservative revisions in forecasting strategies appeal to a major finding
in the psychology literature - that individuals are generally slow in revising their beliefs
and strategies when faced with new evidence.
In sum, in contrast to the REH bubble and behavioral models which explain
swings as arising due to bubbles, irrationality, or market psychology, in the IKE swings
model exchange rate swings can occur even if all market participants base their forecasts
solely on macroeconomic fundamentals.

3.2 What Does UAUIP Imply About the Magnitude o f Swings?

Independently o f how exchange rate swings arise and what drives exchange rate
expectations, UAUIP, coupled with gap restrictions, implies that the exchange rate moves
less than one-for-one with exchange rate expectations. This is in contrast to the bubble
and behavioral models in which the exchange rate moves one-for-one with exchange rate

48 This result is not derived by assuming that the trend in the causal variables remains unchanged. See
Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
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expectations. To illustrate why this is the case, let us first consider the equilibrium
condition for the foreign exchange market on which standard monetary models rely, the
uncovered interest parity (UIP):
(29)
where all variables are defined as before.
The UIP condition states that the foreign exchange market is in equilibrium when
the expected returns on domestic and foreign assets are equal. It can be easily seen from
this equation that if there is, say, an increase in the expected exchange rate for the next
period, ceteris paribus, then the spot exchange rate would change one-for-one with the
change in exchange rate expectations in order to maintain equilibrium in the foreign
exchange market.
Now recall that UAUIP is based on the premise that to speculate in the foreign
exchange market, individuals require an uncertainty premium as a compensation for
exposing themselves to risk, where this uncertainty premium is a positive function o f the
gap between the expected exchange rate and its historical benchmark level as perceived
by market participants.
Also recall that according to UAUIP, equilibrium in the foreign exchange market
occurs when the aggregate uncertainty-adjusted forecasted returns on domestic and
foreign assets are equal:

V ,

+ ("- i f = < H v , - r ) + W

+0

(30)

or, alternatively:

-*/") + VFP.+0

(31)
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UAUIP implies that, when there is a change in exchange rate expectations, the
exchange rate will move less that one-for-one. To see why this is the case, suppose that
gapt|,+1 = £,|<+1 - s"11 > 0. Now suppose that both bulls and bears in the market increase
their forecast o f the future exchange rate, i.e. .?/k+1 and sfll+] both rise. Market participants
are assumed to know about the long swings behavior o f exchange rates in the long run,
and that the exchange rate eventually comes back to its benchmark. So, as before, the
bulls in the market become more concerned about the possibility o f a countermovement
back to the benchmark and they ask for an uncertainty premium as a compensation for
exposing themselves to risk. The farther away the exchange rate gets from the historical
benchmark, bulls become even more concerned and ask for an even higher uncertainty
premium. This leads them to limit their position size. Bears, on the other hand, become
more confident that a countermovement would occur and lower their uncertainty
premium. In the aggregate, the uncertainty premium rises, limiting individuals’
willingness to put more money at risk. Therefore in the premium model, as expectations
rise, the exchange rate rises less than one-for-one.
Furthermore, with UAUIP, the degree o f responsiveness o f the exchange rate, st ,
to a change in expectations, stlt+l, depends on the size o f the weight attached to the gap
from the historical benchmark, c r: the larger (smaller) is a , the smaller (bigger) is the
movement in st that will be required to restore equilibrium in the market.49 In other
words, following a change in £,|<+1, in markets where & is small we will observe larger

49

\

This can also be seen from — — = (1 - a ) .
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movements in st either away from or towards benchmark levels compared to markets
where a is large. This implies that for a given change in the expected exchange rate,
markets where a is small will experience exchange rate swings o f a larger magnitude
compared to markets in which a is large.
This suggests that if policy officials can lead individuals to increase the weight
they attach to the benchmark level in forming their assessments o f the riskiness o f foreign
exchange speculation, this would lead to an aggregate uncertainty premium that is more
sensitive to changes in the forecasted exchange rate, and thus, ceteris paribus, to smaller
swings in the exchange rate. This leads to a key theoretical result suggesting that there
may be a channel through which official intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate
back to some announced or unannounced parity level can limit the magnitude o f
exchange rate swings.50
A key premise behind this result is the positive relationship between the
uncertainty premium and the gap between the exchange rate and its historical benchmark
level. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) have tested for the positive relationship between the
gap and the market premium as given in equation (31) for the British pound/U.S. dollar,
Japanese yen/U.S. dollar and German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rates between
December 1982 and February 1997. They provide strong evidence that as the gap from
PPP rises, so does the premium.51 In Chapter 5, I extend their analysis to twenty-four

50 This idea was first proposed by Frydman and Goldberg (2004). They suggest a reference-rate proposal,
which consists o f a central bank announcement o f an official estimate, a reference rate, o f some benchmark
parity at regular intervals and official intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to parity at any
point in time.
51 Results by Frydman and Goldberg are discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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exchange rates against the dollar. My results also provide support for a positive
relationship between the gap and the premium.

4 Official Intervention, Parity Announcement
and the Uncertainty Premium

The Frydman and Goldberg premium model suggests that official intervention to
push the exchange rate back to some announced or unannounced parity may work to limit
the magnitude o f exchange rate swings by inducing individuals to increase the weight
they attach to the benchmark level in forming their forecasts. Why would such a policy
cause the market to attach a higher weight to the benchmark? Recall the discussion on
UAUIP as an equilibrium condition for the premium. As the market increases their
forecast o f the future exchange rate away from the historical benchmark from above, the
uncertainty premium rises.

This is the case because bulls become more concerned about

an eventual countermovement. They forecast higher potential losses and ask for a higher
uncertainty premium to take open positions, which limits their willingness to put more
money at risk. Bears, on the other hand, become more confident that a countermovement
will occur, thus lowering their forecasted potential losses, and asking for a lower
uncertainty premium. In the aggregate, as the forecasted future exchange rate increases
away from the benchmark from above, the uncertainty premium rises.
In this dissertation, I suppose that, if the central bank were to intervene to push
the exchange rate back to some parity level at unpredictable moments in time, then
market participants would raise their assessment o f the potential losses from betting on

52 Assume that both sf

and S*+l rise. See Section 2.3.4 above.

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

movements away from the central bank’s parity level.

To see why this is the case,

suppose again that bulls in the market raise their expectation o f the future exchange rate
away from historical benchmark levels from above. Now bulls are already concerned
about betting on a further movement away from benchmark levels because they know
that historically, while long swings can continue for extended periods o f time, eventually
the swing ends and the exchange rate comes back to the benchmark. If in addition to this,
they have to worry about a loss that might arise from central bank intervention, it is
reasonable to suppose that they would further increase their forecast o f the potential loss.
As was discussed in Chapter 2, there is empirical evidence that central bank intervention
does have a short run influence on exchange rates in the desired direction, and so they
can lead to actual losses for bulls in the market. Consequently, bulls’ concern about
countermovements may become heightened when the central bank is working to push the
exchange rate back to its benchmark. If that is the case, then bulls would ask for an even
higher uncertainty premium, as compared to the case with no central bank intervention,
which will further temper their desire to risk more capital. Bears, on the other hand are
likely to feel even more convinced o f an eventual countermovement and thus ask for an
even lower uncertainty premium. In the aggregate, the uncertainty premium would be
even higher compared to the case with no central bank intervention, inducing a smaller
increase in the spot exchange rate. Thus, it is possible that with central bank intervention,
as the exchange rate moves away from the benchmark level from above, the uncertainty
premium rises even faster and so we get a smaller swing in the exchange rate for the

53 Because the central bank does not defend the official parity or any bands around the parity, even if such
parity is announced, intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to such a pre-announced
benchmark level would be hard to predict in advance.

110

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

same swing in exchange rate expectations. This suggests a new channel through which
central bank intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some parity can
affect swings exchange rates: the uncertainty premium channel.

4.1 Central Bank Intervention and Parity Announcement: The Uncertainty Premium
Channel

I propose to capture the policy o f intervention to support some parity level as an
additional term in the equation for the uncertainty premium:54

$ ,|M = 0 +*1 (

Vl " C

(

Vl "

)

(32>

where <7, is the weight market participants attach to the gap between the forecasted
exchange rate and their assessment o f the benchmark level, s ™ , and o 2 is the weight
individuals attach to the gap between the forecasted exchange rate and the official
benchmark level, s ™CB.
The second term in equation (32) captures the idea discussed above that, with
central bank intervention to push the exchange rate to some parity level, the aggregate
uncertainty premium may be higher compared to markets with no such policy because
bulls would face higher potential losses while bears would face lower potential losses.55 It
is perhaps the case that such a policy would be more effective if the central bank
announces their official assessment o f the benchmark level. Recall our discussion in
Chapter 2 on official exchange rate communication and the reaction o f the exchange rate

54 In equation (32), 6 is large enough so that wpI|I+1 > 0 holds.
55 When 5 ! rises further away from historical benchmark from above.
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to news announcements. The major conclusion was that such announcements have a
significant effect on exchange rate movements, suggesting that a parity announcement by
the central bank would also matter for exchange rates. However, this does not have to be
the case. Even if the central bank does not announce its official benchmark level, as long
as market participants believe that intervention is aimed at pushing the exchange rate to
some parity, they would still attach a higher weight to the gap in assessing potential
losses. In that case they would perhaps somehow infer what benchmark the central bank
is using, or they would simply attach a higher weight to their individual assessment o f the
benchmark level.
There are several things to be noted about the specification o f the uncertainty
premium given in (32). First, note that the sign o f the two gap terms does not matter in
terms o f the effect o f the forecasted future spot exchange rate on the uncertainty
premium. As before, as the forecasted exchange rate rises, the uncertainty premium
increases as well. Suppose, for example, that

+1 - s ™1) < 0 , which implies that the

aggregate forecast o f the future exchange rate is below market participants’ own
assessment o f the benchmark, i.e. s^+l < s'tm ; and (.?,|,+1 - s ™CB) > 0 , which implies that
the aggregate forecast o f the future exchange rate is above the official benchmark, i.e.
.v(|(+1 > s/®cs. Now suppose that the market forecasts a higher future exchange rate, i.e.
stt+x rises. In this case, both gap terms, (sl]t+l - s lt m) and (s(|(+1 - s ™ai), would increase,
leading to a higher uncertainty premium. This effect o f the forecasted future exchange
rate on the uncertainty premium can be easily seen if equation (32) is rewritten as:

up,\,+x = (<*, + o-2) V i -

- &2s r ° + e

(33)
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What this implies is that the relationship between the two historical benchmarks
does not play a role in the model. It is possible that the individual assessment o f the
benchmark is equal or different from the official parity. Perhaps when the central bank
does not announce its official estimate o f the benchmark, the market participants would
basically assume that official estimate is the same as their own assessment o f the
benchmark. In that case, the uncertainty premium equation given in (32) would become:

i = 0 + (a i + a i ) (V i “

)

(34)

In a way, a specification such as the one given in (32) allows for two different
benchmark levels, however it does not constrain them to be different from each other. In
terms o f the effect o f the forecasted future exchange rate on the uncertainty premium, it
does not matter if the two benchmarks are the same. What really matters here is that
market participants are aware o f the long swings nature o f the exchange rate and bulls,
say, already face some potential losses when they increase their forecast for the exchange
rate away from historical benchmark levels. And now the central bank steps into this
environment with a policy to push the exchange rate back to the benchmark level. Thus,
in addition to the long swings nature o f exchange rates, now there is an additional force
that will push the exchange rate back to parity. So now the question is, how do market
participants react to such a policy?
As was discussed before, even without any central bank intervention, when the
gap from benchmark levels increases, bulls increase their assessment o f potential losses
because they become more concerned about an eventual countermovement. It is possible
then, that for the same gap from historical benchmark levels, bulls increase their
assessment o f potential losses even more when there is central bank intervention aimed at
113
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pushing the exchange rate back to parity. If that is the case, it would suggest that the total
weight attached to the gap from historical benchmark would be higher with central bank
policy compared to the case with no such policy, i.e. <
j x + <j2 > <r. However, whether
<7, + a 2 > a holds would for one thing depend on whether the weight attached to the gap
from s™ would differ with and without central bank intervention.

Note that the

specification in (32) allows for the weight attached to the gap from s™ to be different
depending on central bank policy, i.e. it could be that &x * a . If the market attaches the
same weight to the gap from their assessment o f the benchmark level, i.e. if <j, = a , and
in addition they attach some weight to the official parity, i.e. <j2 > 0 holds, then
<7, + <j2 > & would hold. However, it is possible that market participants lower the weight
they attach to their own assessment o f the benchmark level, a x, while increasing the
weight they attach to the official parity, <j2 . What determines the relative magnitudes o f
<j| and ct2 is an open question. It could be the degree o f access to credible information
that individuals use to form their own assessment o f the historical benchmark, where
easier or cheaper access might lead to higher weight attached to one’s own forecast o f the
gap, i.e. a higher &x compared to <r2. More limited or more costly access, on the other
hand, might lead to higher weigh attached to the official forecast o f the gap. Or perhaps
they attach a higher weight to the official parity just because it is the relevant benchmark
for central bank intervention. In that case it is possible that the magnitude o f <72 depends
on central bank credibility, where the weight is higher with a more credible central
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bank.56 At the end, however, whether the total weight that the market attaches to the gap
from the historical benchmark with central bank intervention ( <r, + cr2) is higher
compared to the case with no central bank intervention (<r) is an empirical question,
which I investigate in Chapter 6.57

4.2 A New Wav for Testing the Effectiveness o f Central Bank Policy

If it is the case that the weight attached to the gap from historical benchmark is
higher with central bank intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some
announced or unannounced parity level, then such policy could lead to a smaller swing in
the exchange rate fo r the same swing in exchange rate expectations compared to markets
with no such policy. Thus, by testing whether the weight attached to the gap is larger in
markets that involve central bank intervention, I can indirectly test for the effectiveness
o f such policy in limiting exchange rate swings.58 What this means is that I do not
directly test whether intervention leads to swings o f smaller magnitude by developing
some measure for the magnitude o f swings as Kubelec (2004a,b) does. One o f the
problems with such an analysis is that countries with different exchange rate regimes
experience different shocks. Therefore, even if official intervention has been effective in
leading to swings o f smaller magnitude, this might not appear to be the case. For

561 owe this point to Sudesh Mujumdar.
57 Note that if the two central banks are intervening to push the exchange rate in opposite directions, then it
is possible that the effect on the exchange rate is nullified. In that sense, the model assumes that either only
one o f the central banks is pursuing a policy to affect the exchange rate, or if they both are, then the policy
intervention is in the same direction.
58 Note that central bank policy would influence exchange rate swings by affecting the weight attached to
the gap from PPP, as well as exchange rate expectations through its effect on macroeconomic fundamentals
such as interest rates and prices. Such a policy could, however, also have a direct effect on the premium.
Such a possibility is discussed in Chapter 6 under future research avenues.
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example, consider two countries - one with a freely floating exchange rate regime
(country A) and another that has adopted a regime that involves central bank intervention
aimed at reducing exchange rate swings with or without an official announcement o f a
parity (country B). Now, it is possible that although intervention policy in country B is
effective in terms o f limiting the magnitude o f exchange rate swings, swings in the
currency o f this country still appear to be larger than the swings for the currency o f
country A just because country B has experienced bigger shocks. Recall that in the IKE
swings model, one way in which changes in exchange rate forecasts, and thus, swings in
exchange rates could arise is due to new realizations o f causal variables. In that context,
swings in the exchange rate for country B may be larger because o f larger changes in the
causal variables, despite the fact that intervention is working to limit swings. Thus, the
way in which I test for the effectiveness o f official intervention allows me to control for
the change in the causal variables and compare the relative effects o f central bank
intervention on exchange rate swings for the same change in exchange rate expectations.
As a last note, it is important to emphasize that the Frydman and Goldberg
premium model leads to a new way to test the influence o f intervention aimed at pushing
the exchange rate back to some parity on exchange rate movements. The question is not
whether central bank intervention can turn around the exchange rate over the next few
days, but rather whether such policy can limit the magnitude o f swings. For the most part,
the literature has not examined this question. The premium model implies that in
currency markets where the central bank is intervening at unpredictable moments in time
to push the exchange rate back to some pre-announced or unannounced parity level,
exchange rates will experience smaller swings for the same swing in exchange rate
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expectations compared to currency markets without such policy intervention. The model
also provides a new way to test for this implication without deriving a measure for the
magnitude o f exchange rate swings and as such, it differs from other studies. It implies
that in markets characterized with central bank intervention the aggregate weight attached
to the gap from historical benchmarks will be larger compared to markets without such
policy. Thus, by testing whether the aggregate weight is larger for countries that have
been pursuing some kind o f an exchange rate regime that involves central bank
intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate to some parity level compared to freely
floating exchange rates, one can test if these markets have experienced smaller swings in
exchange rates for the same swing in exchange rate expectations. If that is the case, this
would be an indication that such policy interventions have been successful in limiting
exchange rate swings.
In Chapter 6, I provide some empirical evidence that suggests that markets that
involve some central bank policies aimed at influencing exchange rates are associated
with a larger weight attached to the gap compared to free floats, thus with more limited
swings in exchange rates.

5 Conclusion

In this chapter I built on the Frydman and Goldberg (2007) premium model and
showed that this model provides rationale for a new channel through which central bank
intervention can limit swings in exchange rates. This uncertainty premium channel is
based on the insight that when speculating in the foreign exchange market, individuals
require an uncertainty premium as a compensation for exposing themselves to risk. The
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uncertainty premium depends positively on the gap between the forecasted exchange rate
and its historical benchmark level. This relationship is the key premise on which the
uncertainty premium channel builds - when there is central bank intervention aimed at
pushing the exchange rate back to some parity, market participants would presumably
care more about the gap from the benchmark level because such policy leads to higher
potential losses. These higher potential losses limit individuals’ willingness to put
additional money at risk, and therefore lead to a smaller swing in exchange rates for the
same swing in exchange rate expectations. In Chapters 5 and 6 I respectively test for the
positive relationship between the market premium and the gap from the historical
benchmark, and whether central banks can utilize this link for limiting exchange rate
swings. In the next chapter I discuss the methodology and data for testing these
implications.

118

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER 4

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

1 Introduction

The previous chapter discussed two testable implications o f the premium model. The first
is the positive relationship between the gap from the historical benchmark and the market
premium. The other implication is that central bank intervention supporting some parity
level can lead to a larger weight attached to the gap from the historical benchmark, and
thus, smaller swings in exchange rates. These implications follow from UAUIP and the
gap restrictions, relating the market premium to the gap between the forecasted exchange
rate for the next period and its historical benchmark level and the international financial
position o f the domestic economy vis-a-vis the foreign economy as a percentage o f total
market wealth:

„ ,= <7

<1)

In terms o f the specification that I proposed in the last chapter that captures the
announcement o f a parity by the central bank, equation (1) becomes:
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Testing the predictions o f the premium model requires a measure for the
equilibrium premium, the markets’ exchange rate forecasts, the historical benchmark(s)
and the international financial position.
To obtain a measure o f the markets’ exchange rate forecasts, I use a novel dataset
provided by Forecasts Unlimited, Inc. This data set consists o f survey data o f market
participants’ one-month ahead exchange rate forecasts for twenty-four currencies,
including developed and developing countries from August 1986 through September

2000.1
Survey data on market participants’ forecasts concerning future exchange rates
have been used fairly extensively in the literature. Although there are some bias problems
with forecasts from survey data, most researchers believe that even if there are biases in
the forecast data they are not systematic.
Survey data provide the researcher with the markets’ forecasts o f the exchange
rates and thus eliminate the need for coming up with measures regarding these forecasts
by using some economic model. Moreover, in particular to my analysis, survey data also
allow me to follow an approach in which I can control for different shocks in exchange
rate expectations that different countries might experience. One prediction o f the
premium model is that fo r a given swing in exchange rate expectations, countries with
exchange rate regimes that involve central bank intervention supporting some parity level
should experience swings o f smaller magnitude compared to countries that have a freely
floating exchange rate. As was discussed in section 4 o f chapter 3, different shocks to

1 Although the survey provides forecast data for over 40 countries, due to several reasons that are discussed
below, about half o f these have been excluded from the analysis. The sample runs through September 2000
because the one-month ahead forecasts have been discontinued afterwards.
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different markets might make a successful policy appear unsuccessful.2 I discuss the
survey data in greater detail in Section 2.
To construct a series for the gap from the historical benchmark, one also needs to
have a measure for the historical benchmark, which is a stable and slowly moving rate
that provides a long run anchor for exchange rates. Recall that the effect o f the forecast o f
the future exchange rate on the uncertainty premium does not depend on the two
benchmark levels, s™ and s f Bc" , being different or the same (Section 4 o f Chapter 3).
Therefore, I use one measure for both the individual and the official historical benchmark
levels, which I discuss in Section 3.
Data on bilateral financial positions between countries as a percentage of total
market wealth ( IFPt in the equations above) are not available due to the lack o f data on
total market wealth. Therefore, the effect o f this variable on the market premium will be
captured by the error term. However, there is evidence that when bilateral asset supplies
change, they change more slowly compared to the forecasted future exchange rate.3
Assuming that the total market wealth changes slowly as well, then it might be
reasonable to suppose that the covariance between this variable and the gap is small, and
thus the estimate o f the weight attached to the gap from historical benchmarks will not be
greatly affected.
Testing the second prediction o f the model - that central bank intervention aimed
at pushing the exchange rate back to some parity level could lead to a larger weight

Successful policy refers to central bank intervention leading to more limited swings compared to the case
where such policy is missing.
2

In fact, if asset supplies were changing faster, the portfolio balance models would have performed better
empirically. See Chapters 1 and 2. Also see Frydman and Goldberg (2007).
3
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attached to the gap from historical benchmark, i.e. a higher <r compared to freely
floating regimes - requires classifying currencies according to the exchange rate regime.
One o f the crucial things here is to be able to classify countries according to the exchange
rate regime that they actually adopt (de facto regime) instead o f the exchange rate regime
that the authorities claim to pursue (de jure regime). This is important because it appears
that there are significant differences between the two - many countries that claim to be
pursuing a freely floating regime in actuality follow an intermediate regime, called the
‘fear o f floating’ due to Calvo and Reinhart (2002). However, classifying exchange rate
regimes requires that some assumptions about the behavior o f exchange rates and other
variables under different regimes be made. And o f course, different assumptions imply
different classifications. In section 4 , 1 discuss three classifications in detail - Bubula and
Otker-Robe (2002), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart and Rogoff
(2004), none o f which are free o f shortcomings.
One way to deal with the problem o f classifying exchange rate regimes is to use
central bank intervention data to classify regimes according to the degree to which central
banks are involved in determining the movements o f the exchange rate. Unfortunately
central banks do not make such data publicly available.4 Therefore, I use the change in
international reserves to proxy official intervention as a way to rank countries in terms o f
the degree to which they are pursuing a free float. Then I use estimates for the weight
attached to the gap for each regime and test if the market attaches a larger weight to the
gap in assessing potential losses during regimes with greater intervention. If that is the
case, we would expect to observe smaller exchange rate swings in these markets.

4 The actual data on daily official intervention was released in the early 1990s for the US, followed later by
Germany and Japan.
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The use o f changes in official reserves as a proxy for official intervention has
been criticized by some researchers on the grounds that the two are not well correlated.5
These criticisms are discussed in detail in Section 5, where I argue that the major
shortcomings o f changes in reserves as a proxy for official intervention do not pertain to
my analysis.

2 The Market Premium

Recall from Chapter 3 that in equilibrium, the market premium is equal to the
expected return on foreign exchange:

- { s' +i?-i?)

(3)

The term in the parentheses is the forward exchange rate in the current period,
fw l l+[ = st + if - i f . Therefore, to calculate the market premium I use data on exchange
rate forecasts and the forward exchange rate. The forward rate data come from Global
Insight - DRI Money Market and Fixed Income Database (DRIFACS) and JP Morgan.
Forward exchange rate data are further discussed in the next section in conjunction with
exchange rate forecasts.

2.1 Exchange Rate Forecasts

My exchange rate forecast data come from the Consensus Forecast historical
monthly database provided by Forecasts Unlimited, Inc6 for forty-seven currencies dating

5

For example, see Neely (2000a) and Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002).

6

The Consensus Forecasts is the current name o f the Currency Forecasters’ Digest o f White Plains, NY.
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7

back to August 1986 for many o f them. The number o f currencies in my sample is
twenty-four due to several reasons that are discussed below.
Survey respondents are about forty in number and include multinational firms,
forecasting firms and banks.8 The Consensus Forecast reports one-, three-, six- and
twelve-month horizon consensus forecasts o f various exchange rates vis-a-vis the U.S.
dollar, calculated as the harmonic mean.9 Every month, it also reports the spot exchange
rate and the one-, three-, six- and twelve-month forward exchange rates. Since the onemonth surveys that I use in my analysis were discontinued in October 2000, my sample
runs from August 1986 to September 2000 for most countries.
2.1.1

Issues Concerning the Survey Data. There are several difficulties with using

this dataset. As was discussed above, I need to use the forward exchange rate to calculate
the market premium. In the ideal case, one would have the aggregate for the spot and
forward exchange rates that survey participants have used when forming their forecasts.
Unfortunately, the survey does not include a question on the spot or forward exchange
rates that survey participants have used when forming their forecasts. Moreover, the spot
and forward exchange rates that the Consensus Forecast provides are on a date that is 3-7
days later than the date on which the forecasts were actually made. The survey is send to
participants on the third Thursday o f the month with the following Monday as the

7 Several sources, like the MMSI (Money Market Services International), provide forecasts for several
major currencies. However, since the model predicts a different weight attached to the gap from PPP for
different exchange rate regimes, it makes more sense to use survey data that covers a mix o f countries that
freely float and manage their exchange rates.

8

See Appendix B for a list o f current survey respondents.

9

The harmonic mean is a measure o f central tendency that attaches less weight to outliers. It is calculated
/
\-l

as x
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deadline for response. The issue is generally published on the fourth Thursday o f the
month, and the spot and forward exchange rates that are reported in the issue belong to
that day. Therefore, depending on when survey respondents responded to the survey (the
third Thursday or Friday, or the fourth Monday o f the month), there is a 3-7 day lag
between the forecasted and the spot and forward exchange rates. Such a lag is
problematic because the spot exchange rate can experience sharp movements from day to
day, or even from minute to minute, leading to similar changes in the forward exchange
rate.
To address this problem, I construct a data set that consists o f daily spot and
forward exchange rates for each date at which surveys were conducted. However, there is
another issue that complicates the analysis: the date on which forecasts are actually
formulated is unfortunately not reported. The survey is usually sent to participants on the
third Thursday o f the month with the following Monday as the deadline for response.
Thus, forecasts could have been formulated on that Thursday, or the following Friday or
Monday. However, Forecasts Unlimited, Inc has told me that the majority o f responses
are received either on Friday or on Monday. I have thus taken the average o f the spot and
forward exchange rates for these two days. The daily data on spot and forward rates are
from DRIFACS and JP M organ.10
Another issue regarding the survey data is related to missing observations for
some of the currencies. The source o f some missing observations is the way in which the
survey was conducted. In the early years, the number o f currencies that were surveyed

10 For several currencies for which daily spot and forward rates could not be found for the whole period
from DRIFACS or JP Morgan, data has been compiled from past issues o f the Financial Times. I have tried
to exploit every possibility to expand the sample size to as many currencies and years as possible.
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was twenty-four and for some ‘minor’ currencies the survey was conducted every other
month on a rotating basis with other ‘minor’ currencies. Such missing observations are
encountered for some o f the sample period for the Czech koruna, Polish zloty, Turkish
lira, Indonesian rupee, Korean won, Malaysian ringgit, Phillipine peso, Singapore dollar
and Thai baht. Another reason for missing observations is lost issues. The survey was
initially owned by its current owner, but was sold to the Financial Times for a short
period o f time, before it was again acquired back by Forecasts Unlimited, Inc. In this
process o f changing ownership, several o f the printed issues were lost. Because printed
issues were the only source I was provided with, I had no way o f recovering these
missing observations.
Missing observations that arise due to some self-selection process can lead to
biased estimates. Since none o f the missing observations in my series are on a self
selection basis, however, they would only lead to an efficiency loss due to lower sample
size. With a large enough sample size, this may not be an issue. However, given that the
sample size for some o f the currencies in my sample is already small, the efficiency loss
caused by missing observations could be significant. Therefore, I interpolated the missing
observations using the cubic spline method in SAS. This method overcomes some o f the
disadvantages

of

other

interpolation

methods,

such

as

linear

or

polynomial

interpolation.11
2.1.2 Sample Size. As was mentioned in the beginning o f this section, the survey
data are available for over forty countries, but my sample size is only twenty-four due to

11 Linear interpolation is not very precise, and the error is proportional to the square o f the distance between
the data points. The error in polynomial interpolation is proportional to higher powers o f the distance
between the data points, and thus it is better than linear interpolation, however this method is not very
precise at the end points o f the series.
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several reasons. First, I exclude the countries that are part o f the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), i.e. are on the euro12 and Denmark, that is part o f the second Exchange
i

Rate Mechanism.

-7

The reason for excluding these countries is that up to 1999, their

currencies have been fixed with respect to the German mark, and as is shown in Figure
4.1 for the French frank and the Danish krone, their dollar exchange rates behave very
similarly to the German mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate. Including these countries in the
sample would have given more weight to the German mark or later the euro within the
analysis.
The coverage for three countries, China, Israel and Egypt, is 12 months or less. I
thus exclude these countries from my analysis. Such a small number o f observations is
insufficient to derive meaningful statistical relationships.
The lack o f daily spot and forward exchange rate data for another eight currencies
has reduced the sample further to twenty-six.14 Furthermore, Taiwan was excluded from
the sample because o f the lack o f exchange rate regime classification. Hong Kong was
excluded because it is a currency board, and the model does not have much to say about
such hard pegs. W ith these two exclusions, the number o f currencies in my sample ends
up being twenty-four.

12 These countries are Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain.

13 Countries that are part o f the second Exchange Rate Mechanism have tied their currencies with respect to
the euro.

14 These currencies belong to the following countries: Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, India, Russia, South
Africa and Ukraine.
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3 The Historical Benchmark

A historical benchmark is a stable and slowly moving rate that provides a long run
anchor for exchange rates. Market participants might have different views o f the
benchmark depending on what models or information they use. Unfortunately, the survey
data does not collect information on individual forecasts o f the historical benchmark
level, or on any historical benchmark that survey participants might have used when
formulating their forecasts o f the future exchange rate. Thus, to calculate the gap, we
need to come up with a measure for the benchmark exchange rate. One factor that
reduces the issues posed by the unavailability o f individual data on historical benchmarks
is that although individual assessments o f the benchmark might differ, the range over
which these individual assessments differ should be smaller than the range over which
the exchange rate varies. Thus, the use o f a single measure for the historical benchmark
as assessed by individuals themselves should not cause much concern.
Furthermore, as I argued before, the relationship between the individual
assessment o f the historical benchmark and the official historical benchmark is not
important for my analysis. It is also the case that exchange rate forecasts are much more
variable than the historical benchmark, suggesting that results would not depend on the
use of one or two benchmark levels. Therefore, using a single measure for both historical
benchmarks simplifies my analysis without causing any obvious loss o f generality.
One benchmark level that is often used in open-economy macroeconomics is the
purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate. As Samo and Taylor (2001: 51) put it,
“estimates o f PPP exchange rates are important for practical purposes such as
determining the degree o f misalignment o f the nominal exchange rate and the appropriate
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policy response, the setting o f exchange rate parities, and the international comparison of
national income levels.” But does PPP act as a historical benchmark?

3.1 PPP as a Long Run Anchor for Exchange Rates: Evidence15

Studies that have tested whether in the long run the real exchange rate has a
tendency to revert to its mean provide considerable evidence that PPP serves as a long
run anchor for exchange rates and that long swings in nominal exchange rates revolve
around PPP.
Corbae and Oiliaris (1988), Kim (1990) and Cheung and Lai (1993) use
cointegration analysis, where rejecting the null hypothesis o f no cointegration provides
evidence o f mean reversion towards PPP.

Corbae and Oiliaris (1988) use monthly

averages for the exchange rates o f the Canadian dollar, French frank, German mark,
Italian lira, Japanese yen and British pound vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar between July 1973
and September 1986. They fail to reject the null hypothesis o f no cointegration for all five
currencies. Kim (1990) uses the Canadian dollar, French frank, Italian lira, Japanese yen
and British pound vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar between 1900 and 1987. The author concludes
that PPP seems to provide a long run anchor in general, but not for all currencies and nil
specifications. Cheung and Lai (1993) analyze the same currencies as Kim (1990) for the
1914-1989 period and conclude that all five exchange rates mean-revert towards PPP.
Edison and Klovland (1987) and Lothian and Taylor (1996) test for PPP using
long span data and provide evidence supporting PPP as a long run anchor for the
exchange rate. Edison and Klovland (1987) estimate an error-correction model for the

15

For review articles see R ogoff (1996) and Taylor and Taylor (2004).
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Norwegian krone/British pound exchange rate between 1874-1971, whereas Lothian and
Taylor (1996) use the U.S. dollar/British pound and French franc/British pound exchange
rates between 1971-1990.
Taylor and Samo (1998) uses panel data for the G5 exchange rates vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar and provides supporting evidence for PPP as a long run anchor.16 Taylor, Peel
and Samo (2001) allow for nonlinear adjustment and provide evidence that PPP provides
such an anchor for the German mark, British pound, French franc and Japanese yen vis-avis the U.S. dollar between January 1973 and December 1996.
These findings suggest that PPP might be a relevant benchmark for exchange
rates. So, to measure the historical benchmark in the foreign exchange market, I construct
a PPP series.

3.2 The Historical Benchmark in the Premium Model: Constructing the PPP Series

To calculate the PPP series I use the following approach. I first calculate the
average o f the spot exchange rate for the whole period for which forecasts are available
for the particular currency. This average constitutes the PPP exchange rate for the first
period, i.e.
N

X^k+i

Then I use inflation rates for the two countries to expand the time series for the
PPP exchange rate to the whole period, so that

16

G-5 countries include France, Germany, Japan, the U.K and the U.S.
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where n t+x and tt*+i denote the inflation rate in the U.S. and the other country,
respectively, from t to t + 1, as based on the consumer price indices (CPI’s) for the two
countries.17
Another way o f constructing the historical benchmark levels would be to use the
Big Mac PPP for a specific year instead o f the average for the spot exchange rate, and
then expand the series by using the CPI data for the two countries.181 have not used this
measure since the Big Mac PPP index is not available for some o f the countries in my
sample. However, both measures produce the same results by construction - using PPP as
described in the text generates a series that is identical to the Big Mac PPP series scaled
by some constant factor. Figure 4.2 plots the relative PPP (according to my approach),
the relative Big Mac PPP and the spot exchange rate for the Japanese yen vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar. As can be seen from this figure, the two measures for the historical
benchmark move in the same way, but are located at different levels.
Note that by using the approach described above I obtain series for relative PPP.19
Relative PPP implies that the change in the nominal exchange rate is equal to the change
in the relative price o f the two countries. Absolute PPP, on the other hand, implies that

17

The CPI data come from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.

18 The Big Mac purchasing power parity exchange rates are reported in The Economist magazine in the
April issue o f every year.

19

Note that equation (5) follows from relative PPP:
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the nominal exchange rate is equal to the price ratios o f the two countries. The only
difference between the two series over time is, however, the level at which the historical
benchmark is located. What is important for my analysis is to capture the movements in
the exchange rate, thus it is not important at what level the benchmark is located. That is
the case because for my analysis what matters is the way in which the gap moves, not
whether it is positive or negative.
By using PPP as a measure for both the individual and the official historical
benchmark levels I am assuming that the two have a tendency to move together, which
seems to be a reasonable assumption. In this case, the uncertainty premium becomes

up

,\m

= 0 + ( a i +<h ) ( v i -

K pp)

(6)

4 Exchange Rate Regime Classification

As I mentioned in the introduction, there can be significant differences between
the exchange rate regime that authorities claim to pursue (de jure regime) and the regime
that they actually adopt (de facto regime). The de jure regime classification is provided
by the IMF from 1975 through 1998 and it is based on member countries’ own official
statements. As was later argued by many studies, however, many countries do not
actually adopt the regime they report to the IMF.20 To improve upon that classification,
the IMF officially adopted a new classification scheme in January 1999, which relies on

20 For example, by analyzing exchange rates, reserves and interest rates, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) report
that many countries that announce a floating exchange rate actually manage - what they call a ‘fear o f
floating’. O f course, this and other studies that use different approaches to find the ‘true’ exchange rate
policy have their drawbacks, as is discussed below.
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exchange rate behavior and information from IMF country reports and other sources.21
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) have extended the coverage o f the IMF de facto
classifications back to 1990 on an annual and monthly basis.
There have been several other attempts at identifying de facto regime
classifications, such as the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart and
Rogoff (2004) classifications. All three classifications - Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002),
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) - employ different
approaches.
But before discussing each o f the three classifications in more detail, it is useful to
discuss how I would use these classifications to test if central bank intervention aimed at
pushing the exchange rate back to some announced or unannounced parity, without the
obligation to defend a parity or bands around the parity, leads to swings o f smaller
magnitude. None o f the classifications in the literature has such a category simply
because no country is pursuing such an exchange rate regime. Thus, I use the available
classifications to classify regimes as ‘managed regimes’ to the extend that they involve
central bank intervention aimed at reducing misalignments in exchange rates with or
without the announcement o f a parity. Accordingly, irrevocably fixed exchange rates
such as a currency board or a monetary union are excluded from the analysis.
Intermediate regimes, such as other conventional fixed pegs and crawling pegs or bands
are included in the managed regime group, although under these regimes there is an
obligation by the central bank to defend a parity or bands around it.22 In most managed

21

International Monetary Fund (2003).

22

For definitions o f these regimes, see Table 4.1.
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floating regimes central banks likely have some notion for misalignments and try to
prevent these by intervening in the market without announcing a specific parity.
Therefore, managed floating regimes are also included in the managed regimes group.
In the following three sections I discuss each classification in more detail. Then in
Section 4 .5 ,1 compare the three classifications.

4.1 The Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) (or IMF De-Factol Classification

The classification by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) spans from 1990 through
2001. This classification uses information obtained through bilateral consultation
discussions, and regular contacts with IMF country desk economists as the primary
source in identifying regimes, and combines these with other sources o f information,
including press reports, news articles, other relevant papers, as well as an analysis of
observed exchange rates and reserves behavior.
Each country is assigned to one o f the following thirteen categories: formal
dollarization, currency union, currency board, conventional fixed peg to a single
currency, conventional fixed peg to a currency basket, horizontal band, forward looking
crawling peg, forward looking crawling band, backward looking crawling peg, backward
looking crawling band, tightly managed floating, managed floating and independently
floating. The definitions o f these regimes are provided in Table 4.1.
A country is classified as having a conventional fixed peg with respect to a
specific currency if the exchange rate is observed to be within a narrow band o f 2% for at
least 4 months, and this classification is supported by country information. It is a
conventional peg with respect to a basket if this is the de jure classification and it is also
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what the country information indicates, unless the country clearly pegs to a single
currency (as indicated by an analysis o f the exchange rate).
A gradual depreciation o f the currency by small amounts according to a formula
with or without formal or unannounced bands is classified as a crawling peg (with or
without bands). If there are announced bands but there is heavy intramarginal
intervention within some detected narrow inner band, the regime is classified as a fixed
or crawling peg.

Based on information contained in the documents, distinction is made

between forward and backward looking crawls.
The country is identified as a managed float in three cases: if the announced
regime is a fixed peg but the official exchange rate is subject to frequent devaluations
within very short time periods, or when the country has multiple exchange rates and most
transactions are done using the parallel market-determined rate; or if intervention is
aimed at countering the long term trend o f the exchange rate.24 25 This way o f classifying
managed floating regimes is somewhat troublesome because it does not necessarily
indicate central bank intervention aimed as reducing misalignments in exchange rates.
Therefore, we should interpret results for managed floating regimes with some caution. In
tightly managed floating regimes intervention achieves a stable exchange rate by very
tight monitoring, where such stable rates have not been clearly identified as any o f the

23 Intervention is measured by balance o f payments position, international reserves, and parallel market
developments.

The official exchange rate is the exchange rate that is set by the Central Bank and is used by banks and
other financial institutions. In some countries, an exchange rate market has developed parallel to the official
rate (sometimes called the black market rate).
24

25

In general, if parallel rate is used in most transactions, this is the rate used for classification purposes.
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above discussed regimes. If intervention is aimed at preventing excessive exchange rate
volatility only, it is classified as a free float.
One big advantage o f this classification involves the use o f country information
besides data on exchange rates and other indicators. The use o f exchange rate behavior
alone could lead to erroneously assigning a fixed exchange rate regime if the exchange
rate has been stable due to stable fundamentals or the lack o f shocks to the economy. The
shorter the time period for which the exchange rate behavior is analyzed, the more
serious this problem becomes.
One shortcoming o f this classification involves possible biased inference because
some countries may not be disclosing all information. Another is that it only goes back to
1990. More importantly, however, the classifications o f managed and tightly managed
regimes seem to be the ‘leftover’ category o f regimes that could not be incorporated
anywhere else.
For my analysis, I include the following exchange rate regimes under the group o f
managed regimes: conventional fixed pegs to a single currency or to a currency basket,
crawling pegs, horizontal and crawling bands, tightly managed and managed floating
regimes. This leaves out hard pegs such as formal dollarization, currency union and
currency board.
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4.2 The Lew-Yevati and Sturzenegger (2002) Classification

Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) provide annual series for 183 countries for
1974-2000. They use K-means cluster analysis to classify countries in one o f four
exchange rate regimes: flexible, dirty float, crawling peg and fixed.26
The authors utilize the behavior o f three variables: changes in the official nominal
exchange rate, volatility o f exchange rate changes and volatility o f international reserves.
Changes in the official nominal exchange rate are calculated as the average o f the
absolute monthly percentage change in the nominal exchange rate during a calendar year.
Volatility o f exchange rate changes is given by the standard deviation o f the monthly
percentage changes in the exchange rate. Lastly, the volatility o f international reserves is
calculated as the average o f the absolute monthly change in net dollar international
reserves relative to the monetary base in the previous month, where net dollar reserves
are given by foreign assets less foreign liabilities and government deposits at the Central
Bank.27
The authors distinguish between flexible regime, dirty float, crawling peg and
fixed regime as given by Table 4.2. Flexible regimes involve little intervention (i.e. low
volatility in reserves) and large fluctuations in the exchange rate (i.e. high volatility in
exchange rates and exchange rate changes). In a fixed exchange rate regime, on the other

26 Cluster analysis is a technique that allocates observations in homogeneous groups according to some
rule. K-means cluster analysis allocates observations according to their distance to the center o f the cluster
(centroid) - an observation is assigned to the cluster with the nearest centroid. The number o f groups is pre
specified by the researcher, and the centroids are iteratively estimated by the program itself.
27 The argument here is that a given percentage change in reserves in countries with low monetization
implies a larger relative intervention in foreign exchange markets. However, this might not necessarily be
the case. A specific change in reserves would imply larger relative intervention with a relatively smaller
volume o f the foreign exchange market, and low monetization does not necessarily imply a smaller foreign
exchange market. A better measure would be the sum o f exports and imports, see Section 5 below.
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hand, the volatility o f reserves is high and exchange rates do not change much. A
crawling peg is characterized by high volatility in reserves and small changes in the
exchange rate in fixed increments (i.e. high changes in the exchange rate and low
volatility o f exchange rate changes). In dirty floats there is foreign exchange intervention
that is aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations, where both changes in the
exchange rate and the volatility o f exchange rate changes still remain high. Combinations
of low change in the exchange rate, low volatility o f exchange rate changes and low
volatility o f reserves are marked as ‘inconclusive’.
One shortcoming o f the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification is that series
are annual, and therefore, they cannot capture changes in the exchange rate regime during
the year. Thus, it might attribute an exchange rate regime that might have lasted only a
few months to the whole year. For example, when the exchange rate was fix e d in
Argentina in April 1991, owing to the high exchange rate volatility in the first three
months, year 1991 is specified as a dirty float. Similarly, a high sample variance may be
due to a one-time large devaluation under a pegged regime and may not indicate greater
exchange rate flexibility.28
Another shortcoming is related to the heavy reliance on exchange rate behavior to
classify regimes. As was stated above, using movements in exchange rates to classify
regimes could pose problems since, for example, an exchange rate may remain fairly
constant over some time due to the absence o f shocks, which would be mistaken for some
pegged or intermediate regime. Since the authors use the annual average o f some
measures o f monthly exchange rate behavior, this could be a significant problem in terms

28 The reliance on exchange rate behavior to classify regimes may also lead to an endogeneity problem in
terms o f my analysis. See Section 4.4 below.
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o f regime classifications. Additionally, unlike the other two classifications, Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger use official exchange rates, which can mislead results in the presence o f
an extensively used parallel market.

Moreover, their classification ends up with many

i n

inconclusive periods.

Also note that Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger do not distinguish

between hard and other conventional (‘soft’) fixed regimes. It only has a broad ‘fix’
category characterized by high volatility o f reserves and stable exchange rates, which
could be the case in hard as well as soft fixes. There is one currency in my sample that is
classified as a fix, the New Zealand dollar (NZD). I do estimate a gap weight for the
NZD, however, I also check to see whether results are sensitive to the estimate for the
NZD. In general terms, in my analysis, I include the crawling peg and dirty float
exchange rate regimes under the group o f managed regimes.

4.3 The Reinhart and R ogoff (20041 Classification

Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) provide annual and monthly database for 153
countries over the period o f 1946-2001. This classification relies solely on the behavior
of the exchange rate to classify countries in one o f the following ten exchange rate
regimes: no legal tender, currency board, peg (to a single currency), (horizontal) band,
crawling peg, crawling band, moving band (which allows for both a sustained

29 Reinhart and R ogoff (2004) analyze the use o f parallel and dual markets and argue that they are more
important than is usually thought.
30 To be exact, there are 716 unidentified years, either due to the lack o f some data or because o f low
change in the exchange rate combined with low volatility o f exchange rate changes and low volatility o f
reserves.
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depreciation and appreciation), managed floating, freely floating, and freely fa llin g.31 The
freely falling category includes countries for which the officially announced regime is not
statistically verified and that experience annual inflation rates higher than 40%.32 The
argument here is that countries experiencing macroeconomic instability often have very
high inflation rates, which may be reflected in high and frequent exchange rate
depreciation, and thus such macroeconomic disturbances can be incorrectly attributed to
the exchange rate regime. It might therefore be problematic to classify such regimes as
floating, intermediate or pegged. The authors do, however, provide a secondary
classification for the freely falling category as well, classifying the currency into one of
the nine exchange rate regimes, which I have used in my analysis.
The Reinhart and Rogoff classification is depicted in Figure 4.3. A country is
classified as a peg if no dual or multiple exchange rate exists, and the absolute percentage
change in the exchange rate is zero for 4 consecutive months or more, or if the
probability that the monthly exchange rate remains within a 1% band over a rolling 5year period is greater than 80% and no drift is present.
If the probability that the monthly exchange rate remains within a 2% band over a
rolling 5-year period is greater than 80% and a positive drift is present, the country is
classified as a crawling peg; if the exchange rate goes through periods o f both
appreciation and depreciation, it is a moving band. A country is classified as a band also

31 This classification relies mainly on movements in dual and parallel market exchange rates if they differ
substantially from the official rate.
32 The countries in my sample that fall in the freely falling category for some period are Brazil (02/9908/99), Indonesia (04/98-03/99), Korea (12/97-06/98) and Turkey (05/98-09/00).
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if a band is announced and there is a unified exchange market, and the regime is not
being identified as a de facto peg.
If a country cannot be classified as any o f the other regimes, it is either a managed
£
or a free float. Reinhart and Rogoff define a ratio —;-------- - , where e is the mean
P { s < 1%)
absolute monthly percentage change in the exchange rate over a rolling 5-year period,
and P { s < 1%) gives the likelihood o f small changes in s . Then they get a frequency
distribution by pooling the observations for all most transparent floaters, and test the
freely floating as the null hypothesis vs. managed floating.

In that case, if

for a particular country for a particular period falls inside the 99% confidence interval, it
£
is characterized as freely floating. If, on the other hand, —;--------- falls in the lower 1%
P { e < 1%)
tail, then the country is characterized as managed floating. As such, the classification o f
managed floating does not necessarily imply active or frequent foreign exchange market
intervention, just that the index does not behave like the indices for the free floaters.
Thus, similarly to the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification, one might question how
appropriate it is to include this managed floating category under managed regimes.
Furthermore, this classification does not identify the regime as being a managed float
with respect to a specific currency. Beyond that, this approach poses another difficulty.
Since the classification relies solely on exchange rate behavior, it is quite possible that an

33 Most transparent floaters include the US dolIar/DM-euro, US dollar/yen, US dollar/UK pound, US
dollar/Australian dollar, and US dollar/New Zealand dollar exchange rates. It is rather strange that authors
would include the New Zealand dollar among most transparent floaters when their classification actually
identifies the currency as a managed float.
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exchange rate regime that is truly managed floating could be classified as a free float if it
has experienced large shocks, or that a truly floating regime could be classified as a
managed float if it has not experienced large shocks.34 Thus, even if central bank
intervention has been effective in limiting exchange rate swings by leading to a larger
weight on the gap from PPP, this might not appear to be the case if the country has
experienced large shocks. This country would erroneously be classified as a free float and
this would affect the average weight for managed and freely floating groups. If it is in
fact the case that central bank intervention leads to a larger weight on the gap from PPP,
then such an erroneous classification would bias the average weight for free floaters in
the upward direction relative to the average weight for managed regimes.
To circumvent the problem o f attributing the stability in fundamentals or lack o f
significant shocks to the economy to exchange rate stability, Reinhart and Rogoff authors
use a rolling 5-year window. As such, their classification might be seen as more reliable
that the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification. But although this approach reduces
the significance o f this problem, one can hardly argue that it eliminates it altogether.
One certain advantage o f this classification is the time period it spans: 1946-2001.

4.4 Comparing the Classifications

As was discussed above, all three classifications have some shortcomings. The
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) or IMF de facto classification combines quantitative
analysis with country reports, which is a big advantage over the other two classifications.
However, this classification only goes back to 1990, which limits its usefulness for

34 Similarly to the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification, the reliance on exchange rate behavior to
classify regimes may also lead to an endogeneity problem in terms o f my analysis. See Section 4.4 below.
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empirical analysis. The Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classification, on the other
hand, is on an annual basis, and as such may classify the whole year as a particular
regime while this regime may have started, say, in March. The classification provided by
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) is on monthly basis and goes back to 1946, which is a big
advantage. However, their main reliance on quantitative measures may result in incorrect
inferences about regime classifications.
One major problem related to the Reinhart and Rogoff and the Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzengger classifications is their main reliance on exchange rate behavior to classify
regimes. Such an approach raises the concern o f first using exchange rate volatility to
classify exchange rates into different regimes and then using these exchange rate regimes
to test for long run misalignments in the exchange rates - the endogeneity problem. If one
were relying on some measure for exchange rate swings to test if central bank
intervention is effective in limiting the magnitude o f swings in exchange rates, this would
be a major problem. One would almost guarantee obtaining smaller swings in exchange
rates under exchange rate regimes involving such policy, since by construction, under
these regimes the exchange rate is less volatile. But is this a problem in terms o f testing
whether managed regimes attach a. higher weight to the gap compared to freely floating
regimes? Exchange rate volatility could affect results by influencing the market premium,
since smaller changes in exchange rates lead to a higher premium.35 Thus, for the same
change in exchange rate expectations, to get larger changes in the premium, one would
need a higher gap weight. Thus, if endogeneity is a problem, it would likely bias results
in favor o f getting a higher gap weight under managed regimes. Note that for the Bubula

35 Recall that the market premium is calculated as p r i;i^ = s(|(+l - ( y + f

) .

143

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and Otker-Robe classification, that would probably be less o f a problem, if any, since its
primary source in identifying regimes is country reports and information, and exchange
rate behavior is only supplementary.
The differences between the three classifications are evident in Table 4.3, which
provides the different regime classifications for the 24 currencies in the sample.36 A
currency that is identified as a managed or free float in one study could be identified as
-5*7 - i n

some type o f intermediate regime in another.

For example, the Turkish lira (TRL) is

classified as a crawling peg by Bubula and Otker-Robe, while the other two
classifications state the TRL to be a free float. Even more strikingly, the NZD is
classified as a free float by Bubula and Otker-Robe, managed float by Reinhart and
Rogoff, and a fix by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger! It is also worth noting that the
classifications differ mainly in determining the exchange rate regimes adopted in
developing countries.
Since there is no way o f telling which classification is closer to the ‘true’
exchange rate regimes adopted by the different countries in the sample, in the next two
chapters I run empirical tests using all three classifications.
Given the major shortcomings o f these exchange rate classifications, most notably
their reliance on the behavior o f the exchange rates, in the next section I discuss an

36 One common problem with all classifications is that they do not allow for effects o f intervention by other
countries that negates the need for exchange market action by the country under consideration.
37 See Maier (2005) for a comparison o f the classifications provided by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(2002) and Reinhart and R ogoff (2004).
38 The cut-off months for the exchange rate regimes o f the different currencies are based on the Reinhart
and Rogoff classification with no specific purpose.
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alternative way o f classifying exchange rate regimes by using data on reserves as proxy
for central bank intervention.

5 Reserves Data as Proxy for Official Intervention

If data on central bank intervention were available, one could use these data to
classify regimes according to the degree to which central banks are involved in
determining the movements o f the exchange rate. Unfortunately central banks do not
make such data publicly available. Therefore, many researchers have used different
measures to try to capture the degree o f official intervention in foreign exchange markets.
As was mentioned above, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) have used central banks’
net foreign assets less government deposits at the central bank.

TO

Calvo and Reinhart

(2002) and Bofinger and Wollmershauser (2001) have used total reserves minus gold.40
This is the sum o f foreign exchange, reserve position in the IMF and the U.S. dollar value
o f special drawing rights (SDR) holdings by monetary authorities.41 Both o f these
measures include foreign assets that are not part o f central bank intervention, namely
reserve positions with the IMF and SDRs. Moreover, the first measure also includes gold
holdings.
The IFS also provides data on foreign exchange reserves, which include monetary
authorities’ claims on nonresidents in the form o f foreign assets, such as banknotes, bank

39 Net foreign assets are obtained by subtracting line 16c from line 11, and government deposits at the
central bank are given in line 16d in the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database.
40 Which corresponds to line 1 l.d in IFS.
41 SDRs are reserve assets created by the IMF to supplement existing reserves. These are allocated to
member countries that participate in the IMF’s Operations Division for SDRs and Administered Accounts
proportionately to their quotas. SDRs can be used for many transactions such as settling financial
obligations, purchasing foreign currency, or extending loans.
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deposits, treasury bills, and government securities.42 Since these data do not include gold,
reserve positions in the IMF and SDRs, they could be considered a better proxy for
official intervention. Since the exchange rates that I consider in my analysis are all with
respect to the U.S. dollar, foreign exchange reserves in terms o f U.S. dollars alone would
be a better proxy for official intervention in the dollar market. However, such data are not
available for all countries in my sample. Nevertheless, it might be reasonable to assume
that for the most part the difference between the two series is not significant since the
majority o f foreign exchange held by central banks throughout the world is likely
denominated in U.S. dollars. Therefore, to proxy official intervention, I use the change in
foreign exchange reserves.
Since a particular change in reserves can imply a different degree o f intervention
for different countries depending on the size o f the foreign exchange market, the reserves
data need to be normalized. Unfortunately, historical data on the size o f the foreign
exchange market are not available for most countries.43 There are several different
measures that have been used in the literature, such as reserves o f the previous period
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), the monetary base (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2002), or
the sum o f exports and imports (Bofinger and Wollmershauser, 2001). Since the sum o f
exports and imports provides a measure for the amount o f foreign exchange traded in a

42 Line ld.d in the IFS.
43 Such data is provided by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey,
which started in 1989 with 21 countries and expanded to 52 countries in 2004.
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specific period o f time, I view this as the best proxy for the size o f the foreign exchange
market that is available for every country in my sample.44
Several economists have argued that changes in reserves are not a good proxy for
foreign exchange intervention. They have argued that international reserves are not well
correlated with official intervention since they may change due to reasons that are
unrelated to official intervention, such as fluctuations in valuations and accrual o f interest
earnings. Moreover, changes in international reserves may not capture all transactions
that are in fact official interventions, such as the Japanese hidden reserves, or the use o f
open market operations and interest rate changes to affect exchange rate behavior.45
However, many o f these arguments are not very important for my analysis. This is
because I use foreign exchange holdings measured in U.S. dollars and thus, to the extent
that most reserves are held in dollars, there are no valuation effects in my data. Moreover,
my objective is to examine the relative effects o f intervention across countries. Therefore,
fluctuations in valuations, or the accrual o f interest earnings as well as the use o f other
policy tools besides the purchase and sale o f foreign exchange to affect exchange rate
behavior (as long as the use o f such policy tools is proportionate across countries), may
not play a crucial role for my results. This would be the case because all o f these would
affect changes in reserves in the same way for all countries. Thus, the relative effects o f
intervention across countries would be based on changes in reserves that are not due to
these factors but due to different degrees o f intervention. Therefore, one can view the use

The capital account provides trade in financial assets, which makes up about 97% o f the total volume o f
the foreign exchange market. As such, it would be a better measure for the amount o f foreign exchange
traded in a country. However, these data are not available for several countries in my sample.

44

Japanese hidden reserves are official foreign exchange deposits with commercial banks. See Dominguez
and Frankel (1993b) and Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002).
45
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of change in foreign exchange reserves to be a good measure o f the relative degree of
central bank intervention across countries.
As a last note, I would like to emphasize that classifying exchange rate regimes
according to the degree to which central banks are involved in determining the
movements o f the exchange rate by using changes in reserves as a proxy for intervention
overcomes the major issues from which the exchange rate regimes discussed in the
previous section suffer. Data on reserves, exports and imports are widely available and
thus, this approach does not impose period constraints on the sample. Most importantly,
however, it does not rely on exchange rate behavior, and as such could perhaps be seen as
a more reliable way o f classifying exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, one should
keeping mind that the exchange rate regime classifications and the changes in reserves
imply different ways in which one can test the prediction o f the premium model that
official intervention could limit swings in exchange rates by leading to a higher gap
weight. By using exchange rate regime classifications, I group countries under two
groups - freely floating and managed regimes - and test if the average gap weight is
larger for the second group. I cannot perform the same analysis by using changes in
reserves unless I come up with a measure o f how much intervention would classify a
country as a managed regime versus a free float. Changed in reserves, however, allow me
to test whether more intervention leads to a larger weight attached to the gap from PPP.

6 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the methodology and data for testing the two implications
o f the premium model. One is that the market premium and the gap from PPP are
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positively related. The other implication is that in markets characterized by central bank
intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some announced or unannounced
parity level at unpredictable moments in time, the aggregate weight attached to the gap in
assessing potential losses will be larger compared to markets without such policy. Such a
finding would indicate smaller swings in exchange rates. The next chapter provides
supporting evidence on the positive link between the gap and the premium. Whether
policy officials can make use o f this positive link between the gap and the premium in
limiting exchange rate swings is the topic o f Chapter 6.
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Table 4.1: Exchange Rate Regime Classification
by Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002)
General
category
Hard pegs

Intermediate
regimes

Floats

Exchange rate
regime

Explanation

Formal
dollarization

The country uses the currency o f another country as the legal
tender.

Currency unions

The countries that are part o f a monetary or currency union use the
same currency as the legal tender.

Currency boards

The country commits legally to exchange domestic currency for a
particular foreign currency at a fixed rate. In that case the domestic
currency is fully backed by foreign assets.

Conventional fixed
pegs vis-a-vis
another currency
or a currency
basket

The country pegs its currency to another currency or a basket o f
currencies at a fixed rate, which may be adjusted although
relatively infrequently. The exchange rate may fluctuate within a
narrow margin o f less than + 1 % around the central rate, or the
maximum and minimum values o f the exchange rate remain within
the margin o f 2 % for at least three months.

Crawling pegs:
forward and
backward looking

The rate vis-a-vis a single currency or a basket o f currencies is
periodically adjusted in small amounts at a fixed rate or in
response to changes in selected indicators. A crawling peg is
classified as backward looking when the crawl is determined by
past inflation differentials, and it is forward looking when the
crawl is determined by projected inflation differentials.

Horizontal bands

The currency is allowed to fluctuate within margins o f at least +1
percent around a fixed central rate.

Crawling bands:
forward and
backward looking

The currency is allowed to fluctuate within margins o f at least +1
percent around a fixed central rate, which is periodically adjusted
in small amounts at a fixed rate or in response to changes in
selected indicators. The backward versus forward looking
distinction is made similarly to the crawling peg.

Managed floating:
tightly or other

Authorities intervene in the foreign exchange market to counter the
long-term trend o f the exchange rate without a pre-specified path
or target. In tightly managed floating intervention achieves a stable
exchange rate by very tight monitoring, again without a clear
exchange rate path. Under “other managed floating” intervention is
more ad-hoc.

Free floating

The exchange rate is determined by the market. Intervention is
aimed at reducing fluctuations in exchange rates rather than at
establishing a level for the exchange rate.

Source: Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002).
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Table 4.2: Exchange Rate Regime Classification by
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002)

Flexible regime
Dirty float
Crawling peg
Fixed regime
Inconclusive

Changes in the
exchange rate
high
high
high
low
low

Volatility o f exchange
rate changes
high
high
low
low
low

Volatility of
international reserves
low
high
high
high
low

Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002).
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Table 4.3: Exchange Rate Regime Classifications by
Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) (BOR), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) (LYS)
and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) (RR)46

AUD
BRL
CAD
CHF
COP
CZK
DEM
EUR
GBP
GBP
HUF
IDR
JPY
KRW
KRW
MXN
MXN
MYR
NOK
NZD
PEN
PHP
PLN
SGD
SGD
THB
TRL
VEB

Time Period
BOR
LYS
11/86-09/00
free float
float
02/99-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
cra w lin g p e g /fix
08/86-09/00
m an aged/free f lo a t
f lo a t
08/86-09/00
free float
float
02/98-09/99
c ra w lin g b an d
f lo a t
04/98-09/00
free float
float
08/86-09/00
free float
float
01/99-09/00
free float
float
08/86-09/92
h o rizo n ta l b a n d
f lo a t
09/92-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
f lo a t
04/98-09/00
free float
04/98-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
in te rm ed ia te /cra w lin g p e g
08/86-09/00
free float
float
12/93-11/97
tig h tly m an a g ed
fix /in te rm e d ia te /c r.p e g
12/97-09/00
fr e e /m a n a g e d flo a t
c ra w lin g p e g /fix
12/94-03/96
f r e e f lo a t
in term ediate
04/96-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
in term ed ia te/flo a t
03/93-07/97
m a n a g ed /tig h tly m ng
in term ediate/fix/float
11/86-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
f lo a t
02/93-09/00
f r e e f lo a t
f ix
04/99-09/00
m a n a g ed /tig h tly m ng
flo a t/c r a w lin g p e g
12/97-05/99 m a n a g ed/free/m an aged
f lo a t
04/98-09/00
c ra w lin g b a n d
f lo a t
01/88-11/98
tig h tly m n g/m an aged
12/98-08/00 managed/tightly managed
06/98-09/00
m a n a g ed f lo a t
c ra w lin g p e g /flo a t
c ra w lin g p e g
fix /flo a t
05/98-09/00
cra w lin g p e g
04/99-08/00
c ra w lin g b a n d

RR
free float
m a n a g e d flo a t
m ovin g ban d

free float
c ra w lin g b an d

free float
free float
free float
f r e e f lo a t
m a n a g e d flo a t

free float
f r e e f lo a t

free float
c ra w lin g p e g
f r e e f lo a t
f r e e f lo a t
m a n a g e d flo a t
m ovin g b an d
m a n a g e d flo a t
m a n a g e d flo a t
peg
m a n a g e d flo a t
m a n a g ed flo a t
m ovin g b a n d

managed float
m a n a g e d flo a t
f r e e f lo a t
c ra w lin g b an d

The cut-off months for the exchange rate regimes o f the different currencies are based on the Reinhart and
Rogoff classification with no specific purpose. Note that some currencies appear more than once (GBP,
KRW and SGD) due to different exchange rate regimes being adopted during the sample period.

46 AUD: Australian dollar, BRL: Brazilian real, CAD: Canadian dollar, CHF: Swiss franc, COP: Chilean
peso, CZK: Czech koruna, DEM: German mark, EUR: euro, GBP: British pound, HUF: Flungarian forint,
IDR: Indonesian rupee, JPY: Japanese yen, KRW: Korean won, MXN: Mexican peso, MYR: Malaysian
ringgit, NOK: Norwegian krone, NZD: New Zealand dollar, PEN: Peruvian sol, PHP: Philippine peso,
PLN: Polish zloty, SGD: Singapore dollar, THB: Thai baht, TRL: Turkish lira, VEB:Venezuelan Bolivar.
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Figure 4.1: Danish krone/U.S. dollar, French frank/U.S. dollar and German
mark/U.S. dollar exchange rates (in the order o f appearance)
(August 1986-September 2000)
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The Danish krone and French frank are plotted on the primary axis, and the German mark is plotted on the
secondary axis.
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Figure 4.2: PPP and Spot Exchange Rates of the Japanese Yen vis-a-vis the U.S.
Dollar (August 1986-September 2000)

180
160
140

Relative Big Mac PPP

120

100

Relative PPP

Spot exchange rate

8/28/1986 4/21/1988 12/21/1989 8/22/1991 4/29/1993 12/15/1994 8/28/1996 4/28/1998 12/28/1999

154

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 4.3: The Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)
Natural Exchange Rate Classification Algorithm
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Source: Reinhart and R ogoff (2004).
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C H A PTE R 5

T H E M A R K ET PR EM IU M AND T H E GAP FR O M PPP:
EV ID EN CE FR O M 24 C U R R EN C IES

1 Intro d u ctio n

In this chapter I test for a positive relationship between the market premium and
the gap from PPP. As was mentioned previously, Frydman and Goldberg (2007) have
tested this relationship for the Japanese yen, German mark and British pound vis-a-vis the
U.S. dollar. I also test for these currencies, but with a different data set for exchange rate
expectations and with a different time frame. Furthermore, I extend the analysis o f
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) to 24 currencies.

Thus, my results help generalize the

empirical findings on the positive relationship between the market premium and the gap
from PPP. Furthermore, my series are based not on individual currencies but on exchange
rate regimes. Recall the implication o f the premium model that the weight attached to the
gap from historical benchmark might be higher with some central bank policy supporting
a parity compared to the gap weight under freely floating regimes. If this is in fact the
case, then it would not be appropriate to estimate one gap weigh for a period that spans
two different exchange rate regimes.
In estimating the relationship between the market premium and the gap from PPP,
I follow two different approaches: contingency table analysis (Section 2) and regression
analysis based on an autoregressive distributive lag model (Section 3). The contingency
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table analysis enables me to capture the qualitative relationship between the gap and the
premium, which is important because the quantitative relationship could be changing
over time. The autoregressive distributive lag model takes the nonstationarity o f the
series into account and allows one to make inference on the significance level of
parameter estimates.
As was mentioned in Chapter 4, the exchange rate regime classifications by
Reinhart and R ogoff (2004), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2002) arrive at different classifications with different time periods. For
comparison purposes, I provide the results for all three classifications.
The main finding that emerges from the empirical analysis is that there is general
support for the positive link between the gap and the premium. The contingency table
analysis results provide suggestive evidence that the gap and the premium move in the
same direction for 61-77% o f the exchange rate regimes in my sample, depending on the
regime classification. The results from the autoregressive distributive lag model, on the
other hand, provide strong support for the positive relationship between the gap and the
premium in the short run, as the premium model predicts. All three classifications
provide similar results.

2 Contingency Table Analysis

2.1 What is a Contingency Table Analysis (CTA)?

CTA is a very simple non-parametric technique that allows one to test the
qualitative relationship in the data without imposing a quantitative relationship. For some
of the currencies, the sample size is about 170 observations, which spans roughly 14
157

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

years. One would not expect the quantitative relationship between two variables to
remain unchanged for such a long period o f time. It is unlikely that individuals would
follow a fixed rule for 14 years in assessing potential losses from taking open positions in
the foreign exchange market. So, one would think that the relationship between the gap
and the premium would be nonlinear. It is possible that individuals care about the gap
from PPP more when the gap is large, and less when it is small. And how they measure
the gap from PPP could change over time too. A CTA allows the quantitative relationship
between the gap and the premium to vary over time but still picks up whether there is this
qualitative relationship, which is the key prediction o f the model.
A contingency table reports the number o f observations for which two variables
move in the same direction (in our case, the number o f observations for which the gap
and the premium either increases together o f decreases together), and the number o f
observations for which these variables move in opposite directions. For example,
consider the case for Australia as given in Table 5.1. In this table the on-diagonal
elements capture the number o f observations for which the gap and the premium move in
the same direction over a month: there are 53 months during which the gap and the
premium both increased and there are 55 months for which both o f these variables fell.
The off-diagonal elements capture the number o f observations for which the gap and the
premium move in opposite directions: there are 28 months for which the premium fell as
the gap increased, and 31 months for which as the gap fell the premium increased.
The prediction o f the premium model is that the gap and the premium should
move in the same direction. Continuing with the same example, for Australia, the total
number o f observations for which the gap and the premium moved in the same direction
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is 108, whereas the total number o f observations for which the gap and the premium
moved in opposite directions is 59.
A CTA also reports a %2 statistic that one can use to test whether the number of
observations for which the two variables move in the same direction is significantly
different from the number o f observations for which they move in opposite directions. In
the case for Australia, t h e j 2 statistic is equal to 14.41. The use o f this statistic is,
however, conditional upon non-autocorrelated error terms in the series that is being
investigated. Tests reveal that the individual currency series in my sample exhibit
autocorrelation, in which case the CTA is not distributed as %2 • Therefore, we cannot
comment on the significance level o f the test, so we can only use it as a suggestive
statistic. Thus, as an additional indication o f the degree to which the premium and the gap
are likely to move in the same direction, I report the ratio o f the number o f observations
for which the gap and the premium move in the same direction to the number o f
observations for which they move in opposite directions. For Australia, for example, this
ratio is 1.8. I also provide the percentage o f observations for which the gap and the
premium move together, which for Australia is found to be 64.7%.

2.2 CTA Results

Tables 5.2a, 5.2b and 5.2c at the end o f the chapter report the contingency table
results using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) and LevyYeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classifications, respectively. In this part o f the analysis I
use the exchange rate regime classifications only to determine the sample period for each
currency.
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For all three classifications, the CTA results provide general support for the
positive relationship between the premium and the gap from PPP (summarized in Table
5.3). For all three classifications, the ratio o f the number o f observations that move in the
same direction (SD) to the ones that move in opposite directions (OD) is greater than 1
for 17, which for the Reinhart and Rogoff classification makes up 61% o f the total 28
regimes.

For the

Bubula

and

Otker-Robe

and

Levy-Yeyati

and

Sturzenegger

classifications, these percentages are 65% (out o f total 26 regimes) and 77% (out o f total
22 regimes).
How do my results for the Japanese yen, German mark and British pound vis-avis the U.S. dollar compare to the findings o f Frydman and Goldberg (2007) where their
analysis is based on a different survey and a sample period from December 1982 through
February 1997? I analyze all three currencies between August 1986 and September 2000
for the Reinhart and Rogoff and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, and between January
1990 and September 2000 for the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification. My results are
weaker for the Japanese yen and the German mark, but stronger for the British pound.
For the Japanese yen, the ratio o f the number o f observations for which the gap and
premium move in the same direction to the number o f observations for which they move
in opposite directions, which Frydman and Goldberg call the success rate, is 1.2 (1.5) for
the period o f 01/90-09/00 (08/86-09/00). Frydman and Goldberg find the success rate for
the Japanese yen to be 1.83. For the German mark I find the success rate to be 0.9 (1.1)
for the period 01/90-09/00 (08/86-09/00), whereas Frydman and Goldberg report it to be
1.66. For the British pound, my results indicate a success rate o f 1.4 (1.5) between 08/8609/00 (01/90-09/00), versus the 1.27 reported by Frydman and Goldberg. The difference
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in results is likely due to the different forecast data that was used, and perhaps also due to
the different time span that was analyzed.
In sum, the CTA results provide evidence that the gap and the premium move in
the same direction for about 61-77% o f the exchange rate regimes in my sample.
However, since we cannot use the Chi-square statistic to test for the significance o f the
positive relationship between the gap and the premium, these results should be viewed
only as suggestive evidence (or descriptive statistics).

3 Autoregressive Distributive Lag Model

3.1 What is an Autoregressive Distributive Lag (ADL) Model?

The non-stationarity o f time series data poses problems for statistical inference
since the sample mean and variance o f such series are not constant Over time, and
successive observations are highly interdependent. As is well known, differencing nonstationary (unit root) time series data helps since it yields stationary series, thus allowing
one to make inference on the significance level o f parameter estimates. However, such an
approach ignores the long run relationship between the variables, which implies a
misspecification o f the model.
One approach that avoids such a misspecification, which Frydman and Goldberg
(2007) and other researchers have used to deal with unit root data, is to estimate an
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autoregressive distributive lag model.1 In terms o f the premium model, an ADL
specification o f order one is given by:

'y

pr, =b0 +bn p r ,_x + b20gap, + b2l gap,_x + e,

( 1)

Equation (1) can also be written in an error-correction form:4
Ap r, = a 0 + a xAgap, + a 2ECT,_x + s,

(2)

where the error correction term (ECT) is given by:
ECT,_X= p xgap,_x +P0 - p r , x

(3)

The ADL model, as stated in equation (2), allows for a distinction between the
short run and the long run effects o f the gap on the premium. The first difference terms in
equation (2), Agap, and A p r ,, capture the contemporaneous (short run) relationship
between the gap and the premium. A contemporaneous relationship captures the effect of
changes in causal variables from one time period to the next on the dependent variable
between the same time periods. The ECT provides a relationship between the gap and the
premium in their levels, as captured by /?,. This relationship can be viewed as a long run

1

See Hendry and Juselius (2000).

2

Ignoring the lFPt term - see Section 1 in Chapter 4.

For most series, one or two lags were enough to obtain stationary and normally distributed errors. For
very few series, three lags were necessary. Appendix C provides the ADL model with two and three lags.
For several series, normality was not attained and therefore the significance tests related to these series are
valid only asymptotically.

3

4

By subtracting p r,_ x from both sides, adding and subtracting blljgapi l on the right side and rearranging.
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relationship, because when a 2 > 0 , over time the market has a tendency to move towards
this relationship between the gap and the premium.5 A long rim relationship is defined as
the state o f the economy where all variables have had time to adjust to their steady state
levels.
How do these short run and long run components o f the ADL model relate to the
prediction o f the premium model? Recall that the premium model implies that as the gap
rises from one time period to the next, the premium rises as well. Thus, it implies a
contemporaneous relationship between the gap and the premium in their levels. Does the
ADL model capture such a relationship? Note that in the error correction form, as given
in (2), the parameter a x captures the effect o f the change in the gap from time t - 1 to t
on the change in the premium from t - 1 to t . Also note that a x = b20, where, according
to the ADL specification as given in equation (1), the parameter b20 captures the effect o f
the gap on the premium in their levels. Thus, the prediction o f the premium model is that
a x > 0.
If we were to expect the gap and the premium to be positively related in the long
run as well then it should be the case that /?, > 0 . For this to hold in the long run,
however, there needs to be a stable relationship between the gap and the premium. In
estimating the ADL model, I assume that the relationship between the gap and the
premium is stable for the length o f the sample period on a particular regime. This,
however, may not be the case. It is possible that the weight attached to the gap from PPP

5 Suppose, for example, that the ECT in some period is positive, implying that the premium that market
participants expect is lower than the level implied by the gap variable. In this case, the premium will tend to

rise over time, where the magnitude o f the rise is determined by a 2.
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changes over time even during a particular regime. That would be the case if the gap
weight depends, for example, on the magnitude o f the gap. It is possible that individuals
attach more importance to the gap in forming their forecasts the farther the exchange rate
is from PPP. That could be the case because as the exchange rate forecast increases
further and further away from PPP from above, bulls in the market would get more and
more concerned about an eventual countermovement. Thus, they would put a larger
weight on the gap from PPP in assessing their potential losses. In fact, Kubelec (2004a,b)
reports that official intervention is more successful in moving the exchange rate in the
desired direction when misalignments from benchmark levels are larger. This finding is
in line with my argument that the weight attached to the gap could be higher when the
gap is larger. Thus, if the gap weight changes over time, we should not expect to see a
long run relationship between the gap and the premium. Therefore, results on the long run
relationship between the gap and the premium should be interpreted with caution.
I estimate the ADL model in two steps. First, I estimate equation (1) to obtain
estimates o f the bQ,b n ,b 20 and b2i coefficients, which I then use to construct the ECT.
Then I estimate the error-correction form o f the ADL model as given in equation (2).

3.2 ADL Results

Tables 5.4a, 5.4b and 5.4c report the results obtained from the ADL model for the
Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002) and Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger (2002) classifications, respectively.6 The contemporaneous effect o f

6 Results are arranged in two groups according to the exchange rate regime: freely floating regimes and
regimes that involve some central bank intervention, called the managed regimes. That is because I will use
the ADL results by these groups to perform the analysis in Chapter 6.
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changes in the gap on the market premium, a x, is found to be positive for most currencies
with all three classifications. For the Reinhart and Rogoff classification, o f the 27
regimes, a x is positive for 22 (82%), o f which 15 (56% o f 27) are significantly positive.7
For the classifications o f Bubula and Otker-Robe and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,
results are stronger. For the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification, o f the 26 regimes, a x
is positive for 23 (92%), o f which 14 (56% o f 25) are significantly positive. For the
classification by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, a x is positive for 17 out o f 21 regimes
(81%), and 14 o f the estimates are significantly positive (67% o f 21). For all three
classifications, none o f the negative estimates are significant. Also note that for several
currencies, which are denoted in the tables, the significance tests are only valid
asymptotically because the normality assumption was violated. In other words, these tests
•

o

would be valid if the sample size were to approach infinity. Thus, they can only be
treated as suggestive. It is also the case that for several regimes, assumptions such as
heteroscedasticity were violated, implying that significance tests are not valid.
The findings on the long run relationship between the gap and the premium in
levels, as captured by (ix, are not as supportive to the model as previous results. For all
three classifications the findings are mixed - there are both positive and negative
estimates for /?,. For the Reinhart and Rogoff classification the estimate for fix is positive

7 Note that compared to the CTA results, one regime are missing, the Mexican peso between 12/94-03/96.
The reason is that I could not obtain unbiased estimates for these, as revealed by the Reset test, which is
used to test for omitted variables or nonlinearity in the model. The same holds for the Bubula and OtkerRobe classification with the British pound between 10/90-08/92, and the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
classification with the Mexican peso between 01/95-12/96.
8 Due to the Central Limit theorem that states that any distribution would approach a normal one in the
limit.
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for 48% o f regimes (13 out o f 27), and significantly so for only 19% (5 out o f 27). For
52% o f regimes (14 out o f 27) the estimate is negative, and significantly so again for 26%
(7 out o f 27). Findings with the other two classifications are somewhat better. For the
Bubula and Otker-Robe classification, the estimate for /?, is positive for 52% o f the
sample (13 out o f 25), and significantly so for 24% (6 out o f 25), while it is significantly
negative for 24% (6 out o f 25). For the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification the
estimate for

is positive for 57% o f regimes (12 out o f 21), significantly positive for

38% (8 out o f 21) and significantly negative for 29% (6 out o f 21).
There can be two reasons for why do not see a positive relationship between the
gap and the premium in the long run. It is either the case that a long run relationship just
does not exist, or it exists but the data are not capturing it.
The first possibility was already discussed above. As was mentioned, it is possible
that the weight attached to the gap from PPP has changed over time, perhaps because it
depends on the size o f the gap, in which case we should not expect to see a long run
relationship between the gap and the premium. There is one way to explore this
possibility - by referring to the CTA results. Recall that a CTA allows for the gap weight
to change over time since it captures only the qualitative relationship between the gap and
the premium. Although we are not able to comment on the significance o f the CTA
results, we could use these as suggestive evidence. One can see that, depending on the
exchange rate regime classification, a time-varying gap weight could account for the
negative estimate o f the gap weight for 50-89% o f the exchange rate regimes. For the
Reinhart and R ogoff classification, for 10 out o f the 14 (71%) negative estimates for the
weight, the CTA indicates that the gap and the premium have moved together over the
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same sample period. When only significant negative estimates are considered, these
numbers are 4 out o f 7 (57%). For the Bubula and Otker-Robe classifications for 9 out of
12 (75%) negative weight estimates the gap and the premium have moved together over
the same sample period. When only significant negative estimates are considered, these
numbers are 3 out o f 6 (50%). For Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, the numbers are 8 out
of 9 (89%) and 5 out o f 6 (83%), respectively.
Let us now consider the second possibility - that the data are not capturing the
long run relationship between the gap and the premium. One problem might be the
sensitivity o f the results to the time frame, which is determined by the exchange rate
regime classifications. Such a difference in the estimates o f the gap weight is especially
striking, for example, for the Brazilian real (BRL) and the Peruvian sol (PEN) with the
Renhart and R ogoff and Bubula and Otker-Robe classifications. The BRL (PEN) spans
the period 02/99-09/00 (04/99-09/00) with the first, and 01/99-09/00 (05/98-09/00) with
the second classification. For the BRL the inclusion o f one observation (January 1998)
leads to a change in the estimate o f the gap weight from negative to positive (from 2.6883 to 0.43, both insignificant). For the PEN, the inclusion o f eleven observations
(05/98-03/99) leads to a change in the estimate o f the gap weight from negative to
positive (from -1.6343 to 0.3934, both significant). This suggests that if the cut-off dates
that are determined by the classifications are not correct, then it could be that part o f the
sample period in fact does not belong to that regime, or that a relevant part o f the sample
is missing, leading to a parameter shift in the data. Also, this sensitivity in the parameter
estimate could be due to a small sample bias.
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Another reason might lie with the problems related to survey data, more
specifically, the lag between the forward rate and the forecast o f the future exchange rate,
as discussed in the previous chapter. Although I have tried to alleviate the problems
associated with this lag by taking the average o f the forward exchange rate for the most
likely days on which the forecasts were being formulated, I have been only able to
improve the data. It is very likely that the data I use for the analysis are still different
from the aggregate o f the actual spot and forward rates that survey participants have used
when forming their forecasts, affecting results.
The results also indicate that the error correction term enters the equation
positively for all but one regime (the Australian dollar) and significantly so for almost all
regimes. For the three classifications - Reinhart and Rogoff, Bubula and Otker-Robe and
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, respectively - for 89% (24 out o f 27), 80% (20 out o f 25)
and 91% (19 out o f 21) o f the regimes, the estimate o f a 2 is significantly positive.
However,

for the

majority o f the regimes with

all three

classifications the

contemporaneous effect o f the gap on the premium is larger than the influence o f the long
run relationship as captured by the error correction term (78%, 72% and 81% o f the total
number o f regimes for the Reinhart and Rogoff, Bubula and Otker-Robe and Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger classifications, respectively).
For easy comparison to the findings o f Frydman and Goldberg (2007) for the
Japanese yen, the German mark and the British pound vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar, I have
constructed Table 5.5. For the Japanese yen, estimates using all three classifications are
similar to those reported by Frydman and Goldberg. The results for the German mark are
somewhat different, especially for the long run estimate o f the effect o f the gap weight on
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the premium. Estimates for the British pound are distinctively different from Frydman
and Goldberg’s findings. Results are not only different from the findings by Frydman and
Goldberg, but also among the three classifications, whenever a different time frame was
used. Since the sample size for these currencies is not small, this is not likely to be due to
a small sample bias. Rather, the difference in the estimates for the gap weight could be
due to the different cut-off dates and instability in the parameter.
Summarizing the findings discussed in the previous paragraphs, it appears that the
short run component o f the ADL model in error correction form provides strong support
to the prediction o f the premium model o f a positive link between the gap from PPP and
the market premium. As such, it appears that the gap and the premium move in the same
direction in the short run. However, findings do not provide support for the long run
positive relationship between these two variables.
Nevertheless, results also indicate that, for the majority o f the currencies, the
contemporaneous effect o f the change in the gap on the change in the premium, as
captured by the short run component in the ADL model, is larger than the effect o f the
ECT on the change in the premium. Furthermore, the results from the CTA suggest that
for the majority o f the exchange rate regimes in the sample for which the long run
relationship was found to be negative, there might have been a shift in the gap weight.
Therefore, one can conclude that the findings on the contemporaneous effect are more
relevant for the prediction o f the premium model, and these suggest that the gap and the
premium are positively related to each other.
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4 Conclusion

In this chapter I extended the empirical analysis o f Frydman and Goldberg (2007)
to up to 28 exchange rate regimes involving 24 different currencies. My sample includes
the three currencies (Japanese yen, German mark and British pound) that Frydman and
Goldberg (2007) have analyzed but with a different data and for a different time span.
Although my results are different and weaker for some currencies compared to the
findings o f Frydman and Goldberg, in general both the contingency table analysis and the
autoregressive distributive lag model provide support for the positive effect o f the gap on
the market premium. These findings generalize the positive link between the gap and the
premium that was reported for three currencies by Frydman and Goldberg (2007) to 24
currencies.
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Table 5.1: CTA for Australia

Apr

period:
10/86-09/00

+

-

+

53

28

-

31

55

Agap

Chi-sq:
SD/OD:
SD/N:

14.41
1.8
64.7%
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Table 5.2a: Contingency Table Analysis
(Reinhart and Rogoff Classification)
SD/N
currency
Australian dollar
Brazilian real
British pound
British pound
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso

period
10/86-09/00
02/99-09/00
08/86-08/92
09/92-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/98-09/99
04/98-09/00

N

Chi-sq

168
20
73
97
170
21

14.41
1.35
0.93
0.00
6.72

SD

OD

108
12
40
48
101
10
14

SD/OD

59
7
32
48
68
10
15
9
81
17
9
67
17
11
24
7
16

1.8
1.7
1.3
1.0
1.5
1.0
0.9
1.2
1.1
0.7
2.2
1.5
1.8
2.0
1.2
1.1
2.3

(% )
64.7
63.2
55.6
50.0
59.8
50.0
48.3
55.0
52.1
41.4
69.0
60.4
63.8
66.7
53.8
53.3
69.8

01/99-09/00
08/86-09/00
04/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00
12/93-11/97
12/97-09/00
03/93-07/97
12/94-03/96
04/96-09/00

30
21
170
30
30
170
48
34
53
16
54

02/93-09/00
10/86-09/00
04/99-09/00
12/97-04/99
04/98-09/00

92
168
18
17
30

0.00
0.02
1.11
0.16
0.84
4.44
7.27
3.58
3.42
0.33
0.08
7.55
1.16
6.75
0.88
0.15
0.77

Singapore dollar
Singapore dollar
Swiss frank
Thai baht

01/88-11/98
12/98-08/00
08/86-09/00
05/98-09/00

131
21
170
29

0.18
0.27
4.44
0.00

63
9
98
14

67
11
71
14

0.9
0.8
1.4
1.0

48.5
45.0
58.0
50.0

Turkish lira
Venezuelan bolivar

05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00

29
18

0.54
0.08

12
8

16
9

0.8
0.9

42.9
47.1

Czech koruna
Euro
German mark
Hungarian forint
Indonesian rupee
Japanese yen
Korean won
Korean won
Malaysian ringgit
Mexican peso
Mexican peso
New Zealand dollar
Norwegian krone
Peruvian sol
Phillipine peso
Polish zloty

11
88
12
20
102
30
22
28
8
37
51
100
6
7
17

40
67
11
9
12

1.3
1.5
0.5
0.8
1.4

56.0
59.9
35.3
43.8
58.6

N: number of observations
SD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in the same direction
OD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in opposite directions
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Table 5.2b: Contingency Table Analysis
(Bubula and Otker-Robe Classification)
SD/N
currency
Australian dollar
Brazilian real
British pound
British pound
Canadian dollar
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso
Czech koruna
Euro
German mark
Hungarian forint
Indonesian rupee
Japanese yen
Korean won
Korean won
Malaysian ringgit
Mexican peso
New Zealand dollar
Norwegian krone
Peruvian sol
Polish zloty
Singapore dollar
Swiss frank
Thai baht
Turkish lira
Venezuelan bolivar

period
01/90-09/00
01/99-09/00
10/90-08/92
09/92-09/00
01/90-08/98
09/98-08/99
01/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
01/99-09/00
01/90-09/00
04/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
01/90-09/00
12/93-11/97
12/97-12/99
03/93-06/97
12/94-09/00
02/93-09/00
01/90-09/00
05/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
01/90-08/00
01/90-09/00
05/98-09/00
05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00

N

Chi-sq

SD

OD

129
21
23
97
104
25
20
30
21
129
30
30
129
48
25
52
70
92
129
29
30
128

9.26
0.80
4.18
0.00
9.40
0.12
0.04
0.02
1.11
0.26
0.84
4.44
1.54
7.67
2.74
0.16
5.83
1.16
4.15
0.21
0.77
0.34

81
12
16
48
67
11
10
14
11
61
12
20
71
33
16
27
45
51
75
11
17
67

47
8
6
48
36
13
9
15
9
67
17
9
57
14
8
24
24
40
53
17
12
60

129
29
29
18

1.97
0.00
0.54
0.08

72
14
12
8

56
14
16
9

SD/OD
1.7
1.5
2.7
1.0
1.9
0.8
1.1
0.9
1.2
0.9
0.7
2.2
1.2
2.4
2.0
1.1
1.9
1.3
1.4
0.6
1.4
1.1
1.3
1.0
0.8
0.9

(% )
63.3
60.0
72.7
50.0
65.0
45.8
52.6
48.3
55.0
47.7
41.4
69.0
55.5
70.2
66.7
52.9
65.2
56.0
58.6
39.3
58.6
52.8
56.3
50.0
42.9
47.1

N: number of observations
SD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in the same direction
OD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in opposite directions
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Table 5.2c: Contingency Table Analysis
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Classification)
SD/N
currency
Australian dollar
British pound
Canadian dollar
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso
Czech koruna
Euro
German mark
Indonesian rupee
Japanese yen
Korean won
Mexican peso
Mexican peso
New Zealand dollar
Norwegian krone
Peruvian sol
Phillipine peso
Polish zloty
Swiss frank
Thai baht
Turkish lira
Venezuelan bolivar

period
10/86-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/87-12/88
01/92-09/00
01/98-08/00
04/98-09/00
01/99-09/00
08/86-09/00
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00
03/97-12/98
01/95-12/96
01/97-09/00
02/93-09/00
10/86-09/00
05/98-12/99
01/97-04/99
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/99-09/00
01/99-09/00
03/99-08/00

N
168
170
24
105
32
30
21
170
30
170
22
24
45
92
168
20
28
30
170
21
21
18

Chi-sq
14.41
5.22
1.43
5.39
0.41
0.02
1.11
0.16
4.44
7.27
0.40
0.43
8.06
1.16
3.18
0.02
0.03
0.77
4.44
0.22
0.20
0.08

SD
108
99
13
64
14
14
11
88
20
102
12
13
32
51
95
8
14
17
98
9
11
8

OD

SD/OD

59
70
10
40
17
15
9
81
9
67
9
10
12
40
71
11
13
12
71
11
9
9

1.8
1.4
1.3
1.6
0.8
0.9
1.2
1.1
2.2
1.5
1.3
1.3
2.7
1.3
1.3
0.7
1.1
1.4
1.4
0.8
1.2
0.9

(%)
64.7
58.6
56.5
61.5
45.2
48.3
55.0
52.1
69.0
60.4
57.1
56.5
72.7
56.0
57.2
42.1
51.9
58.6
58.0
45.0
55.0
47.1

N: number of observations
SD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in the same direction
OD: number of observations for which the gap and premium move in opposite directions
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Table 5.3: Summary of CTA Results by Classification

Classification

number o f
regimes

SD/OD > 1:1 for

Reinhart and R ogoff

28

17 regimes (61%)

Bubula and Otker-Robe

26

17 regimes (65%)

Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger

22

17 regimes (77%)

SD : number o f observations for w hich the gap and premium m ove in the sam e direction
O D : number o f observations for w hich the gap and premium m ove in opposite directions
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Table 5.4a: ADL Model Estimation Results
(Reinhart and Rogoff Classification)
currency

period

N
free floats

Australian dollar
British pound
Euro
German mark
Hungarian forint
Indonesian rupee
Japanese yen1
Korean won1

10/86-09/00
08/86-08/92
01/99-09/00
08/86-09/00
04/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00

168
73

12/97-09/00

34

Swiss frank
Turkish lira2

08/86-09/00
05/98-09/00

Brazilian real
British pound
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso1

02/99-09/00
09/92-09/00

21

170
30
30
170

a,

0.2201 *
2.0256 ***
0.3785
0.9436 ***
0.7204
3.0717 ***
0.8286 ***

a2
-0.1845
0.7479
1.4902
0.3486
0.9758
0.8048
0.3051

-0.0904

A
***
***
***
***
***
***
***

0.2372
0.0686
-1.0033
-0.3574
-1.3529
-0.3254
0.0534

0.5555 ***

*
***
**
***

170
2.1720 ***
29
7.6735
managed regimes

0.8146 ***
0.3074

-0.0253
-0.1257
5.7700

0.6849 ***
0.4043 ***

-2.6883
0.4067 *

0.8161
0.6744
0.9666
0.6464

-0.0571
0.1344
-0.5334 *

03/93-07/97

30
48
53

1.4801 **
1.2114 ***
2.3367 ***
-1.1518
-0.8237
3.8063
0.1042

New Zealand dollar

04/96-09/00
02/93-09/00

54
92

Norwegian krone
Peruvian sol

10/86-09/00
04/99-09/00

Phillipine peso
Polish zloty
Singapore dollar
Singapore dollar
Thai baht
Venezuelan bolivar

12/97-04/99
04/98-09/00
01/88-11/98
12/98-08/00
05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00

Czech koruna
Korean won1
Malaysian ringgit1
Mexican peso1

08/86-09/00
01/98-09/99
04/98-09/00
12/93-11/97

20

97
170
21

***
**
***
***

0.4331 ***

1.4771
-0.6935 *

2.1380 ***
2.3212 **

0.9614 ***
0.8529 ***

-0.2770
0.1804

168
18

2.3155 ***
-2.0985

0.7723 ***
1.3358 ***

0.2265 *
-1.6343 ***

17
30
131

1.1158
1.6956 *
0.3632
-1.3498
2.1542 **
4.0854 *

0.3952 ***
0.9460 ***
0.9296
0.7756 ***

1.6504
-1.2252 *
-0.0328
1.1714

21

29
18

0.9998 ***
0.4587 **

1.4355 **
6.5005 *

N: number of observations
1All significance tests valid asymptotically.
2 Significance tests not valid.
Stars indicate significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 5.4b: ADL Model Estimation Results
(Bubula and Otker-Robe Classification)
currency
...........
2
Australian dollar

period

N
free floats

01/90-09/00
01/99-09/00

129
21

Czech koruna

09/92-09/00
09/98-09/00
04/98-09/00

Euro
German mark1

01/99-09/00
01/90-09/00

97
25
30
21
129

Hungarian forint

04/98-09/00

Indonesian rupee
Japanese yen

04/98-09/00

30
30

01/90-09/00

129

Korean won

12/97-12/99

Mexican peso
Norwegian krone
New Zealand dollar
Swiss frank

12/94-09/00

Brazilian real
British pound
Canadian dollar

2.6169
0.7670 *
1.2114 ***
4.2012 ***
-0.8237
0.3785
0.7905 ***
0.7204
3.0717 ***

A

0.8489
0.4977 ***
0.4043
0.9997
0.9666
1.4902

***
***
***
***

0.1409
0.4300
0.4067
1.8565
-0.5334
-1.0033

*
**
*
***

0.3663 ***

-0.2788 **
-1.3529 ***
-0.3254

0.6253

0.9758 ***
0.8048 ***
0.2574

25

2.6298 *

0.4620 ***

-0.5159

70

0.2775

0.7885 ***
0.7674 ***
0.8529
0.8573 ***

-0.1525
0.1094
0.1804
-0.0920

0.8273 ***

-0.0723

Canadian dollar

129
2.1719 ***
92
2.3212
129
1.8363 ***
managed regimes
01/90-08/98
104
2.4803 ***

Colombian peso

01/98-08/99

20

1.1642

Korean won1
Malaysian ringgit

12/93-11/97
03/93-06/97

48
52

3.5631
-0.1825

Peruvian sol
Polish zloty

05/98-09/00
04/98-09/00

29
30

Singapore dollar

01/90-08/00

128

Thai baht

05/98-09/00
05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00

29
29
18

Turkish lira
Venezuelan bolivar

«2

01/90-09/00
02/93-09/00
01/90-09/00

2.0344

0.1498

1.4176

0.6511 ***
0.3148 ***

5.6193
-0.7974 **

2.7429 **
1.6956 *

1.0970 ***
0.9460 ***

0.3934 *
-1.2252 *

0.0527

0.8975

-0.0578

2.1542 **

0.9998 ***
0.3074 ***
0.4587 **

7.6735 ***
4.0854 *

N: number of observations
1All significance tests valid asymptotically.
2 Significance tests not valid.
Stars indicate significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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1.4355 **
5.7700 ***
6.5005 *

Table 5.4c: ADL Model Estimation Results
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Classification)
currency
Australian dollar
British pound1
Canadian dollar
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso
Czech koruna
Euro
German mark
Japanese yen1
Mexican peso
Norwegian krone
Peruvian sol
Phillipine peso
Polish zloty
Swiss frank
Thai baht
Turkish lira

period

a2

N
free floats

A
0.2372
0.2944
0.8435
-0.1220
0.0752

*
*
***
**

10/86-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/87-12/88
01/92-09/00
01/98-08/00

168
170
24
105
32

04/98-09/00
01/99-09/00

30
21

08/86-09/00

170

0.9436 ***

0.3486 ***

-0.5334 *
-1.0033 ***
-0.3574 **

08/86-09/00
01/97-09/00
10/86-09/00

170
45
167

0.8290 ***
2.3393 ***
2.3242 ***

0.3053 ***
0.9980 ***
0.7729 ***

0.0534
0.0225
0.2280 *

05/98-12/99
01/97-04/99
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/99-09/00

20

28
30
170

2.2628
1.9294 *

21

1.6956 *
2.1720 ***
3.4122 ***

1.2315
0.2308
0.9460
0.8146
1.3182

01/99-09/00

21

7.5333 ***

0.5112 ***

0.6958
-0 .0 2 1 2
-1.2252
-0.1257
2.2451
3.1442

0.8048 ***

-0.3254

0.8680 ***

-2.3807 ***
0.2265
6.5005 *

0.2201 *
1.9386 ***
2.4494 ***

-0.1845 ***
0.7625 ***
0.5594 ***

-0.0233
-0.6410
-0.8237
0.3785

1.0368
0.6668
0.9666
1.4902

***
***
***
***

***
**
***
***
***

**
*
***
*

managed regimes
Indonesian rupee

04/98-09/00

30

Korean won
New Zealand dollar2
Venezuelan bolivar

03/97-12/98

22

02/93-09/00
03/99-08/00

92
18

3.0717 ***
-1.8421
2.3155
4.0854 *

0.7723
0.4587 **

N: number of observations
1 All significance tests valid asymptotically.
2 Significance tests not valid.
Stars indicate significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 5.5: ADL Model Estimation Results
Compared to Results by Frydman and Goldberg (2007)
Estimate British pound German mark Japanese yen |
2 03 ***
«i
q 9 4 ***
j 21 ***
0.83 ***
Results according to classification
0.75 ***
a2
0 4 Q ***
0.35 ***
0.31 ***
by Reinhart and Rogoff1
0.07
A
0.41
0.05
-0.36 **
Results according to classification
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
(August 1986-September 2000)2

a,

1 94 ***

0 94 ***

0.83 ***

a2

0.76 ***

0.35 ***

0.31 ***

A

0.29

«i

1

Results according to classification
T
by Bubula and Otker-Robe

0 4 0 ***

it

Results by Frydman and Goldberg
(2007) (December 1982-February
1997)

21 ***

-0.36 **

0.05

***

0.63

0 37 ***

0.26

0 79

A

0.41

a,

0.84 ***

1.10 ***

0.84 ***

0.33 **

0.28 ***

0

0.56 ***

0.29 *

0.19

a2

A

-0.28

0.15

29

***

1 Periods are August 1986-September 2000 for JPY and DEM; August 1986-August 1992; then
September 1992-September 2000 for GBP. Significance tests for the JPY are valid asymptotically.
2

Significance tests for the JPY and GBP are valid asymptotically.

Periods are January 1990-September 2000 for JPY and DEM; September 1992-September 2000 for
GBP. Significance tests for the DEM are valid asymptoically. Significance tests for JPY are not valid.

3

Stars indicate significance levels at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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CHAPTER 6

LIMITING EXCHANGE RATE SWINGS IN A W ORLD OF IMPERFECT
KNOWLEDGE

1 Introduction

The empirical results presented in Chapter 5 provide evidence o f the positive
effect o f the gap from PPP on the market premium in the short run. These findings
suggest that if central bank policy can lead to a higher weight attached to the gap from
PPP, then there is a new channel - the uncertainty premium channel - through which
official intervention aimed at pushing the exchange rate back to some announced or
unannounced parity level can limit long swings in exchange rates.
In this chapter, I investigate if the data supports the existence o f the uncertainty
premium channel. I use two different approaches. In Section 2 , 1 use different estimates
for the weight attached to the gap from PPP and investigate if, on the average, the weight
attached to PPP in speculating is higher in countries with some managed exchange rate
regime compared to the weight in countries with a freely floating exchange rate regime.
Findings from this analysis provide some evidence that official intervention and parity
announcement have led to smaller swings in exchange rates. Results depend on the
exchange rate regime classification -th e average weight for managed regimes is
significantly higher compared to the average weight for freely floating regimes only for
the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification.
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Then in Section 3, to circumvent some major issues regarding exchange rate
regime classifications that were raised in Chapter 4, I investigate if markets in which
there is more intervention, as proxied by changes in reserves, are associated with a larger
weight attached to the gap from PPP. Supporting evidence would suggest that in markets
that are characterized with a larger volume o f foreign exchange intervention, swings in
exchange rates will be more limited. Note, however, that results obtained by using the
change in reserves still depend on the exchange rate regime classifications because the
classifications determine the cut-off periods for the currencies used to estimate the weight
attached to the gap from PPP. As was discussed in Chapter 5, with small samples,
different sample periods could lead to different estimates for the gap weight. For all three
regime classifications, results from this analysis provide evidence that in markets
characterized by central bank intervention to support some parity, the weight attached to
the gap from PPP is significantly higher compared to the weight under freely floating
regimes.
The main conclusion o f this chapter is that the implication o f the premium model
on a higher gap weight under exchange rate regimes involving central bank intervention
supporting some parity level, compared to freely floating regimes receives general
empirical support. When the classifications by Reinhart and Rogoff, Bubula and OtkerRobe and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger are used to test if the average gap weight for
managed regimes is higher compared to the average gap weight for free floaters, results
are mixed. However, when countries are classified according to the degree o f official
intervention, as proxied by the change in reserves, the prediction o f the premium model is
strongly supported.
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2 Is the Gap from PPP More Important under Managed Regimes?

To investigate if the market tends to attach more weight to the gap from PPP
under managed regimes compared to free floats, I follow the following approach. In
Section 2 .1 ,1 use the results from the autoregressive distributive lag model that I reported
in Chapter 5 and investigate if the average effect o f the gap on the premium is larger for
currency markets in which there is central bank intervention and parity announcement
(the managed regimes), versus the average weight for free floats. A larger weight
attached to the gap under managed regimes would indicate that exchange rate swings are
smaller in such regimes compared to free floats. Then in Section 2 .2 ,1 follow the same
methodology by using regression results from a static OLS regression. In Section 2.3, I
discuss findings and some future research avenues.

2.1 ADL Results: Short-run and Long-run Effects o f the Gap on the Premium

The average weights attached to the gap from PPP for managed regimes and free
floats that are obtained using the ADL results from Chapter 5 are provided in Tables
6.la-6 .lb for all three classifications. Table 6.1a provides the average weight for free
floats and managed regimes using the short run estimates for the weight from the ADL
model, whereas Table 6.1b reports results using the long run estimate for the gap weight.
The Bubula and Otker-Robe classification provides support for the implication o f
the premium model that the average weight attached to the gap should be larger under
managed regimes with both short run and long run ADL estimates - the average o f the
estimates o f the gap weight for managed regimes is significantly higher than the one for
freely floating regimes (at the 10% and 5% level for the short run and long run effects,
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respectively). For the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classification, the average o f the
estimates o f the gap weight is larger for managed regimes both in the short run and the
long run, but the difference is not significant. The same holds with the Reinhart and
Rogoff classification for the long run. In the short run, however, for the Reinhart and
Rogoff classification the average o f estimates o f the gap weight for managed regimes is
insignificantly smaller than the average for free floats. Thus, the Levy-Yeyati and
Sturzenegger, and Reinhart and Rogoff classifications do not provide support to the
hypothesis that the weight attached to the gap from PPP depends on the exchange rate
regime that a central bank is pursuing. In contrast, the Bubula and Otker-Robe
classification suggest that the gap weight will be higher in countries in which there is
central bank intervention supporting some parity level.
Recall that the managed floating category o f the Reinhart and Rogoff and Bubula
and Otker-Robe classifications required caution because they did not necessarily indicate
larger central bank intervention. Thus, I have performed the analysis by excluding the
currencies identified as ‘managed floating’ or by switching them to the group o f free
floaters. Results o f both classifications change quantitatively, but the general conclusion
does not.
In sum, results obtained by using the short run and long run estimates for the
weight attached to the gap from PPP from the ADL model depend on the classification.
The only significant result was obtained for the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification,
and that result provides evidence that the average weight in markets that are characterized
by central bank intervention and parity announcement is larger compared to markets that

183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

do not involve such policy interventions. A discussion on why that might be the case
follows in Section 2.3 below.

2.2 Static OLS Results: Effect o f the Gap on the Premium

To test whether the average weight attached to the gap from PPP, a , is higher in
countries with some managed exchange rate regime compared to countries with a free
float using static OLS results, I employ the following approach. First I get an estimate o f
a for every country and every regime that a country has adopted over the period under
consideration. To do so, I estimate the following equation using a static OLS regression:1

( 1)
where s 1l’pp is the PPP exchange rate, e, is the white noise error term and all other
variables are as defined before.
Similarly to the analysis with the ADL estimates, I the group the OLS estimates
of a in two groups: managed regimes and free floats, and I test whether the average
weight attached to the gap from PPP, a , is larger for the first group.
The OLS results from regressing the gap on the equilibrium premium are given in
Tables 6.2a-6.2c for the Reinhart and Rogoff, Bubula and Otker-Robe and Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger classifications, respectively. Results using all three classifications
indicate that the average o f a for the managed group is larger than for the free floats,

1 As was noted in Chapter 5, OLS estimation using time series data does not allow for a comment on the
significance o f the parameters, since the conventionally calculated critical values are incorrect (see Hendry
and Juselius, 2000). However, as long as no other classic linear model assumptions are violated, which
appears to be the case with the data at hand, except for the small sample size for some currencies and
possibly an omitted variable problem, it produces unbiased coefficient estimates, which is what we need
here. The possibility o f an omitted variable bias is explored in Section 2.3.
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however the difference is significant (at the 10% level) only for the Bubula and OtkerRobe classification.2 Again, results are somewhat affected if the currencies under a
managed floating regime are excluded from the analysis or added to the freely floating
group, but the main conclusion does not change for any o f the three classifications.
To sum up, in this section I compared the ADL short run and long run estimates,
as well as static OLS estimates o f the gap weight for two groups o f regimes - freely
floating and managed regimes. A higher average gap weight for the managed group
would support the prediction o f the premium model that such currencies experience more
limited swings in exchange rates. The analysis produced mixed results that depend on the
exchange rate regime classification that was used to group the countries. Significant
results supporting the prediction o f a higher weight for the managed group o f regimes are
obtained using the Bubula and Otker-Robe classificaion, but not using the Levy-Yeyati
and Sturzenegger or Reinhart and Rogoff classifications.

2.3 Discussion

Results in this section suggest that the exchange rate regime classification is
crucial for the results. Results change with the classification due to two reasons. One is
the different time frame due to different cut-off dates, and another is the type o f regime freely floating versus managed - that is attributed to a specific currency by the different
classifications. Several o f the currencies that are classified as freely floating under the

2 For some currencies, the Reset test reveals that the OLS estimates might be biased. Therefore, these have
been excluded from the sample. In general, however, results do not depend on whether these currencies are
included in the analysis or not. These are the Japanese yen (08/86-09/00), Brazilian real (02/99-09/00),
Korean won (12/93-11/97) and Norwegian krone (11/86-09/00) for the Reinhart and Rogoff, and the
Canadian dollar (09/98-09/00), Japanese yen (01/90-09/00), Korean won (12/93-11/97), Norwegian krone
(01/90-09/00) and Peruvian sol (05/98-09/00) for the Bubula and Otker-Robe classifications, respectively.
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Reinhart and Rogoff classification are identified as managed regimes under the Bubula
and Otker-Robe classification, such as the Czech koruna and the Polish zloty.
According to the Reinhart and Rogoff and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
classifications, the average weight attached to the gap from PPP is not significantly
higher under exchange rate regimes that involve central bank intervention supporting
some parity level compared to freely floating regimes.
According to the Bubula and Otker-Robe classification, on the other hand, the
weight attached to the gap from PPP is significantly higher under managed regimes than
it is under free floats. This result holds for the short run ADL, long run ADL and static
OLS estimates o f the gap weight. This finding suggests that central bank intervention
supporting a parity level would lead to smaller swings in exchange rates.
Which o f these results should be given more weight? There is no way o f telling
which classification is a better representation o f reality. One thing we can do is to
compare the classifications and arrive at some conclusion as to which one might be more
reliable. Refer back to the discussions in Chapter 4 that provided detailed analysis on the
classifications. Recall from these discussions that one o f the big advantages o f the Bubula
and Otker-Robe classification is its primary reliance on information obtained through
bilateral consultation discussions, and regular contacts with IMF country desk economists
to identify exchange rate regimes. While this classification uses exchange rate behavior
only as supplementary evidence, the classifications by Reinhart and Rogoff and LevyYeyati and Sturzenegger rely primarily on exchange rate behavior to identify regimes. It
was discussed in Chapter 4 that the use o f exchange rate behavior, in particular, its
volatility, might pose problems for empirical analysis. Although one would expect this
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problem to bias results in favor o f finding a higher gap weight for managed regimes, it is
not clear that this is the case because these two classifications do not provide strong
support for that prediction.
Several other things can be noted from the results in this section. First, the sample
size for many currencies is 30 or less, and so the coefficient estimates obtained from such
small sample sizes may not be very reliable due to the small sample bias. Comparing the
OLS estimates for the same currencies with the three classifications, one can notice a
pattern. It is the case that for several currencies, the sample size among the three
classifications differs by several observations. And it also happens to be the case that the
weight estimate is in general larger with a larger sample size. Comparing just the
Reinhart and R ogoff and Bubula and Otker-Robe classifications alone, this is the case,
for example, with the Malaysian ringgit (-0.1847 vs. -0.2433) or the Mexican peso
(0.0399 vs. -0.2167).

One possible strategy for increasing the sample size for some

currencies would be to use a three-month ahead monthly forecast data instead o f the onemonth ahead forecast data that I have used in my dissertation. As was mentioned before,
the one-month forecast data was discontinued in October 2000, but the three-month
ahead forecast data is still being collected.
As was discussed in Chapter 5, another possibility is that perhaps the weight that
market participants attach to the gap from PPP actually depends on how far the exchange
rate is from benchmark levels. It could well be the case that individuals would attach
more importance to the gap in forming their forecasts the farther the exchange rate is
from PPP. One way to capture such a relationship would be to formulate some threshold

3

The first estimate is obtained with the larger sample size.
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levels for the gap size and use dummy variables to estimate different gap weights with
the different levels for the size o f the gap. Another way would be to use a different
specification for the gap that would still be consistent with the spirit o f the premium
model, perhaps some nonlinear version.
Another point to be made is that macroeconomic fundamentals are assumed to
affect the premium through their effect on the market’s assessment o f the gap from
historical benchmark. However, it is quite possible that they also have a direct effect on
the premium. If that is the case, then the current estimates o f the gap weight will be
biased because o f an omitted variable problem. Such an issue could provide an
explanation for the negative estimates for the weight attached to the gap.4 A negative
weight attached to the gap from PPP implies that as the market increases their forecast o f
the future exchange rate, they would ask for a lower uncertainty premium. This is in
contrary to the prediction o f the premium model that as the gap rises, so would the
uncertainty premium. This prediction o f the model, however, assumes that all other
factors that would directly affect the uncertainty premium are held constant.5 Thus,
another future avenue o f research would be to add some macroeconomic variables that
are available for the currencies in my sample, such as relative output levels and relative
inflation rates, to the regression equation.

For about half o f the estimates using the Reinhart and Rogoff classificantion, and about a third o f the
estimates using Bubula and Otker-Robe and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger. Note that none o f the negative
estimates are significantly different from zero.

4

In addition, a negative weight attached to the gap could also be due to any o f the reasons discussed in the
previous two paragraphs, namely small sample size, or the weight depending on the size o f the gap perhaps the gap was so small during the sample period that individuals did not really care about it.

5
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3 Docs More Intervention Lead to Smaller Swings in Exchange Rates?

In this section I investigate whether the market attaches a larger weight to the gap
in assessing potential losses during regimes with greater intervention, as proxied by
changes in international reserves. If that is the case, we would expect to observe smaller
exchange rate swings in these markets.
As was discussed in Chapter 4, such an approach allows one to circumvent the
issues related to classifying exchange rate regimes. To test this implication, I separately
regress the short-run ADL, long-run ADL and the OLS estimates o f the weight attached
to the gap from PPP on the change in official reserves, i.e. I run the following regression:
&i =S 0 + SxOIt + st

(2)

for i = \,...n exchange rate regimes, where a i denotes the weight estimate attached to the
gap from PPP during exchange rate regime i , 01t stands for official intervention during
exchange rate regime i , as proxied by the change in reserves, and s i is the white noise
error term.
The empirical results obtained from this analysis are provided in Tables 6.3a-6.3c.
For the Bubula and Otker-Robe and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger classifications, results
using short-run and long-run ADL estimates o f the weight attached to the gap, given in
Tables 6.3a and 6.3b, respectively, provide evidence o f a positive but insignificant effect
o f the change in reserves on the weight attached to the gap from PPP. For the Reinhart
and Rogoff classification, on the other hand, the estimate o f Sx is significantly positive
for the short run estimate o f the gap weight, whereas it is insignificantly negative for the
long run estimates o f the weight.
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Results using the OLS estimate o f the weight attached to the gap, provided in
Table 6.3c, show that with all three classifications, official intervention has a significant
(at the 10% for Reinhart and Rogoff and the 1% level for the other two classifications,
respectively) positive influence on the weight attached to the gap from PPP.
In sum, the findings from the regression o f the gap weight ( <r) on the change in
reserves provide mixed results. When the short run and long run estimates from the ADL
model are used, the size o f intervention appears to have a positive but insignificant effect
on the weight attached to the gap from PPP, except for the Reinhart and Rogoff
classification that finds a significant positive relationship in the short run and
insignificant negative relationship in the long run. When the OLS estimates for the gap
weight are regressed on the change in reserves, all three classifications indicate a
significant influence o f the size o f intervention on the weight attached to the gap,
implying that in markets characterized with greater official intervention we will observe
swings o f smaller magnitude. These findings provide support to the implication o f the
premium model, suggesting that central bank policy composed o f intervention supporting
some parity can lead more limited swings in exchange rates.

4 Conclusion

In this chapter I investigated the implication o f the premium model that central
bank intervention at unpredictable moments in time aimed at pushing the exchange rate
back to some announced or unannounced parity level may lead to more limited swings in
exchange rates by increasing the weight that the market attaches to the gap from PPP in
assessing potential losses.
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In general, findings provide support to this implication. Results tend to depend on
how one classifies exchange rate regimes - results obtained by using the Bubula and
Otker-Robe classification provide strong support independently o f the method used for
testing the prediction. Also, findings strongly support the prediction o f the model when
currencies are classified according to the degree o f official intervention as proxied by the
change in reserves, independently o f the classification that is used to obtain the gap
weight. One can conclude from these findings that central bank intervention aimed at
pushing the exchange rate back to some announced or unannounced parity level has led
to more limited swings in exchange rates.
Some future research avenues were also discussed, which include increasing the
sample size by using three-month ahead monthly forecast data, allowing for the gap
weight to change with the size o f the gap and controlling for other factors that might have
a direct influence on the market premium, besides the gap from PPP.
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Table 6.1a: Aggregate Weight for Free Floats Versus M anaged Regimes:
Short-Run Effects

Classification

Aggregate weight
free floats

managed regimes

Reinhart and Rogoff

1.7944

1.1590

Bubula and Otker-Robe
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger

1.5197
1.7024

2.5429
1.9076

DIM S1
-0.7549
1.3417 *
0.1485

Table 6.1b: Aggregate Weight for Free Floats Versus M anaged Regimes:
Long-Run Effects

Classification
Reinhart and Rogoff
Bubula and Otker-Robe
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger
1

Aggregate weight

DIM S1

free floats

managed regimes

0.2939

0.3554

0.0781

-0.0654
0.2618

1.8983
1.0052

2.1715 **
0.3846

Difference-in-means statistic

Stars indicate significance levels at 5% (**) and 10% (*).
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Table 6.2a: OLS Estimates of Gap Weight
(Reinhart and Rogoff Classification)
N1

Estimates of a

168
170
21
170
30
30
34
16
170
29

0.3482
0.0834
-0.8979
-0.1127
-0.9483
0.3618
-1.5553
0.1515
0.0113
6.0212
0.3463

09/92-09/00

97

0.6341

Canadian dollar
Colombian peso
Czech koruna
Malaysian ringgit
Mexican peso2
New Zealand dollar
Peruvian sol
Phillipine peso2
Polish zloty2

08/86-09/00
01/98-09/99

170
21

04/98-09/00
03/93-07/97

30
53
54
92
18

0.0248
-0.4390
-0.7044
-0.1847

Singapore dollar

01/88-11/98

currency
Australian dollar
British pound
Euro
German mark
Hungarian forint
Indonesian rupee
Korean won
Mexican peso
Swiss frank
Turkish lira
average

period
free floats
10/86-09/00
08/86-08/92
01/99-09/00
08/86-09/00
04/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
12/97-09/00
12/94-03/96
08/86-09/00
05/98-09/00
managed regimes

British pound

2

04/96-09/00
02/93-09/00
04/99-09/00
12/97-04/99
04/98-09/00

Singapore dollar
12/98-08/00
Thai baht2
05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00
Venezuelan bolivar
average
difference in means statistic
1
2

-0.2167
0.3161
-1.8185

17
30
131

-0.6836
-0.5776
-0.0392

21

0.7479
1.5726
6.4279
0.3614
0.0180

29
18

N: number o f observations
Managed floating regime
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Table 6.2b: OLS Estimates of Gap Weight
(Bubula and Otker-Robe Classification)
currency
Australian dollar
Brazilian real
British pound
Czech koruna
Euro
Hungarian forint
Indonesian rupee
Korean won
Mexican peso
New Zealand dollar
Swiss frank
average
British pound
Canadian dollar2
Colombian peso
Malaysian ringgit
Polish zloty
Singapore dollar2
Thai baht2
Turkish lira
Venezuelan bolivar
average

period
free floats
01/90-09/00
01/99-09/00
09/92-09/00
04/98-09/00
01/99-09/00
04/98-09/00
04/98-09/00
12/97-12/99
12/94-09/00
02/93-09/00
01/90-09/00

N1

Estimates of

129
21
97
30
21
30
30
25
70
92
129

0.2423
4.2395
0.6341
-0.7044
-0.8979
-0.9483
0.3618
-1.4914
0.0399
0.3161
0.0513
0.1675

managed regimes
10/90-08/92
23

1

2

1.3088

01/90-08/98
01/98-08/99

104
20

0.0599
-0.0997

03/93-06/97
04/98-09/00
01/90-08/00

52
30
128

-0.2433
-0.5776
-0.0592

05/98-09/00
05/98-09/00
03/99-08/00

29
29
18

1.5726
6.0212
6.4279
1.6012

difference in means statistic

<j

1.4141 *

N: number o f observations
Managed or tightly managed floating regime

* Significant at 10%.
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Table 6.2c: OLS Estimates of Gap Weight
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger Classification)
currency
Australian dollar
British pound
Canadian dollar
Canadian dollar
Colombian peso
Czech koruna
Euro
German mark
Japanese yen
Mexican peso
Peruvian sol
Phillipine peso
Polish zloty
Swiss frank
Thai baht
Turkish lira
average

period
free floats
10/86-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/87-12/88
01/92-09/00
01/98-08/00
04/98-09/00
01/99-09/00
08/86-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/97-09/00
05/98-12/99
01/97-04/99
04/98-09/00
08/86-09/00
01/99-09/00
01/99-09/00

N

1

168
170
24
105
32
30
21

170
170
45
20

28
30
170
21
21

managed regimes
01/99-09/00
21
22
03/97-12/98
01/95-12/96
24
02/93-09/00
92
03/99-08/00
18

Indonesian rupee
Korean won
Mexican peso
New Zealand dollar
Venezuelan bolivar
average
difference in means statistic (DIMS)
1

N: number o f observations

2

Fixed regime

Estimates of

a

0.3482
0.3093
1.0054
-0.1071
-0 .1 2 0 0
-0.7044
-0.8979
-0.1127
0.1152
0.2277
0.4932
-0.3078
-0.5776
0.0113
2.1630
5.6372
0.4677
1.1389
-2.6339
0.8382
0.4418
6.4279
1.2426
0.5123
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Table 6.3a: Results from Regressing the Short-Run ADL Estimates of the
Gap Weight on the Change in Reserves
Classification

Sample size

Reinhart and Rogoff

27

0.0116 *

Bubula and Otker-Robe

25

0.0064

Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger

21

0.0125

Estimate of S x

Table 6.3b: Results from Regressing the Long-Run ADL Estimates of the
Gap Weight on the Change in Reserves
Classification

Sample size

Estimate of S x

Reinhart and Rogoff

27

-0.0035

Bubula and Otker-Robe

25

0 .0 0 2 0

Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger

21

0.0119

Table 6.3c: Results from Regressing the OLS Estimates of the Gap
Weight on the Change in Reserves
Estimate of Sx

Classification

Sample size

Reinhart and Rogoff

24

0.0148 *

Bubula and Otker-Robe

20

0.0164 **

Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger

22

0.0250 **

Stars indicate significance levels at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*).
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APPENDIX A

PROSPECT THEORY, ENDOGENOUS PROSPECT THEORY AND UAUIP

In Section 1 I discuss the experimental findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) that led them to develop prospect theory as an
alternative way to expected utility theory that incorporates how individuals make choices
under uncertainty. Here I also touch upon the main differences between prospect theory
and expected utility theory. In Section 2, I summarize the main difficulties that a
researcher is faced with when trying to apply prospect theory to real world issues and the
approaches that extant behavioral-finance economists have proposed. This is followed by
the solution to these problems proposed by Frydman and Goldberg, which leads to
endogenous prospect theory, discussed in Section 3. In Section 4 1 derive UAUIP.

1 Experimental Findings and Prospect Theory

1.1 Experimental Findings

Decision making under risk or uncertainty involves making choices between
prospects or gambles. A prospect (

x ,

,

i

s

defined as a contract that yields

N

outcome x, with probability p , , where

/>, = 1. The expected utility theory due to Von
i= i

Neumann and Morgenstem (1944) postulates that the overall utility o f a prospect is the
expected utility o f its outcomes:
198
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££/ = J > , £/(*,)

(1)

;=1

This expected utility function incorporates the following properties: it is a linear
sum o f probability-weighted outcomes and it depends on the level o f final stakes. With
risk aversion, where risk-averse preferences imply that an individual is better off when he
replaces an uncertain final wealth by its expected value, the utility function is concave in
the level o f wealth.
In series o f experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) discovered, however, that these characteristics o f the expected utility
function are constantly refuted. They found that individuals care about the gains and
losses, i.e. changes in wealth, rather than the level o f their final wealth; that individuals
are more sensitive to losses than gains o f the same size; and that in choosing among
alternatives individuals use decision weights that are not equal to probability weights,
rather they are nonlinear functions o f probabilities.1 In light o f these findings, they
develop prospect theory as an alternative way to model preferences that is consistent with
experimental findings on how individuals make choices under uncertainty.2

1 More on decision weights will follow below.
2 Expected utility theory is based on ordinal preferences, whereas prospect theory is consistent with rank dependent preferences. Rank dependence is a generalization o f ordinal preferences that explains the
observation that individuals can be both risk-loving (lottery tickets) and risk-averse (insurance policies);
and the behavior in the Allais paradox. The Allais paradox is related to the observation that individuals
overweight outcomes that are considered to be certain relative to probable outcomes, which Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) label as the ‘certainty effect’.
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1.2 Prospect Theory

Prospect theory postulates a value function with three characteristics that
summarize the experimental findings by Kahneman and Tversky on how individuals
actually choose among gambles with uncertain outcomes. These characteristics o f
reference dependence, diminishing sensitivity and loss aversion are embodied in the
following utility function, which is depicted in Figure A l:3

where AW denotes the change in wealth, and a , / ] and A are parameters, explained
below.
a) Reference dependence
The utility function depends on the change in an individual’s wealth (gain or
loss), relative to some reference point. This is as opposed to the expected utility
hypothesis, in which, as mentioned before, the utility function depends on an individual’s
level o f wealth.
b) Diminishing sensitivity
The utility function depends nonlinearly on the magnitudes o f gains and losses.
More precisely, the marginal value o f gains and losses decreases with their size, which
implies that the utility function is concave in the domain o f gains and convex in the
domain o f losses, i.e. a < 1 and ft < 1. In contrast, expected utility is linear in gains and
losses.

3 See Tversky and Kahneman (1992).

200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

c) Loss aversion
Individuals are more sensitive to negative changes in their wealth (losses) than to
positive changes (gains) o f the same size. In Kahneman and Tversky’s words, “losses
loom larger than corresponding gains.” Under the assumption that a - f i , which is used
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) as well as other researchers, loss aversion implies that
X>\ .

The utility function given in (2) attaches a value to single outcomes. However, to
represent an individual’s preferences over prospects (or gambles) with different outcomes
one needs to arrive at a weighted sum o f the utilities o f single outcomes comprising a
gamble.
In experimental settings Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and
Kahneman (1992) have asked individuals to choose among M gambles by disclosing the
true values o f the payoffs and the true probabilities associated with each. Using the utility
function given by (2 ), the prospective utility from choosing gamble j is thus given by

pu, =i>,.<
(AIPT - & * , * ( - AWf
k
k

0)

where n ) k denotes the weights that an individual attaches to the utility o f each outcome
k

, called decision weights,

K *

is the set o f outcomes comprised o f potential gains,

is the set o f outcomes comprised o f potential losses, and

K } = K j

+ K j

K j

is the set o f

potential returns from choosing gamble j.
As opposed to expected utility theory, where the utility o f a gamble is expressed
as the probability-weighted sum o f the utilities o f the single outcomes o f a gamble,
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Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present experimental evidence that these decision-weights
are nonlinear functions o f the true probabilities - individuals tend to overweight small
probabilities and underweight moderate and high probabilities (see Figure A2 ) .4

2 Issues Concerning the Application o f Prospect Theory

As compelling as Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental evidence is concerning
the properties o f their utility function, the application o f prospect theory to model both
individual behavior and aggregate outcomes in real markets is challenging on two
grounds. First, the utility function is nonlinear in gains and losses. With heterogeneous
forecasts, this nonlinearity o f the utility function leads to aggregation problems.
Moreover, as was noted above, Kahneman and Tversky present evidence that decision
weights are nonlinear functions o f true probabilities. Although Kahneman and Tversky
have estimated decision weights from their experiments, they have pointed out that these
weights may not be applicable in non-experimental settings, because “ [in] the typical
situation o f choice, where the probabilities o f outcomes are not explicitly given[,]...the
decision weights may be affected by other considerations, such as ambiguity or
vagueness” Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 288-289). Therefore, to formulate a
prospective utility o f a gamble, an economist also needs to represent decision weights.
As different from experimental settings, however, in the context o f the foreign
exchange market neither the payoffs associated with each gamble nor the probabilities
associated with each payoff are known to market participants. Therefore, in order to

In laboratory experiments, individuals are asked to choose between gambles with payoffs whose true
probabilities are known to them. Therefore, one can infer the difference between decision weights and true
probabilities from individuals’ choices among the gambles. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use their
experimental data to estimate a nonlinear function relating decision weights to true probabilities.

4
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represent decisions in the foreign exchange market, an economist needs to represent
market participants’ forecasting strategies and the revisions o f these strategies over time.
Doing so implies a probability distribution o f the potential return on a unit position at
time t that is conditional on the structure o f this representation and the realizations o f any
causal variables at time t .
As was discussed in the text, to circumvent the aggregation difficulties posed by
the nonlinearity o f the utility function in single outcomes, behavioral-finance economists
have constrained the marginal value o f gains and losses to be constant by setting
a = p - \ . s This linear specification o f the utility function, however, implies that
individuals would want to hold positions o f unlimited size whenever they perceive profit
opportunities. Thus, to derive a well-defined equilibrium, Barberis and Huang (2001),
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), as well as other behavioral-finance economists have
relied on risk-averse preferences, despite the rejection o f this assumption in the
behavioral literature in favor o f loss aversion.
Besides constraining Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) utility function to be linear
over gains and losses, behavioral-finance economists have also set decision weights equal
to probabilities. This has enabled them to formulate prospective utilities as linear
functions o f the expected prospects implied by their representations o f forecasting
behavior. However, as Kahneman and Tversky (1979) point out, when the probabilities
o f outcomes are not explicitly given, the decision weights may be affected by factors that
cannot be represented adequately with specific parametric functions o f probabilities, such

5 Schmidt and Zank (2001) use a piece-wise linear utility specification where the utility function is linear in
both gains and loses, but steeper in the region o f losses. Although this solves the aggregation problem, it
does not allow for diminishing sensitivity.
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as ambiguity or vagueness .6 Thus, the practice o f replacing decision weights with
probabilities does not allow for the possibility that decisions, and thus decision weights
and prospects, in real world markets depend on factors such as “ambiguity” and
“vagueness” as well as other factors that arise from the imperfection o f knowledge.
In sum, these “simplifying” assumptions by behavioral-finance economists
disregard key experimental findings concerning individual behavior in uncertain
situations .7

3 Endogenous Prospect Theory

Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provide experimental evidence indicating that not
only is the utility function nonlinear in single outcomes, but that its curvature in the
o

domain o f losses may be greater than in the domain o f gains. Frydman and Goldberg
(2007) note that this implies a positive relationship between the degree o f loss aversion
and the position size, and they build on this observation to modify Tversky and
Kahneman’s (1992) utility function in a way that enables them to model limits to
speculation on the basis o f prospect theory. This alternative formulation o f the utility
function implies a representation o f prospective utilities that is linear in prospects,
allowing for aggregation, but nonlinear in the position size, providing limits to
speculation. Furthermore, in contrast to other behavioral-finance models, it does not

6

See Ellsberg (1961) and Fellner (1965).

See Chapter 9 in Frydman and Goldberg (2007) for a detailed discussion on the problems with the extant
behavioral-finance literature.

7

8

See Figure A2.
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violate any o f Kahneman and Tversky’s experimental findings on the properties o f the
utility function for single outcomes.

3.1 The Modified Utility Function

Frydman and Goldberg (2007) propose the following utility function in the
context o f the foreign exchange market:

(Wt |a(|)a |rg|

if AW > 0

V (A W )
if

where

= a +1 ,

apt

<o

(4)

A, > 1 , /^ > 0 are constant parameters, and f l {rl ) is the sum o f

potential losses from a unit position in foreign exchange weighted by the decision
weights. Recall that a negative realization o f the nominal return on a pure long position in
foreign exchange is a loss for a bull while it is a gain for a bear. Thus, the sum o f
A
potential

losses

is

given

by

ft(^ ) =

for

a

bull

and

by

A
fl(y ) =

f°r a bear. With this utility function, the degree o f loss aversion,

which is the ratio o f disutility from losses to the utility from gains o f the same magnitude,
becomes

a

=V

- A

t >F,H

-n(r)

(5)

where - f t (r 1^ serves as a scaling parameter.
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As can be seen from equation (5), in this alternative formulation o f the utility
function, the degree o f loss aversion is endogenous as it depends on the position size.
The utility function in (4) has the following characteristics:
a) Reference dependence
As with the original formulation o f prospect theory, the utility function still
depends on the change in an individual’s wealth (gain or loss) relative to some reference
point.
b) Loss aversion
It is still the case that the disutility from losses exceeds the utility from gains of
the same magnitude, that is A > 1, because A, > 1, ^ > 0 and - A ( r ' ) >

0

.

Additionally, this modified utility function also displays
c) Endogenous loss aversion
With [5 > a , the degree o f loss aversion increases with the position size for both
gains and losses for bets that involve equal value o f gains and losses on a unit position.
This is seen by

d\at \

> 0 , which states that the degree o f loss aversion increases with the

unit position size. This characteristic is consistent with the experimental evidence o f
Kahneman and Tversky indicating that the curvature o f the utility function in the domain
o f losses is greater than in the domain o f gains, i.e. f5> a ?

' See Figure A l.
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d) Endogenous sensitivity
The marginal value o f both gains and losses decreases with the position size,
except for large values o f losses, at which point the marginal value o f losses increases
with the position size. To see this, first note that payoffs o f gambles in the foreign
A

/ I I

^

exchange model differ only by the unit position size, so that dL = Wr d\at\, where L

stands for the amount o f forecasted losses from a unit position size a,, and

1

dV

dV

dL

dL Wr

- . Consequently, it follows that : 10

d 2V(&W)
{A+aB)

a (a -l)iw r2 n
, n
cc(cc + \ ) U V ta-x
— >0.
where A = -----*------pi4 - ^ — < 0 and B = -----*-----/
/.,\ \2

(6)

„

a

(-n(f'))

d 2V ( A W )
The utility function in (4) embodies diminishing sensitivity, i.e. —
<0>
dLd[-L)

for small unit position sizes

-A \
d 2V (A W )
a, < — , and increasing sensitivity, i.e. —
>0>
B
dLd{-L)

for large unit position sizes I a, >

-A '

. This characteristic is also consistent with

experimental evidence: Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 278) state that although smaller
gambles are characterized by diminishing sensitivity, for larger gambles individual
preferences may be consistent with increasing sensitivity.

10

Recall that r is the forecasted losses for a unit position on foreign exchange.
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The prospective utilities implied by the utility function in (4) are given by the
following equations for bulls and bears, respectively:

= (a,W ,T [ft(r)■-(1 - \ ) n (r‘ )] + % (a,W,f n ( f )
P U f = ( - o , » ; ) " [ n ( r ) - ( i - ^ ) n ( r - ) ] + ^ ( ai ^ ) ' n ( - f * )

(7)
(8)

3.2 Utility-Maximizing Position Size

The position size that maximizes the utility function given in (4) is found by
differentiating (7) and ( 8 ) with respect to at and setting the resulting equations equal to
0:

(9)

(10>

where a/' > 0 is the unit position size for a bull and a f <

0

is the unit position size for a

bear . 11
In order to examine the implications o f these representations for the way market
participants revise the size o f their speculative positions, and the implications o f such
revisions for the movements in the exchange rate and the equilibrium premium, the
decision weighted sums o f prospect realizations have to be related to some causal
variables. However, as was discussed earlier, decision weights depend on factors that

n(r) = i> ,|(+1,A+u; n ( r ) =

w ; n(-P+) = - S ^ , +Uv,,4.
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cannot be represented adequately with specific parametric functions o f probabilities.
Frydman and Goldberg (2007, Ch.9, Pg.24) argue that “in representing behavior,
economist should not presume that he could fully prespecify the way individuals make
and revise their decisions.” Consequently, to model preferences over gambles with
uncertain outcomes, Frydman and Goldberg replace the decision-weighted sums o f
prospective utilities with the IKE representations o f an individual’s forecasts . 12
Replacing the decision-weighted sums

n(r)

and

n ( r / ) with the IKE

representations o f an individual’s forecasts o f return and loss, rf™ and

and substituting ^

(l + Q?) ^ ^
a

, respectively,

ut]i[ty_maxjm | zjng position size can be written as : 13

( 11)

( 12)

4 Uncertainty Adjusted Uncovered Interest Parity (UAUIP)

Using endogenous prospect theory to model preferences and IKE representations
o f forecasts lead to a new equilibrium condition in the foreign change market - UAUIP.
Momentary equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is defined as the balance
between the supply o f and demand for foreign exchange. In deriving the condition for
momentary equilibrium, Frydman and Goldberg (2007) assume that:

12 A more detailed discussion on the IKE representations o f a forecast is beyond the scope o f this thesis.
The interested reader should refer to Frydman and Goldberg (2007).

13

Note that, in the discussions in Chapter 3, the IKE subscript has been omitted.
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1) Equilibrium in both the domestic and foreign money markets is determined
independently o f the spot-rate determination process and the level o f wealth. This
assumption allows one to model equilibrium in the foreign exchange market in
terms o f domestic (foreign) individuals’ decisions on how to divide their non
monetary wealth between the safe, A (B), bonds and the risky, B (A), bonds.
2) Domestic (foreign) money is held only by domestic (foreign) wealth holders. This
assumption ensures that whenever a domestic (foreign) individual changes his
holdings o f B (A) bonds, which are sold only in B (A) currency, he will buy or
sell foreign (domestic) currency.
With these assumptions, momentary equilibrium in the foreign exchange market
can be expressed as

£ ( ! ) ? ' - b ; ) = b ? - b ,= 0

(13)

i

where B f

denotes an individual’s demand for B bonds at time t , B\ denotes his

holdings o f B bonds at time t , and B f and Bt stand for the aggregate demand for and
supply o f B bonds at time t , respectively. In each period t , an individual decides how
much o f his monetary wealth he wants to hold in B bonds. If this demand is greater (less)
that the B bonds he currently holds, he will purchase (sell) foreign exchange in the
amount o f {B f

In equilibrium, the sum o f individual demands and supplies o f

foreign exchange equals zero.
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The optimal position size for the bulls and bears in country A was derived in
Section 3.2, given by equations (11) and (12). Similarly, for country-B wealth holders : 14

(14)

(15)

where (a f - 1 ) > 0 and (a f - 1 ) < 0

15

.1

Substituting the optimal position sizes for country-A and country-B wealth
holders into the momentary equilibrium condition in (13) by taking into account the
decision rule outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3, which implies that an individual will
take a long (short) position if she expects a positive excess return from holding foreign
(domestic) assets, and stay out o f the market otherwise, and assigning equal wealth shares
( 1 / 2 ) to bulls and bears, we get:

fw t'

2

k

K

.ML

J

v*/" N?
\ w , u ) wtM +z/ 2t [W'M )

wtM

(16)

wtM

where A /', A f and N° denote the number o f individuals taking long, short and no
positions in foreign exchange, respectively ; 16 /,' is an indicator variable that equals

14

1 (0 )

An individual from country B holds a long position in foreign exchange when she holds B bonds in

excess o f her total wealth,

(a' -

1

) > o , and a short position when she holds A bonds,

( a ' - 1)

<

0 .

15 The degree o f loss aversion for bulls and bears is assumed to be the same. In Chapter 11, Frydman and
Goldberg (2007) consider the house-money effect o f Thaler and Johnson (1990) where individuals become
less (more) loss averse when they incur gains (losses).
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V/’+Af

if individual i is from country A (B), WtM = ^

W/ denotes the real wealth o f all

i

individuals that take open positions at time t , and, for convenience, domestic and foreign
price levels at time t are set to equal one.
Equation (16) can be rewritten as an equality between the aggregate forecast o f
the return on foreign exchange and the market premium where the market premium
depends on the aggregate uncertainty premium, which is the UAUIP:

4+ i = P r ,\,+x

O 7)

= ^ ( 4 +i~ 4+ i)

(i8 )

where

4+ 1

P r ,\n i = W

u P ,\t+ 1

=

\ [ UP L
, \,+1

~

IF P , -

m

+ ^ IF P ,

\ 0 - ■4) (ft+i ~ 5 + i )

B ? ~ A t* l s t

(19)

(2 0 )

(2 i)

Wt

16

Note that the N° individuals that decide to stay out o f the market will set a = 0 if they are from country

A, and a = 1 if they are from country B. These individuals are included in the equation because they might
be holding A or B bonds when they enter period t.
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Figure Al: The Value Function in Prospect Theory
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APPENDIX B

C U RR EN T SURVEY PA R TIC IPA N TS IN T H E CONSENSUS FO R EC A STS
DATABASE

ABN AMRO
Allied Irish Bank
A N ZB ank
Banca Intesa
Bank o f America
Bank o f New York
Bank o f Tokyo - Mitsubishi
Bank One
BBVA
BMO Nesbitt Bums
BNP Paribas
Citigroup
Commerzbank
Credit Agricola Indosuez
Credit Suisse - First Boston
Daiwa Securities
Danske Bank
Deutsche Bank
Dresdner Bank
Dresdner Kleinwert Wasserstein
Fortis
Goldman Sachs
Grupo Santander
HSBC
HVB Group, Munich
ING Bank
JP Morgan Chase
Macquarie Bank
Mellon
Merrill Lynch
Mizuho Bank
National Australia Bank
Nordea
Rabobank
Royal Bank o f Canada
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Royal Bank o f Scotland
Scotia Bank
Societe Generale
Standard Chartered
Suntrust
Toronto Dominion
UBS Warburg
Wachovia
West LB Dusseldorf
Westpac
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APPENDIX C

THE ADL MODEL WITH TWO AND THREE LAGS

1 ADL o f Order Two

The ADL model o f order two is given by:

p r ,= b Q+bn pr

+ bu pr,_2 + b20gap, + b2Xgap,_x+ b22gap,_2 +s,

(1)

Equation (1) can also be written in an error-correction form, which is achieved by
subtracting pr,_x from both sides, and adding the following term to the right side and
[(6 U - 1 )pr,_2 ~(bxx - 1 )pr,_2] + [b20gap,_x- b 2<xgap,_^\ +

rearranging:
[(^ 2 1

+ b20) gap,. 2 - ( ^ 2 1 + b20) gap ,.2 ] :

A pr, = a 0 + a xApr,_x+ a 20Agap, + a lxAgap,_x+ a 2ECT,_2 + e,

(2)

where the error correction term (ECT) is given by:

ECT,_ 2 = p xgap,_2 + p 0- pr,_2

and

oc0 = bQ—(l —bxx —bX2]P0,

a , = ( i - b u - b l2), A =
1

bxx bx2

ccx ={blx —l ) ,

(3)

cc20—b20,

a 2X ={b2Q+ &21) ’

•
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Here, in addition to the two steps outlined in the text, we need to solve for the
static solution to capture the total effect o f the gap on the premium : 1
Ap r, = y0 + yxAgap, + r 2ECT,_2 + s,

,

o

OC

^20

^ 2 1

J

(4) 2

^3

where y 0 = — — , yl = —^ ----- — and y2 =— — .
1- ax
1- a x
l-ax
In the context o f an ADL o f order two, the premium model predicts that yx > 0
and Px > 0.

2 ADL o f Order Three

The ADL model o f order three is derived similarly to an ADL (2). The ADL (3) is
given by:

pr, =b0 +bxxp r ,_x + bX2pr,_2 + bX3pr,_3 + b20gap, + b2l gap,_x + b22gap,_2 + b23gap,_2 + s,
(5)
Similarly, equation (5) can be written in an error-correction form as follows:

Apr, = a 0 + a xxApr,_x + a x2Apr,_2 + a 20A g a p ,+ a 2XAgap,_x+ a 22Agap,_2 + a 3ECT,_:i+£,
(6)
where the error correction term (ECT) is given by:

ECT,_2 = Pxgap,_2 +P0 - p r ,_3

(7)

1 Obtained by setting A p r t = A p r , , and A gap, = A gap,_,.
2 Note that in this case the y { and y 2 here correspond to the a, and a 2 in the text.
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and

&o ~ b 0 —(l —bxl—bu —bl3) flQ,

a n —(bn

a 2\ ~ {b20+b2]sj , a 22—^b20+b2l+b22^, (x3 —(l

bu

ccn —(bn +bu

l),

bn

l) ,

oc20

b20,

b2Q+ b2l + b22 + b23

bx3),

'b\\ ~ bu —bu

Solving for the static solution we get:
A p r, = / 0 + Y\Agapt + Y2ECTt_3 + e,

OCtj

^20

^21

^22

A

(8 )

^3

, yx = -f* ------ ----- - and y 2 =---------*-------.

where r 0 = ---------

1 — Q f l j — 0^12

1 — Q f j j — Ofj2

1

OCj j

CTj2

Similarly, in the context o f an ADL o f order three, the premium model predicts
that yx > 0 and /?, >

0

.
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